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The main objective of this research is to 
investigate the policymaking apparatus of u.s. foreign 
policy in its response to famine and hunger disasters. Of 
crucial importance is the extent that an immediate and 
effective response to the victims of these disasters is 
held captive to their race, form of government, or 
importance to the u.s. view of geopolitics. An effective 
response is considered in this study to be one which 
addresses the causes of famine and hunger in a society 
(armed conflict, debt). 
The administration of Ronald Reagan and its 
response to the African famines of the 1980s can be 




foreign policy as has been practiced since the dismantling 
of colonialism. 
Ronald Reagan essentially inherited a development 
structure that was an extension of U.S. economic and 
political aims. There is a tenuous relationship between 
U.S. development and emergency relief and humanitarian 
aspirations. 
The President chose to decline attempts to assist 
African nations under duress by famine, whether such 
nations were socialist or non-socialist. The threat to 
eliminate funding from crucial international agencies 
which combat famine also pointed to an administration that 
was insensitive to appeals to equate the life of an 
African with that of an American or a European. The 
significance of this study is its focus on discerning the 
structure and decision-making process involved in famine 
response and hunger prevention. It is also significant as 
it is one of the early studies to examine the u.s. 
response to famine in the 1980s. 
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From 1960 through 1968, Africa had five nations 
with recorded famine conditions (Morocco, Algeria, The 
Congo, Nigeria, and Mauritania).! Since 1968, thirty-
three African nations have been faced with famine (see 
Table 1). By October 1985, the United Nations Office for 
Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) had designated 
eleven countries as being 'most severely affected.'2 
These nations consist of more than 122.1 million people, 
of which, 29.4 are affected by famine (see Table 2). It 
was also estimated by the OEOA that 4.7 million refugees 
were created by famine-related conditions. In Botswana, 
Niger, and Mauritania, approximately half of the 
inhabitants were affected by famine (see Table 2). 
The OEOA list of most severely affected nations 
was the basis upon which the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) identified Africa's most food-deficient 
nations. Those nations identified were: Chad, Ethiopia, 
Mali, Niger, Mozambique and Sudan.3 The FAO estimated 
that 24.3 million of the 98.4 million people living in 
these countries, were affected by food shortages.4 The 
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SOURCES: Bill Rau, Feast to Famine (Washington, 
D.C.: Africa Faith and Justice Network, 1985), pp. 53-62. 
"Scope of World Hunger," Seattle Times/Seattle Post 
Examiner (17. March 1985), p. B12. 
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those people affected by famine. 
Malnutrition and hunger have become more 
commonplace throughout the continent. In 1985, only Libya 
and the white populations of South Africa exceeded the 
average estimated daily calories that are necessary to 
sustain life.S As a consensus between the donors and 
recipients of famine assistance does not yet exist on the 
nature of famine, the likelihood of effective programmatic 
response remains in doubt. 
Though the U.S. is one of the most dominant 
participants in foreign assistance programs, the question 
of causes and effective remedies is vitally important if 
the growing number of deaths attributed to hunger-related 
causes can be reduced. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the development and implementation of U.S. foreign 
policies and programs, under the Reagan administration, as 
they affected famine-stricken African countries from 1981 
to 1986. 
Statement of Problem 
The most recent surge in awareness of famine 
problems across the African continent was initiated by the 
government of Ethiopia in 1983. The Ethiopian government 
petitioned the international donor community for 
assistance to its famine conditions.6 Despite the request 
of the Ethiopian government, the response by the inter-
national community was slow. The U.S. failed, in 
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particular, to provide any substantive assistance until 
early 1986. As Ethiopia was only one of many African 
countries which suffered famine conditions from the early 
1980's, the hesitation by the u.s. to respond to such 
requests raise concerns about the purpose and 
effectiveness of not only u.s. foreign aid but also u.s. 
foreign policy. This research seeks to address these 
general concerns. The objectives of this study are: 
1. To demonstrate that the pervasive character 
of hunger and famine in Africa is strongly 
influenced by foreign political and economic 
determinations; in short, factors that are 
controllable by people and governments. 
2. To demonstrate that the structure of u.s. 
foreign policy prohibits effective, substantive 
action on the causes of famine, to the extent 
that addressing such causes interferes with the 
goals and objectives of u.s. economic and 
geopolitical policies. 
3. To demonstrate the extent that Reagan adminis-
tration policies, programs and practices, are 
applied to the causes of famine and hunger in 
Africa. 
As famine was once viewed as an anomaly limited to 
a specific region, it must now be investigated in a 
broader context. On a widely diverse continent of 
6 
nations, with a variety of climates and soils, hunger and 
famine are seemingly fixed realities. It is imperative to 
identify the broader context out of which hunger and 
famine can be understood; in short, those factors which 
are common and prevalent to the affected nations. 
One framework for the study of famine, the Radical 
Approach, incorporates a wide variety of disciplines of 
both the natural and social sciences, specifically, the 
affects of the colonial economic order and its post-
colonial economic relationships.? This approach suggests 
that political and economic factors (not just environ-
mental constraints) are contributors to such privation. 
Nations confronted with massive food deficiencies are also 
frequently affected by: war, (Angola, Mozambique, Chad, 
Ethiopia); extremely low per-capita incomes (Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Somalia); and a sacrificial attempt to satisfy 
foreign debts, often with injury to those most vulnerable 
to food shortage emergencies (almost anywhere on the 
continent). 
Though famine may be created by acts of nature, 
social relationships contribute significantly to the 
formation of conditions that lead to famine and frequently 
serve to obstruct efforts to either prevent, or reduce, 
levels of starvation. A major factor in the formation of 
social relations in Africa has been the advent of 
underdevelopment activities, as introduced by western 
1 
European nations and the u.s. 
Underdevelopment occurs when a country 
increasingly becomes integrated as a dependency into the 
world markets through patterns of trade andjor invest-
ment.& This integration has been inspired by the 
dismantling of existing development and trade activities, 
which have been reformulated to promote the development 
activities of the technically and economically advanced 
countries.9 Underdevelopment is a recognition of the 
extent that the development of Europe and North America 
has been tied to the political and economic control of 
foreign countries. The period of colonial domination and 
the transition to neocolonial formations have solidified 
the strength of foreign investment and trade activities 
that are inconsistent with indigenous assessments of 
development needs. 
As Chapter II indicates, prior to European· 
colonial efforts, African nations were most able in 
providing for the essential food needs of its people. The 
usurpation of political power from Africans by Europeans 
(and subsequently, the denial of African priorities in the 
rule of African people) , the depopulation of the African 
continent during slavery and the diversion of the labor 
activities from products to be destined for domestic 
consumption to products for foreign consumption (without 
just compensation) all combined to reverse the development 
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process for African nations and people.lO Underdevelop-
ment is fundamentally the diminution and control of people 
and not solely the control of economic systems and 
political structures. 
Samir Amin stresses that there is a structural 
difference in the design of development employed by the 
formerly colonized nations (Africa, Asia, Latin America) 
and that of the technically and economically advanced 
nations (Europe and North America) in the nature of their 
economic development.ll These factors include: 
1. production is designed for export marketsr 
2. concentration of productive activities among a 
limited portion of the national economy (e.g.-
mono-crop production)r 
3. production is confined to the harvesting/ 
excavation of raw materialsr 
4. raw material export prices are controlled by 
importing, developed economiesr and 
5. restructuring of the human (training, 
education) and financial (direct investment, 
infrastructure) resources of underdeveloped 
economies to satisfy developed markets leads 
to similar transferals of profits (and 
benefits) to developed economies.l2 
Claude Barnes succinctly concludes that: n ••• the origin of 
underdevelopment in Africa as located in the way Africa 
was integrated into the world Capitalist economy through 
violent conquest and the violent construction of 
capitalist relations of production.nl3 
An important aim of the neocolonial efforts 
pursued by western nations has been to maintain their 
economic and political advantages, vis-a-vis Africa, that 
were challenged by Africa's independence movements of the 
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post World War-II period and with their subsequent 
experimentation with socialism.l4 The extent that the 
U.S. responds to Africa's famine is dependent upon the 
degree that such solutions are consonant with overall U.S. 
foreign policy objectives in the region. 
How the issues of famine are conceptualized and 
defined by the analysts of the Reagan administration, 
ultimately, develops into policy. Given that the u.s. is 
a dominant actor in the dispensation of foreign food 
assistance, how the problem of hunger is analyzed by 
governmental decision-makers will direct the nature of 
their response to famine and hunger. 
As the Reagan administration was not simply the 
election of a man but the ascent of conservative political 
thought, the principle ideology of this administration is 
deserving of examination, in the context of its 
application to foreign food assistance. At the height of 
the African famine, attempts by people to understand its 
causes lead to a now familiar litany of thought revealing 
a certain intellectual bias, based upon notions of 
Calvinist, Darwinian and Malthusian logic. Those who 
share a Calvinist approach view Africa's problems as the 
result of its own poor work habits; the failure to work 
hard for a given goal. The disciples of Darwinian thought 
assert that those affected are ill-equipped to meet the 
challenge of the responsibilities that are implied with 
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self-rule.l5 Of those who echo the view of Malthus, the 
issue of hunger is one of a people's hyperactive sexual 
activity, leading to an all too rapid increase of the 
population, straining available food supplies.l6 
It is the Malthusian approach to analyzing the 
causes of hunger and famine (and its suggested remedies) 
which have had the greatest influence among Conservative 
thinkers. Public policy has been greatly impacted by this 
approach, emphasizing such remedies as population control 
to respond to hunger. The notion of triage (also known as 
the 'lifeboat ethic') also found an audience in the 1970s 
among some analysts.l7 Such ethics would be employed onto 
the growing masses of the non-white world, where hunger 
was becoming a fixed reality amongst its citizens. Only a 
few would be saved it was theorized, due to the limited 
supplies of food, as food donor nations would withhold 
food supplies in the event that population levels would 
exceed the ability of the donor nation to respond 
effectively.lB Former World Bank president, Robert 
McNamara, is reported to have compared the annual cost of 
caring for a child ($600) to the cost of child prevention 
($6).19 It is apparent that cost-benefit analysis had 
converged with population ethics. 
The unfortunate analysis provided which created 
a Darwinian •survival of the fittest' mentality made no 
distinction between the depression of population growth 
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(as occurred under slavery) ; population density (which is 
quite low in Africa); nor the extent that a nation's 
material wealth is distributed throughout a society. A 
policy response to the above logic is one that would 
curtail, if not eliminate, food assistance programs. 
The perception is that such people cannot usefully 
absorb support as provided by the donor nations, nor would 
they be able to develop their own support mechanisms 
beyond the crisis stage. There are also those who support 
an approach that owes more to cost-benefit analysis than 
to humanitarian concern. What again emerges from the 
shadow of Malthus is a tenet of thought that food 
resources are finite. In this mindset, to provide food to 
those emaciated by hunger would be to waste precious 
resources on people who may perhaps never recover from the 
maladies and dysfunctions created by starvation. 
For many others, the world of global politics 
(east vs. west) is the plausible basis for understanding 
how African hunger originated. To this group, it is felt 
that starvation is the result of efforts to restrain 
western concepts of 'free enterprise.'20 The remedy is 
perceived as the creation of more capitalism. Aid that 
would be dispensed would be provided to further develop 
capitalist economies. Little consideration is given to 
capitalism as a contributor to the creation of hunger 
throughout Africa. The fact that the non-socialist 
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economies of Africa have also been unable to retard hunger 
and famine seems to have been excluded from the analysis 
of those who subscribe to the global security (east vs. 
west) model of the conservatives. 
These and other conservative theories combine to 
lay the premise for a kind of directed giving. These 
offerings have at its core the national interest, a 
euphemism which has come to describe U.S. domination, or 
the support of a status quo, that is loyal to the 
preservation of an existing set of political and economic 
relationships favorable to the u.s. Out of this framework 
emerges the perception that the national interest may not 
be served by feeding those who starve. Once this 
theoretical construction is developed, insensitivity can 
be made acceptable. It has thus become possible to more 
easily seek to reduce or restrict the form of foreign 
assistance. What is often absent from many of the analyses 
of the political impact of food assistance upon the u.s. 
national interest is an appreciation of the very purpose 
for what created the need for inquiry: the survival of 
those in need. 
Hypothesis 
The capacity of the u.s. government to respond 
effectively to the causes and impact of famine and hunger 
in Africa is limited by u.s. geopolitical, economic and 
domestic policy interests and concerns. The following 
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questions will assist in responding to this problem: 
1. What are the causes of African famine? 
2. What is the nature and purpose of emergency 
foreign food and development assistance, in the 
context of u.s. foreign policy? 
3. What major bilateral and multilateral programs 
exist that the u.s. can influence foreign food 
and development production activity? 
4. At what point do political considerations 
supersede humanitarian considerations as the 
basis for providing food and development 
assistance? 
5. When is addressing the causes of famine and 
hunger considered incompatible with u.s. 
foreign policy goals and objectives. 
6. To what extent has the ascendancy of the 
Reagan administration subverted, or acted 
accordance with, u.s. emergency and development 
assistance policies? 
7. To what extent is there a u.s. emergency 
food assistance policy? 
Literature Review 
An awareness of the variety, impact, implications 
and assumptions in defining the causes of famine and 
hunger becomes imperative if remedies are to be either 
understood or developed. Many of the causes of famine and 
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hunger can be identified as part of one or more of the 
following categories: 
1. Famine and hunger are an outgrowth of 
environmental conditions, of which little can 
be done to limit their advance. This group 
may be identified as environmental 
determinists. 
2. Famine and hunger are the products of the 
foreign and/or domestic political and economic 
decisions of governments, corporations and 
financial institutions whose policies and 
programs of operations limit the potential for 
the production and distribution of food in a 
nation that is characterized by inadequate 
supplies of food. 
3. Famine and hunger are thought to be the 
inability of a nation to produce food at the 
rate that population increases. 
The categories represented above have incorporated 
some aspect of supply and demand thinking. In one and 
two, the problem is perceived as some form of disruption 
in the supply chain. In the third category, the demand 
side of the equation is viewed as having become too 
expansive. In the case of the latter, the proper soluti0n 
would be to decrease the number of those who either are, 
or who would potentially be, in need. The position is 
15 
advanced to limit the number of children born in 
underdeveloped nations (i.e.-poor people), then it is 
reasoned that the economy of a nation would be better able 
to provide the necessary goods and services required for 
an enhanced quality of life, if not survival itself. 
Of the first two perspectives, although the 
curtailment of the supply side of the equation is 
generally perceived at issue, there is a departure among 
such authors on the nature of limited food supplies. The 
first category alludes to a problem in which its causes 
(drought, topography, soil composition) and solutions are 
beyond the capacities of human design. The second 
category asserts that people, whether through their 
policies, programs and institutions, do indeed contribute 
to the creation (and possibly the remedy) and the crisis 
that hunger and famine present. 
As the nature of famine and hunger in Africa may 
indeed have a number of substantive causes, the approach 
taken by those nations which purport to assist the 
famine-stricken African countries may either help, 
exacerbate, or produce an effort which does little more 
than preserve the status quo. Josue de Castro, 
Geopolitics of Hunger, was one of the earlier writers to 
link the preponderance of hunger as a consequence of 
global economic and political relations. De Castro offers 
insights to the extent that foreign domination, from 
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Imperial Rome through the era of European colonialism, has 
reduced the capacity of African countries to produce and 
distribute food goods. The often used argument that the 
climate of Africa inhibits food production is cast aside 
as de Castro provided comparisons to European countries 
with similar climates but more favorable agricultural 
responses. 
The thesis that geopolitical activity has a 
substantive impact on a nation's capacity to produce and 
distribute food was given further specificity by Michael 
Lofchie. The author expressed the view that writers from 
a variety of ideological constraints tended to analyze the 
spread of famine as having originated from environmental 
conditions (i.e.- drought). The focus centered on the 
impact of famine and on speculation with respect to who 
profits (i.e.-capitalism). Lofchie attempts to extend the 
analysis of famine beyond environmental concerns to focus 
on its political and economic origins. 
Claude Meissaloux: "Is the Sahel Famine Good 
Business," assesses the relationship of famine and social 
relations particularly between capitalist and under-
developed economies. Meissaloux asserts that the 
dominance of western capitalism has not only contributed 
to the deterioration of the Sahel environment, but also 
provides the opportunity for an even greater exploitation 
of rural underdeveloped areas, to satisfy the import needs 
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of western capitalist countries. 
In the Political Economy of Food, the editor, 
Vilhos Harle, sought to establish food as yet another 
commodity sector, sensitive to the economic and political 
relations of global national and corporate interests. 
Food is embraced as a commodity, driven by the same market 
forces and relationships as any other commodity. Harle 
stresses the unequal distribution of power and wealth as 
the primary factors in the creation of hunger, both of 
which are lacking in the rural poor of underdeveloped 
countries. 
Susan George, How the Other Half Dies, asserts 
that hunger and famine are a consequence of the concen-
tration of political and economic power among industri-
alized countries and the propertied elites of under-
developed nations. George sees the solutions offered by 
the industrialized nations to the problems of food 
deficiencie~, as perpetuating the productive relation-
ships and priorities which have led to hunger. For 
George, this is most apparent in the bilateral and 
multilateral aid programs from the western nations to 
those nations that are underdeveloped. The solutions to 
hunger and starvation, as viewed by George, do not require 
technological repair but the reordering of systemic 
imbalances that devastate the economic and politically 
powerless. 
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In a case study of the Sahel famine (Seeds of 
Famine), Richard Franke and Barbara Chasin connect the 
ecological and human devastation done to the Sahel region 
during the 1968-74 famine to the changing social 
relationships propelled by colonialism and exacerbated by 
the post-World War II primacy of international capitalism. 
From their perspective, the famine was not a sudden 
depression in the fortunes of a specific region, but the 
evidence of an ongoing deterioration of the region 
socially, economically and politically. Anders Wijkman 
and Lloyd Timberlake: "Is the Drought an Act of God or of 
Man?" view the increase of famine as linked to the 
expansion of economic development approaches which 
undermine traditional methods of responding to the 
environment which prevent the spread of starvation. 
Those analysts who subscribe to populations as 
solely consumers and not as producers of food and other 
basic needs offer an analysis which predicts disaster 
while offering little to forestall the eventuality except 
for the limitation of the population. Lester Brown, ~ 
Bread Alone, consistently views the world food problem as 
the result of mounting population increases and the 
satiated dietary habits of the people of the industri-
alized world. Brown views people as the direct causes of 
hunger and famine, bypassing their political and economic 
institutions and their productive relationships. People 
19 
are thus not the contributors to the solutions of their 
problems. Technological inputs are viewed as the proper 
responses (e.g.-Green Revolution) though the relationships 
of production and accumulation of wealth do not alter the 
distribution of wealth and goods to the poor in a society. 
In Limits to Growth, Donella Meadows et al. cast a 
view towards hunger as a consequence of inadequate food 
production levels. By comparing population growth to past 
food production growth, estimates are drawn which forecast 
the likelihood of starvation on more massive scales in 
coming years. The efficacy of the distribution of food, 
economic resources and modes of production were not 
discussed. 
In Famine 1975: America's Decision, Who Will 
Survive?, William and Paul Praddock offered the rationale 
of a Darwinian-tinged self-preservation. With the 
increases in population, the Paddocks established that 
certain nations would have to be sacrificed if the 
food-exporting nations are themselves able to survive. 
Once again, people are viewed as problems, rather than as 
solutions to their predicament. Specifically, people who 
are the brunt of production efforts which diminish their 
pertinence and contributions to society are denied the 
tools that are necessary to effect solutions to their 
dependent condition7 beyond utility and potential. 
Sudhir Sen, "Bow to Combat World Famine,• 
-~ -- ---------------------------------------, 
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identifies hunger and famine as concerns in need of 
technical solutions. The answer for Sen to food 
production problems are to be found in the so-called 
"Green Revolution" technology of genetically-altered 
production inputs. Again, production is seen as the basic 
problem. Although the dislocation of rural people that 
these techniques create are acknowledged, it is regarded 
only as a management problem which must be attended to. 
Renee Dumont and Bernard Rosier in The Hungry 
Future, promote a more effective and efficient use of 
existing resources and the dismantling of institutions 
which impede the modernization of underdeveloped economies 
and productive relations, to encourage food production. 
Dumont and Rosier do not acknowledge people as vital 
participants in production, but as relics of a by-gone 
mode of production which must be overcome if their primary 
needs (e.g.-food) are to be met. People of underdeveloped 
societies are viewed as mainly irrelevant to their own 
development. 
An absence in the literature are is a focus on the 
full parameters of u.s. foreign food and development 
assistance, how such assistance has been formed and how 
assistance is shaped by historical and contemporary 
events. u.s. foreign food and development assistance is 
often discussed, but primarily in the context of 
multinational agribusinesses and u.s. influence, with 
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regard to such international organizations as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/World Bank). 
Specific concerns of u.s. policy are collapsed into 
general discussions of capitalism versus underdeveloped 
nations. U.S. emergency foreign food and development 
assistance is analyzed without the specifics of the 
process which creates U.S. actions in the international 
arena. 
Frances Moore Lappe: Food First, provides 
important analysis of global hunger concerns, and the 
importance of the U.S. role in the distribution of harmful 
foreign assistance. In her body of works, however, there 
is no attempt to provide the reader with the specifics of 
how such policies are created. The formation of policy 
yields important insight to the positions and 
constituencies which ultimately produce the basis for 
governmental action. Without an awareness of how such 
policies are created, there is an inability to devise 
effective strategies which may prevent the formation of 
such policies. 
Significance of Study 
The significance of this study is based on three 
factors. First, this will provide an analysis of the 
effectiveness of the Reagan administration to identify and 
respond to, the nature and effect of the African famine 
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crisis. Throughout the period of pervasive African 
famine, representatives for the Reagan administration 
consistently related that the u.s. government was 
providing an immediate and effective response.21 
Second, the study contributes to the still 
emerging body of works on African famine. Much of what 
exists on famine in Africa focuses on: the nature of 
famine; the establishment of the those material factors 
which contribute to these disasters; and how such 
disasters may be avoided. Much has been recorded of the 
famine of the 1970s and the response (and mistakes) made 
during that period. Although an important body of work 
has also been written of the impact of capitalism and its 
surrogates (e.g.-multinational corporations) in the 
creation of famine, there appears to be an absence of 
works on the impact of public policy decisions, and how 
these decisions are derived and implemented, with respect 
to their impact on famine and hunger. 
The attempt to fill this void will begin with a 
study of how the u.s. has historically defined the causes 
of famine and hunger in Africa, thus, giving an indication 
of how it proposes to resolve these problems. The extent 
that such policies and programs are advanced against 
factors which are major contributors to famine and hunger 
will be unique in this area of examination. It also is 
important to note that at this writing, a comprehensive 
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review of the Reagan role has not been published. 
Third, this study will contribute to the body of 
work which seeks to identify the extent that u.s. foreign 
policy contains effective mechanisms for humanitarian 
support and relief efforts, regardless of a nation's 
ideology or racial composition. This will be done by 
examining the context for defining humanitarian assistance 
and the extent such parameters limit perceptions of need. 
Attempts will be made to suggest approaches that would 
define need without political/ideological considerations. 
By addressing u.s. public policy concerns and 
their influence on famine and hunger, this study should 
add to a more comprehensive understanding of how such 
disaster situations are created and how u.s. public policy 
(should it be directed to do so) can provide more 
effective solutions. As public policy will be examined, a 
greater awareness of the prevailing institutional 
processes and analyses on the famine and hunger issues 
should bring greater clarity to the reasons why u.s. 
foreign policy responds as it does to such critical 
concerns. 
Methodology 
The setting for this study will be the period of 
famine activity in Africa from 1981 to 1986 and the 
application of the u.s. foreign policy apparatus to those 
conditions. This period is significant for three reasons: 
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(1) the increase in the number of African 
nations which made formal requests from the 
international donor community for emergency 
and long-term development assistance; 
(2) the installation of the Reagan admin-
istration which heralded the hegemony of 
conservative political philosophy; and 
(3) by 1986, the nature of the response by the 
u.s., and the remainder of the international 
donor community, to the famine crisis in 
Africa had been established. This provided 
opportunities to analyze the extent of coop-
eration between donor and recipient nations 
in resolving Africa's crisis. 
The framework which will be employed will be the 
radical approach to the study of famine. The radical 
approach can be characterized as having four main 
components. One, this framework has a historical 
component which recognizes that the process of under-
development has had a deleterious affect upon the ability 
of nations to affect societies that are capable of 
providing for the essential needs of its people. TWo, it 
asserts that present governmental and organizational 
structures (e.g.-World Bank, IMF) are biased against 
funding the poor with the means to define and create their 
own development options but support the maintenance of 
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economic inequalities. Three, hunger and famine are seen 
as conditions which are created by poverty and an 
inability to control the use of land and its resources for 
the primary benefit of indigenous landless and low-income 
populations. Four, hunger and famine are also viewed as 
tools to destabilize governments and opposition forces, 
thus, maintaining the status quo of power relationships. 
The fact that hunger and famine are seen as being rooted 
in the human condition allows for the potential of human 
decision-making to provide remedies. 
Policy analysis will be employed as the method 
used to investigate the development of U.S. foreign policy 
in the creation of bilateral and multilateral programs 
which impact on the capacity of nations to produce and 
distribute food crops effectively. By seeking to 
understand the development of U.S. foreign assistance, its 
purpose and objectives, then the context for understanding 
the course of action taken by the u.s. government during 
the African famine crisis of the 1980's may be more 
clearly understood. 
Much of the data which will be collected will be 
gained from existing source materials. The major source 
for the statistical data to be used concerning the 
dimensions of the African famines will be obtained from 
two United Nations agencies: the FAO and the OEOA. 
Information pertaining to the major causes of famine and 
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hunger will be gained from journals (Review of African 
Political Economy, Africa Report, Foreign Policy) and 
books (Seeds of Famine, Agribusiness in Africa, How Europe 
Underdeveloped Africa, The Lagos Plan of Action vs. the 
Berg Report). 
Information on the nature and extent of u.s. 
bilateral and multilateral food and development assistance 
can be collected from USAID Congressional Report, OEOA, 
the u.s. (federal) Budget, annual reports (World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, u.s. Agency for 
International Development Congressional Presentation) ; 
newspapers (Washington Post, New York Times); interviews; 
conference reports and other official documents. 
The nature of famine will first be established. 
This requires a synthesis of analytic accounts on the 
political, economic, social and environmental origins of 
famine. From this analysis, efforts towards identifying 
specific factors in the creation of famine will be sought. 
This will be accomplished by surveying analytic and 
descriptive accounts on the factors which contribute to 
the formation of famines, in addition to pertinent 
demographic and economic data. 
An analysis of the structure of u.s. foreign 
policy and programs will follow; specifying the nature, 
substance and application of U.S. bilateral and 
multilateral responses to African famine emergency and 
----- --
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development need. Policies and programs that address the 
causes of famine will be identified. Policies and programs 
which avoid attacking the substantive causes of famine 
will be criticized and discarded. The limitations of U.S. 
policy and programs apparatus will be discussed. This 
will be followed by an analysis of u.s. policy and 
programmatic response to the African famine under the 
Reagan administration. u.s. responsiveness to the famine 
crisis will be identified and criticized with respect to 
its application towards alleviating famine conditions by 
addressing its causes. Policies and programs engaged 
during this period which support these aims will be 
identified and analyzed. The extent that opportunities 
were presented to respond to famine causes, but were 
avoided, will be identified and criticized. 
Hunger will be viewed as not just individual 
suffering but as a shared devastation, prevalent among 
people of lower income groups, who are unable to afford, 
or gain access to food. In a more clinical context, this 
paper will be concerned with hunger as it relates to 
chronic undernutrition (the inability of the body to 
obtain and consume enough calories and proteins for 
survival). 
Famine is an extreme and protracted shortage of 
food resulting in widespread and persistent hunger, 
evidenced by loss of body weight and emaciation and 
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increase in the death rate caused by either starvation or 
disease resulting from the weakened condition of the 
population. 
Foreign food aid will be examined in the context 
of Titles 1, 2 and 3 of PL 480, euphemistically known as 
"Food for Peace" program. This legislation has been the 
primary conduit for foreign food assistance by the u.s. 
government since 1954. 
Arable land is soil that is either cultivated, or 
in the process of being cultivated. 
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CHAPTER II 
AFRICA FAMINE AND HUNGER: IN SEARCH OF CAUSES 
To explore the question of what creates famine in 
Africa is to ask the question: what has prohibited people 
from consuminq food substances in sufficient, nutritional 
quantities, enough to insure survival? The framework 
necessary to respond to this question can be divided into 
two seqments: (1) production; and (2) distribution. 
People starve from either the absence of food, or the 
absence of available means to obtain food. In the former, 
sufficient quantities of food do not exist to feed people. 
In the latter, sufficient quantities of food exist, but 
access is constrained by either economic, political or 
transport inadequacies. The concern of this chapter 
centers upon the extent that specific identifiable 
factors, individually or collectively, impinqe upon the 
ability of a nation to either produce andjor distribute 
food to all its people. 
It would be difficult to factor all of the myriad 
of problems associated with either the production or the 
distribution of food within Africa and then to establish 
the extent they contribute to the creation of famine. 
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Famine is simultaneously a symptom and a condition. As a 
condition, it is the exponential occurrence of hunger and 
starvation across a somewhat wide geographic area. Famine 
is also a symptom of a nation's inability to either 
prevent or forestall such a condition by establishing 
priorities and assuming measures that could ameliorate the 
potential for crisis. When there is an ensuing crisis, 
and there is an evident need for foreign assistance, the 
failure of a government to provide for its people is 
apparent. The deficiencies of a government may be 
identified in the following categorizations: 
1. the creation of food surpluses, at levels 
sufficient that would offset years of 
limited growth1 
2. the means for the creation of adequate 
personal income at levels sufficient 
for the consumption of basic food goods1 
3. adequate transportation systems to deliver 
food products to areas of extreme need and to 
facilitate the movement of food to market1 
4. to offset low food production and/or inadequate 
distribution by importing necessary food 
products and technology. 
Famine is thus perceived as not a sudden collapse 
of the food production and distribution chain, but the 
ultimate expression of the steady erosion of food 
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production and support relations. Although famine has 
been packaged in the world media and by a host of authors 
as a condition of place, of geography and of land, the 
perception of hunger and famine as the result of people, 
governments and economics has only recently gained wide 
acceptance. 
When famine is brought to our attention, we are 
presented with the image of a people who are unified in 
their ability to absorb suffering. By not focusing upon 
the human elements of famine, we are denied an opportunity 
to explore an area of investigation through which programs 
and policies can impact upon the creation of famine. To 
this end, the discussion on what are the major causes of 
famine in Africa will be explored in the following: (1) 
Social Systems and Structures; (2) Debt and Trade; (3) 
Militarization and Armed Conflict; and (4) Environment. 
i. Social Systems and Structures 
Social systems and their accompanying govern-
ments are indications of how a people are organized, with 
the professed objective of providing for a minimum of 
common needs and services. It is the state which defines 
the economic and political parameters from which the 
distribution of its resources, to promote the development 
of. specific sectors of its economy, can be approached. As 
with most productive sectors of any economy, the question 
of who owns and defines the use of land and labor, as well 
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as, the ability to obtain finance capital are imperatives 
for enhancinq production in the food sectors of a nation's 
economy. Decisions by the state are crucial in the 
formation of these sectors. 
Throuqhout the African continent, the omni-
presence of economies whose successes are peqqed upon the 
development of a sinqle sector (almost exclusively mininq 
or cash-croppinq) are not coincidental. What is the 
impact of development strateqies which rely upon the 
importation of food products, at the expense of domestic 
food qrowers? What are the implications to the African 
economies and their development qoals when there exists 
such hiqh levels of indebtedness to western banks? The 
factors which combine to create such priorities and the 
extent those priorities are, or are not satisfied, are 
often the offsprinq of political and economic forces, both 
domestic and foreiqn to a nation. 
In Africa, the issue to be raised is often one of 
who articulates the interests of the qreater body of a 
nation's population? Is there a harmony between the needs 
of the population and the activity of their qovernment? 
If there is some qreat deqree of compatibility between a 
nation's people and its rulinq institutions, whose 
interests are beinq served by this consensus of qovernment 
and its citizens? Who defines a nation's needs? To the 
extent that the rulinq body of a nation is the expression 
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of its people, then to what extent are the interests, 
needs and services satisfied by this structure of 
governance? 
The history of colonial activity in Africa is 
relevant in 'independent' Africa, as is the question of 
the legitimacy of African governmental structures and 
rule. The history of African contact with western 
nations, the impact on social systems and structures 
indigenous to Africans, and the extent such contact has 
impacted upon the production and distribution of food is 
itself a history of Africa's loss of power over its daily 
activities and common needs. 
Although African contact with Europe and North 
America has had a destabilizing impact upon the nations of 
Africa since the time of the Caesars, it was the coming of 
Europe as a colonizing power that altered the government, 
economic and cultural substance of an entire continent. 
At the onset of European penetration into Africa, the 
continent was far from being a collection of starving 
lands, as is currently depicted. One observer, Leo 
Africanus, writing from Timbuktu (in about 1500 A.D.) 
wro~: 
Here are many wels [sic] containing most sweete 
[sic] water, and so often as the river Niger 
overfloweth they conveigh the water thereof by 
certain sluces into the town. Corne, cattle milke 
[sic] and but~er this town yeeldeth in great 
abundance ••• 2 
As this is the same Timbuktu of Mali which now 
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occupies the list of those nations most severely affected 
by famine, it may be an understatement to note that things 
have changed. It is particularly noteworthy that Mali is 
now known more for its desert than it is known for its 
capacity to grow corn. 
At the time of European penetration, African 
nations had developed strong intracontinental trade 
relations and thriving nation-states (e.g.-Songhay, Ghana, 
Egypt). With the encroaching activity of European slavery 
and colonization efforts, these nations and their 
relationships began to be change. 
The onset of European slavery and colonization 
entangled Africa to the international community in a 
manner that it had not been previously. The nature and 
extent of African connections with Europe have been 
summarized by Walter Rodney: 
The concept of metropole and dependency 
automatically came into existence when parts of 
Africa were caught in the web of international 
commerce. On the other hand, there were the 
European countries who decided on the role to be 
played by the African economy; and on the other 
hand, Africa formed an extension to the European 
capitalist market. As far as foreign trade was 
concerned, Africa was dependent on what Europeans 
were prepared to buy and sell.23 
First Portugal, followed by many of the other 
nations of Europe, sought to exploit Africa for its human 
(labor) and natural (agricultural and mineral) 
resources.24 The mines of Brazil and the agricultural 
promise of the American south and the caribbean provided a 
37 
solid market for African slaves.25 African labor was also 
very important for the establishment of plantations in 
Africa itself, as cotton, cocoa, and many other non-edible 
agricultural and mineral products were exported to Europe, 
where it was refined and resold to the African market.26 
These crops, along with the mineral extraction industries 
(e.g.-gold, diamonds) fueled both European economic 
development while funding the extirpation of African 
relationships.27 
Without the suggested benefits of what is viewed 
as high technology, African people were most capable of 
providing for basic food needs and in many cases, provided 
the basis for trade relationships. This was brought about 
by cooperation among many disparate sectors of African 
life, which included: pastoralists, traders and farmers. 
Evidence of food self-sufficiency and innovation, 
unspoiled by Europeans, were still to be found within 
Africa's interior towards the end of the 19th century. 
One European explorer wrote: 
Everywhere food is abundant-bananas, plantains, 
sweet potatoes, cassava ••• corn beans, peas, 
millet and other seeds, wild fruits, wild grapes, 
tobacco, honey, milk, fowls, and beef. I have 
been able to collect over twenty different species 
of bananas, all known and named and put to 
different uses. This tree furnishes the black man 
with paper and twine, from the leaves he makes mats 
and blankets, from the fruit he makes flour, 
porridge, bread and wine.28 
By 1885, at the Berlin Conference, European 
nations agreed to an arrangement that led to the division 
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and subjugation of the nations and people of Africa. This 
action spoke volumes of the relative military and 
political strength of Europe, vis-a-vis Africa, and also 
set the stage for the further divisiveness of the African 
people for generations to come. Of greater significance, 
the nature and orientation of African economies were to be 
more firmly established and would maintain this character 
even beyond political independence. 
From the time of the Berlin Conference to the 
period of political transition from colonial rule to 
political independence in the early 1960s, the colonizing 
nations of Europe developed political, administrative and 
military elites. The creation of an indigenous work force 
to protect and to serve the interests of the colonial 
occupation was instrumental in the longevity of colonial 
rule and the subsequent influence of the European nations 
in the post colonial order.29 Though the names and faces 
changed, the crucial economic relationships did not 
alter.30 By the time of independence, the tone of African 
economic pertinence to the world community had been estab-
lished. At the end of World War II, Europe was indeed 
weakened from its version of tribal warfare, forcing a 
reconsideration of what could enable them to achieve their 
desired hegemony of Europe in global affairs. 
The post-World War II period provided many of the 
new African rulers with opportunities to raise the 
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economic status of their new nations. By the early 1950s, 
Germany and Japan emerged from the rubble of World War II 
to regain much of their fallen stature in the industri-
alized world.31 With much of the funds necessary to 
reconstruct those societies derived from the u.s. (Mar-
shall Plan, U.S. occupation government in Japan) and 
international monetary institutions, Africans were hopeful 
of establishing a funding source which was not controlled 
directly by their former colonial rulers. Such funds were 
to begin Africa's introduction into the modern, industri-
alized world, while lessening their dependence upon 
Europe. The reality merely masked an exchange of 
dependency relationships (see the chapter on Debt and 
Trade) from bilateral to multilateral forms. 
This form of development (as discussed in the 
segment on Debt and Trade) was based on primary products 
(minerals, agricultural goods) and the import of essential 
goods (food). With most African economies sustained by a 
single sector of production, the new nations were not 
insulated from the general decline in Africa's terms of 
trade for its export products (e.g.-cocoa, copper).32 
With their export markets not providing the level of 
foreign exchange that would cover production costs, and 
given evidence of technological advances (e.g.-synthetics) 
reducing the need for some African exports, African 
governments found themselves increasingly unable to pay 
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for the imported foods and sundry goods (e.g.-military 
equipment) that they had grown increasingly dependent 
upon.33 
A most significant problem of expanded export 
production was in identifying the source of labor 
supplies. Though much has been made of the rate and size 
of Africa's population increase, until African nations can 
afford to create, as well as, import labor-saving devices 
that are capable of supporting production activities, it 
is dependent upon the relatively small size of its 
workforce. 
At sixteen people per square kilometre, Africa 
possesses a population density that is among the lowest in 
the world (see Table 3). With the huge size of the 
African continent and with seventy per cent of its 
population located in non-urban areas, the sparseness of 
the location of African people is an impediment to rural 
agricultural activity (see Table 3). As cash-crops, 
mining and food production sectors vie for the limited 
number of rural laborers, the potential of these sectors 
to lead economic growth and provide for the essential food 
needs of domestic populations, are greatly diminished. 
The alternative, mechanization, poses its own problems. 
The mechanization of food producing sectors has 
worked against the needs of landless laborers.34 With 
machines performing intensive labor activities, and their 
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application to large-scale production, an emphasis on 
agricultural production to assist the smallest number of 
producers, while ignoring small-scale producers (the 
majority), becomes an apparent dilemma.35 An additional 
concern with regards to the importation of technologies 
has been the expanding consumption of foreign exchange 
and/or the increasing need to borrow funds on the world 
market to pay for such products.36 Given the debt 
situation of African countries, continued borrowing 
exacerbates their problems. Further problems are also 
created as the mechanization of production will ultimately 
begin to reduce· the employment of people who are dependent 
on agricultural production and mining industries. 
One proposed solution is that technology to be 
introduced should be mindful of the employment needs of 
workers, as well as, production goals. Technology should 
be introduced that would assist workers in creating a 
better product while maintaining employment and expanding 
the potential for producer self-sufficiency. In 
agriculture, increased production can be obtained with 
simple investments of fertilizers, improved equipment and 
the introduction of ongoing assistance as provided by 
agricultural extension programs. 
Though some identify the problem of Africa and its 
nations as 'too many Africans', a comparison between 
European and African countries is illustrative of the 
43 
shortcomings of this viewpoint. All of the African 
nations listed as being famine-impacted, for example, fall 
below the world average for population densities. Even 
those African nations on the upper end of the population 
density scale fall short of those figures for France and 
the United Kingdom. Despite such glaringly high 
population densities for France and the U.K., there is 
little discussion on whether there may be too many people 
who are French or English (unless one discusses racial and 
ethnic minorities). Only Nigeria exceeds the population 
totals for France, w. Germany, Italy, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom.37 The size of Europe's population, its 
relative close proximity to the point of production, plus 
the economic advantages of the slave trade, enabled the 
shift of European societies to their present level of 
industrial strength and relatively high standard of 
living. 
The .structure of economic development in Africa 
has been a tale of continuance from its colonial 
influence, rather than a severe break with its past. 
Though experiments to establish socialist economies have 
been attempted across the continent (Tanzania, Guinea-
Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), the opportunity to 
succeed has been impeded by a variety of important 
factors, which include: civil war, famine and heightening 
debt. Questions on whether an economy should be more 
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socialist, rather than capitalist, were offset by the 
imperative to find solutions to immediate concerns. The 
example of Mozambique and its signing of the Nkomati 
accords, and the existence of trade relations with south 
Africa by the black-ruled nations of the region, are 
instances where ideology has yielded to economic and 
political pressures.38 
Attempts to manage and develop economies have lead 
to major disincentives for food producers. The pricing 
policies of many African countries have dissuaded farmers 
from producing crops for market, as most governments seek 
to maintain low food costs for the more easily politicized 
urban dwellers. Such a strategy results in negative or 
marginal profits for food producing markets.39 Farmers 
are also held hostage to the impact of supply and demand, 
as food prices immediately after harvest are generally 
lower (due to the availability of food products), which 
results in marginal profits for small-scale and poor 
farmers.40 The price of food increases dramatically 
during the last few months before harvest. Food which had 
been stored is often near depletion. In Burkina Faso 
during 1982, millet was priced at 30 francs per kilo after 
harvest and resold months later for 120 francs per kilo.41 
Food aid has also been a troubling disincentive in 
many African countries, as imported food commodities tend 
to be priced lower than domestically produced crops.42 
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The low cost of imported grain will not always be the 
norm, as prices have been steadly below the production 
costs of most grain exporting nations.43 Should the major 
grain exporting nations develop a more coordinated 
approach towards grain export that does less damage to the 
price of export commodities, major grain importing nations 
will be at an even more severe disadvantage. With foreign 
aid beginning to shrink, and a mounting inability on the 
part of African nations to find debt relief, the prospect 
of African nations being dependent on the importation of 
basic food goods, is a formula for political, as well as, 
economic disaster. A food boycott would then have the 
potential of being a greater threat to a nation than 
military invasion. 
From 1970 to 1983, African imports of grain (corn, 
rice, wheat and wheat by-products) rose to an average 
increase of 340% (see Table 4). This is despite food 
production increases across the continent. A closer 
examination, however, reveals some important inconsis-
tencies. Indices for the period between 1976 and 1984 
show that per capita agricultural production decreased 
(see Table 5). Ethiopia, Niger and South Africa showed 
negative per capita agriculture production while revealing 
increases in the total units of agricultural goods 
produced. Of the famine-stricken nations shown, only 
Sudan indicates a per capita increase in food production 
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TABLE 4 
AFRICAN GRAIN IMPORTS BY REGION IN MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS 



























































SOURCE: World Food Institute, World Food Trade and 
u.s. Agriculture 1960-1984 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
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(see Table 5). 
What is more remarkable is that Africa, until the 
1940s, was a net exporter of food grain (see Table 6). 
The extent that Africa will be able to reverse its trend 
of negative food production is tied, in part, to the 
ability of its governments to direct the management of its 
economies to encourage and support production activities, 
while not doing damage to domestic markets of consumption. 
Development patterns among African nations and 
their economies expose numerous class and sexual biases 
that exclude many of the very people needed to enhance 
food production. Much of the economic development 
activity in Africa has had a particular bias in favor of 
large-scale operations, neglecting the possibility of the 
smaller productive enterprises. Large-scale enterprise 
operations are costly endeavors due to the purchase and 
use of land, advanced technology (mechanized equipment, 
laboratory-produced seeds and fertilizers) and technology 
advisors.44 Only those who control, or have access to, 
large tracts of land and funds are able to take advantage 
of such western offerings. This effectively eliminates 
landless peasants and owners of small tracts of land. The 
oddity is that these are the very people most intimately 
involved with food production. 
Women are the principle group most actively 
involved in the production of food, and the group most 
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likely to be excluded from the financial and technological 
inputs important to food production on a more grand scale. 
Women in Africa produce 60%-80% of total agriculture 
production and 90% of the continent's food crops.45 As 
most African women do not fully own the land that they 
work and are often prohibited from securing land in equal 
quantities as their male counterparts, the contributions 
of Africa's major food producers are being structurally 
reduced at a time in Africa's history when the need is the 
greatest. 
In the rural environs of Africa, many of the men 
go to the cities, mines and fields for employment, while 
women find their labor relegated to the food sector; the 
sector of least financial return on investment.46 Labor 
in the food production system is primarily that of women 
(see Chart 1). Men equal women in the labor time spent on 
food production in the areas of livestock care and 
planting, while trailing women in: food processing and 
storage, weeding and harvesting. It is only in ploughing 
that men exceed the labor input of women in a segment of 
the food production system. As loans and other inputs for 
small-scale food production are scarce, production is 
performed by the most rudimentary of farm implements (hoe, 
ox-drawn plough). Food production is easily one of the 
most demanding of labor sectors that a person can be 
involved with in Africa. 
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TABLE 6 
The Changing Pattern of World Grain Trade, 1934-1976 
(million metric tons) 
Region 1934-38 1948-52 1960 1970 1976 
Africa +02 -06 -17 -37 -47 
~. America +OS +23 +39 +56 +94 
s. America +09 +01 0 +04 -03 
w. Europe -24 -22 -25 -30 -17 
E. Europe 
and USSR +OS 0 +01 -25 
Asia +02 -06 -17 -37 -47 
Australia and 
New Zealand +03 +03 +06 +12 +08 
Source: Lester Brown, "The world Food Prospect, II 
Science (December 12, 1975): P• 1055. 
( +) grain export 
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Land tenure in many African countries structurally 
limits the production potential of women in farming 
communities. one important area of land tenure is decided 
by inheritance. With the great number of nations that are 
Islamic and follow Islamic law, women are distanced from 
the land and productive potential due to inheritance laws 
which state that a woman gets only one-eighth of her 
husband's estate (if she has children) upon his death; a 
daughter only inherits one-half of what a son receives.47 
Non-Islamic African societies are also known to 
limit the potential of women land owners. In Sierra 
Leone, traditio.nal kings appropriated to women only one-
third to one-half the amount of communal land that was 
given to men. 48 The problem and importance of land tenure 
is exacerbated by the diminution in the importance 
attributed to agriculture by African commercial banks. 
Only 5% of total money is allocated to agricultural 
activity, with little going to women.49 Among the major 
providers of development funding, western governments and 
the World Bank, women have only recently been discovered 
as potential recipients of funding and only in a limited 
manner. For example, the largest government development 
agency, u.s. Agency for International Development (AID), 
has spent a mere 2% of its budget (1978) on their Women In 
Development (WID) office.SO 
It is not enough to say that women have been 
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forgotten in discussions on development and in food 
production. Women are viewed as a factor to be con-
trolled, much to the advantage of the male portion of 
their societies. Though African men may have once been 
participants in the production of food, with the coming of 
urban-centered development and the relatively profitable 
cash-crop sector, the most physically demanding form of 
agricultural production (bereft of technological advances 
and supports) has become food production. 
With aid programs that continue to neglect the 
importance of women and thus separating women from 
cooperative productive activities with her male counter-
part, the ability of Africa to expand its food production 
may be tied to the ability of Africa to integrate its 
women into development financing, agricultural marketing 
and agricultural production extension services. 
Deliberate steps should also be taken to insure that 
women, particularly those who are producers, should have 
access to land ownership on a basis that is equal to that 
of men. It is also imperative that African governments 
clearly prioritize a thriving domestic food producing 
sector and sustain it with fair pricing policies and other 
opportunities that are commonly available to large-scale 
development enterprises. In this era of massive external 
debt, the need to lessen external food aid, while simul-
taneously devising methods to expand the productive 
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opportunities for large numbers of rural unemployed, 
should be of the highest national urgency. 
ii. African Debt and Trade 
The total indebtedness of African nations is 
estimated between $107-$150 billion, second only to Latin 
America, with an estimated $350 billion.51 The high debt 
burden became eyen more pronounced during the 1970s, owing 
to a variety of conditions. The stunning increases in the 
cost of petroleum, the first of the Sahel droughts, 
diminishing terms of trade, conditionality of foreign 
loans and unproductive development policies and programs 
exacerbated an already tenuous situation. The growing 
reality of the new African nations was their inability to 
control their economic (and thus, political) fate. 
The extent of a nation's indebtedness does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that a nation's economy 
is under ruin. The u.s. is the world's largest debtor 
nation, yet, few consider it to be a devastated economy.52 
It is, therefore, more than the size of the debt but the 
extent that debt intrudes upon the production, growth and 
distribution of a nation's wealth. Debt, however, does 
bear a considerable impact upon nations with disjointed 
economic and/or political structures. 
World Bank figures indicate that from 1973-1982, 
17 African nations reported decreases in per capita GNP 
(see Table 7). African countries also accounted for 19 of 
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TABLE 7 
AFRICAN COUNTRIES REPORTING NEGATIVE GNP GROWTH, 1973-1982 
(In Percentage) 
Countries 
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the world's 22 nations with per capita income of less than 
$300 (see Table 8). Ghana and the archipelago of Sao Tome 
and Principe barely avoid this dubious distinction, with 
per capitas of $320 and $310 respectively.53 Although per 
capita data do not expose the extent that economic 
resources are concentrated within a nation (class, ethnic 
groups, sex), the figures do reveal the limited productive 
output of these nations. As the capacity of a nation to 
borrow is weighed against the ability of a nation to 
produce items for foreign consumption or profit, a 
curtailment of production translates to a greater 
inability to fulfill the obligations inherent in borrowing 
money on the international marketplace. 
While the economic viability of Africa has been in 
question for quite some time, the countries of the 
continent were not prepared for the collective calamities 
during the 1970s, which included: (1) dramatic increase in 
the price of petroleum; (2) worldwide recession; (3) sharp 
rise in the cost of imported goods; (4) collapse of 
Africa's terms of trade for primary commodities; (5) 
development policies created for and/or pursued by African 
nationsr and (6) environmental devastation (e.g.-drought). 
Though Africa's debt problems did not originate in 
the 1970s, few decades have contained the level of 
economic deterioration. The 1973-74 increases in the 
price of petroleum and its by-products had a significant 
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impact on both the creation and distribution of 
large-scale, mechanized food production. The cost of 
transporting goods was passed onto the importing nations 
and, subsequently, the consumer. As the income of most 
Africans was inadequate to meet the new price demands of 
imported goods, the global recession absorbed African 
nations (except Organization of Petroleum Exporters, such 
as Nigeria) into its decaying orbit. 
The sharp rise in imported goods could be likened 
to the imposition of a tax on foreign goods. This 'tax' 
extended to such essential products as food and 
agricultural inputs (e.g.-fertilizers). It was during 
this time period that the much heralded "Green Revolution" 
ceased to be a viable option in Africa, as much of its 
miracle inputs (seeds, fertilizers) required increased 
farm mechanization and thus, petroleum usage.54 African 
nations were caught in the dilemma of importing, and 
producing, inflation. The staggering global recession 
that followed the increases in petroleum wounded developed 
economies and devastated those of the underdeveloped 
world. 
At the time of petroleum price increases and 
worldwide recession, nations of the Sudan-Sahel zone in 
Africa were seeking methods to overcome a major drought 
that had engulfed nine nations in the region,55 The 
colonial legacy contributed to this most difficult of 
59 
periods as the continent's over-reliance on mineral 
extraction and non-food agricultural crops began to result 
in sharp declines in the terms of trade. The declining 
terms of trade on sub-Saharan Africa's primary commodity 
exports have been evident throughout the 1980's (see Table 
9 ) • 
Though the path towards trade decline preceded the 
arrival of President Reagan, there is little to indicate 
that assistance has been forthcoming to slow these 
declines in the past forty years (see Table 9). With 
export revenues reduced and imports rising sharply, 
African countries were compelled to borrow ever greater 
amounts of money from international lending institutions. 
The rapid decline into debt had begun. 
Between 1975 and 1983, almost one-half of all debt 
reschedulings were for African countries,56 Liberia and 
Senegal accounted for four reschedulings each, only to be 
exceeded by Togo (5) and Zaire (6).57 The World Bank 
states that the indebtedness of sub-Saharan Africa is 
$80.268 billion (see Table 10). As a percentage of 
Africa's exports of goods and services, debt has grown to 
28.3t (see Table 10). If African nations dedicated all of 
their export earnings to service their debt, they would be 
insufficient to cover the total external debt which has 
been accumulated. 
For example, by 1984, the amount paid by African 
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TAitE 9 
TEIUIS 0!' TIIADE FOR SUI-SAHARAN ~FRICAH EXPORT COMMODITIES 
(1980•1.000) 
Nation l98l 1982 1983 l984 l985 l98& 
Benin 1.009 o. 915 0.915 o. 989 0.942 0.751 
Botswana 0 .989 LOU o. 994 o. 990 0.990 1.049 
Burkina raoo 0.88 2 0.832 0.940 0.96Z 0.123 0.720 
Burundi 0.823 0. 9Jl 0.909 l.02l 0.999 l.l94 
Cameroon 0.983 0.957 0.938 0.965 0.924 0.603 
Central ~fr. Rap. 0.885 0. 911 0.903 0.955 0.881 0.868 
Conqo 1.064 l.02l 1.970 0.98l o. 946 0.573 
Ethiopia o .a 3& 0.890 0.910 l.Ol3 0.991 1.273 
Gabon 1.073 l.Ol8 0.954 0.955 0.905 0.563 
Gambia 1.054 0.849 0.939 0.998 0.864 0. 746 
Ghana o. 816 0.734 0.884 0.983 0.906 0.891 
Ivory Coast 0.842 0.862 0.915 0.987 0.93a 0.937 
Kenya 0.915 0.890 0. 930 l.OU o.n5 0.920 
Lesotho 0.980 0.986 o. 98l 0.931 1.005 0.867 
Liberia o.as3 0.942 o. 939 0.940 0.910 0.973 
Madaqascar 0. 86a 0.935 0.939 0.988 1.022 1.075 
Malawi 0.868 0.840 0.852 o. 878 0.744 0.751 
Mauritania 0.959 1.100 1.062 1.064 1.0Z9 0.961 
Mauritius 0.695 0.432 0.443 0.349 0.305 0.384 
Niqer 1.009 1.052 1.088 1.027 1.022 1.172 
Niqeda 1.099 1.042 1.983 0. 992 0.961 0.45a 
Rwanda o .as& 0.926 0.913 1.030 1.052 1.413 
Seneqa1 1.032 0.996 1.003 1.027 o. 988 o. 901 
Seychelles 1.045 1.045 1.002 1.007 1.035 0.981 
Sierra Leone o. 944 0.952 0.966 1.016 0.975 0.97a 
Somalia 0.916 o.n5 0.982 0.939 0.907 0.8l4 
Sudan 0.993 o.no 1.065 1.072 0.889 o.a28 
Tanzania 0 .ua o .an 0 .aaz 0. 911 0.963 0.909 
Toqo l.Oll 1.031 0.972 0. 911 0.945 0.869 
Uqanda o.ao5 0.884 0.892 0. 997 0.960 1.164 
Zaire o.a36 0.792 o. 83a 0.847 0.824 o.ao7 
Zambia 0. 798 0.710 0.7790 0.100 0.722 0.776 
Zimbabwe o.a99 0.841 0.918 0. 915 0.849 0.828 
SOURCE: ~bdel Stambule, world Bank, Global Analysis 
(!'allruary 1, 1988) • 
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TABLE 10 
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SOURCE: World Bank, Financing AdJustment with Growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1986-90 (Washlnqton, D.C.: World Bank, 1986). 
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nations toward their debt (as a percentage of total goods 
and services) had grown to a staggering 22.1% (see Table 
10). No nation, nor group of nations, can be capable of 
managing a healthy economy when so much of its national 
wealth is ultimately an income transfer to developed 
countries due to the servicing of foreign debt. The 
ability of Africa to pay its debt is increasingly 
improbable, a fact which guarantees an unstable economic 
future for these affected nations. 
The debt totals are even more unfavorable for 
African nations if the International Development 
Association (IDA)-eligible nations are isolated. Total 
indebtedness for these nations is $44.265 billion, as 
spread among twenty-eight nations. As a percentage of the 
GNP, if debt would be required to be paid during a single 
fiscal year, it would engross more than 74% of Africa's 
productive wealth (see Table 10). When measuring debt as 
a percentage of a nation's goods and services for export 
(an area where foreign exchange is accumulated) the debt 
total would exceed export production earnings, by an 
average of 348.9%.58 
For IDA-eligible nations, the extent that debt 
claims export earnings is also revealing. Of the nine 
food-shortage nations, six have a debt approaching or 
exceeding fifty percent of GNP (see Table 10). The 
seriousness of debt is in further evidence in the export 
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sector. The extent that export products limit or reduce 
indebtedness is almost made irrelevant among the food 
crisis nations. The average debt incurred by these 
nations is greater than 468% of export earnings (see Table 
10). Somalia and Sudan show the greatest inability to pay 
their debt burden with export earnings, as debt is 1,538% 
and 913.2% of exports, respectively. In addressing the 
problems associated with debt and drought causes of famine 
in Africa, Henry Jackson writes: 
••. debt servicing can be said to be at the core of 
the African countries' economic crisis. Exter-
nally, it prolongs their dependence on external 
creditors. At home, it thwarts their fundamental 
objective of transforming their stagnating economies 
into modern developed societies. By depleting 
available hard currencies, it also cuts back capital 
for food imports at a time when the drought is 
compounding this need.59 
Most African nations are viewed as high credit 
risks by commercial banks. These nations have a limited 
number of options to obtain funding for development 
assistance: (1) World Bank low-interest loans (mainly 
through the IDA); (2) support funding for diminished 
balance of payments from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF); and (3) bilateral foreign aid. Most of Africa's 
debt has become public, which is distinct from the 
private, commercial debt incurred by Latin American 
nations. When aid money and reserves have either 
evapora·ted or are insufficient in quantity, the 
institution of last resort has often been the IMF. 
64 
The initial post-World War II role of the IMF was 
to provide short term loans to offset temporary balance of 
payment problems of its member nations. It is the terms 
of these loans, conditionality, which makes IMF a very 
powerful force. The demands of the IMF are frequently 
made to alter economic policies and programs of the 
recipient nation to fit IMF standards. The conditionality 
demands of the IMF include: reduction in government 
spending, increases in taxes, wage controls and the 
devaluation of currencies. 
The IMF was conceived as an institution capable of 
providing funds to alleviate short-term balance of payment 
deficits of member nations. These deficits would have a 
negative impact on the ability of a nation to import 
coveted goods and services. The void that the IMF has 
filled has both opened and maintained trade relationships 
that continue to make a nation's internal markets 
accessible to the more economically advanced nations' 
products. Many of the World Bank-sponsored development 
projects initiated in underdeveloped countries, began to 
grow increasingly dependent on the IMF to help resolve 
their short-term debt problems. The irony is that the 
developed nations, via the IMF, were demanding of Africa's 
poor to pay the price for the errant policies and programs 
developed and directed by foreign governments (essentially 
Europe and the U.S.), international lending institutions 
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(IMF) , poor economic planning by recipient African 
governments and the frequency of corrupt national 
officials. The poor of Africa are essentially being asked 
to pay for both the legacy and the continuance of Africa's 
economic relationships with the west. 
The reduction of government spending in most 
African countries ultimately means major decreases in 
food, employment and service programs which more 
profoundly impact upon the poor. By definition, those who 
are impoverished are so because they are unable to garner 
enough money to pay for their most essential needs. With 
most taxes being regressive in application, tax increases 
demand an increasing financial burden from the poor, of 
which they are unable to share. Wage controls reduce the 
ability of those who work to provide for basic needs with 
rises in inflation. As the per capita income of most 
rescheduling nations are among some of the world's lowest, 
wage controls hurt the average worker. 
The devaluation of currency increases the cost of 
all foreign imports. As many African nations are no 
longer self-sufficient producers of essential foods and 
are highly reliant upon food imports, the issue of 
devaluation becomes an issue of survival. The average 
person is faced with the prospect of higher food prices 
and a decrease, or elimination, of food subsidies. 
The impact and prioritization of conditionality 
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demands, as set by the IMF upon nations, offers stark 
evidence of the drastic nature of IMF policies. In 
Tanzania, the IMF asked the government to devalue its 
currency to 60t of its original value.60 In 1984, Chad 
and Zaire were each urged to release over 7,000 teachers, 
as part of IMF prescriptions towards economic stability 
(western style). When confronted with IMF-inspired 
increases in the price of essential foods, riots exploded 
in Tunisia, Ivory Coast, Egypt and Tanzania.61 
The imbalance of Africa's financial situation with 
the west is illustrated by its relationship to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 1986, Africa's net 
outflow of funds totalled $960 million.62 The total debt 
of Africa for 1986 is estimated at $200 billion.63 With 
increasing demands placed on many nations due to famines 
and wars, and the repayment of loans to continue needed 
imports (particularly food), the possibility of IMF 
conditionalities being imposed across the continent may 
become a reality, with or without IMF prodding. 
The extent debt contributes to both hunger and 
famine should not be viewed solely at the point that 
massive foreign debt has become too obvious to effectively 
control. Though debt levels had become overly burdensome 
by the 1970s, the decisions and choices that have lead to 
such debt have their history in the years prior to 
political independence. 
67 
One of the primary factors in the linkage between 
debt and famine has been the extent that African economies 
have invested heavily in the production of agricultural 
commodities and mineral extraction for export, at the 
expense of agricultural production for domestic food 
consumption. The extent that Africa's role has been that 
of fueling the growth and maintenance of the 
industrialized world is owed to the activities of 
multinational corporations, as agents of European capital. 
Multinational corporations, most specifically 
agribusinesses, have had a long history of activity in 
Africa. The origins of these multinational corporate 
entities can be found in what were once known as trading 
companies. Acting at the behest of their European 
governments, these companies were in the vanguard of 
Africa's demise and capture into chattel slavery and 
national destruction. The names of these companies 
reflected their patrons: the German East African Company, 
the British Imperial East Africa Company, the British 
South Africa Company, the Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique 
Equatoriale.64 These names are succeeded by the present 
generation of multinationals, which include: the United 
Trading Company (UNILEVER), and the Rhodesia Mining and 
Land Company (LONRHO). By stealth and duplicity, backed 
by the force of arms of their own native governments, the 
trading companies functioned as the extra-governmental arm 
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of European colonialism to create substantial profits. 
Under these manipulative and blatantly aggressive 
actions, Africa moved from a continent that was proficient 
in the production of food products for their internal 
uses, to a series of nations consumed with the production 
of agricultural goods for export. In the early stages of 
colonialism, the export of agricultural goods was the 
creation of small-scale farm production.65 This was 
sufficient at the time, as demand for African produced 
goods had not begun to peak. Much of the earlier activity 
of trading companies was in the capture of people for sale 
as slaves. 
By the late 19th century, the trade relation-
ships had altered significantly. In Africa, the export of 
its people to the Americas had depopulated the continent 
to the extent that Africa was the only continent in the 
19th century to have not increased in total population.66 
In Europe, there was a growing demand for Africa's natural 
resources and agricultural goods. With the loss of 
political control by Europe in the Americas, Africa became 
even more attractive as a source of exploitable markets of 
consumption and production activity. The need to shift 
from the export of labor overseas (slavery) to the control 
of the African labor force on the African continent 
facilitated the creation of goods for export to European 
markets. Africans were needed more in Africa than in the 
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Americas. 
To expedite the need to manage European 
colonialism in Africa, many of the nations began to 
approve major concessions to the trading companies. With 
the "scramble for Africa" having concluded with the 
division of Africa among the European powers, the task 
came to 'pacify' the inhabitants to accepting the new 
political force that was stalking the continent. Though 
Africans were needed to work the plantations and extract 
precious minerals from mines, there was little hesitation 
in dealing harshly with any recalcitrants. 
King Leopold of Belgium was one of the early 
participants in Europe's attempts to tie Africa's human, 
mineral and agricultural resources to its economic and 
political institutions. Leopold created (from his private 
wealth) the Association Internationale du Congo to exploit 
the greater Congo basin. With the discovery of wild 
rubber trees, production rose from one hundred metric tons 
in 1890 to 6,000 metric tons in 1901.67 What also rose 
were the number of deaths, as the system of forced labor 
(and resistance to this labor) resulted in the dwindling 
of the African population of this region to half of its 
original size.68 Other concession companies, while 
perhaps not being able to match King Leopold in his 
brutality were quite effective in exploiting the terri-
tories given to them to achieve incredible profits, at the 
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expense of African freedom. The South Cameroons company 
was granted almost 20 million acres for the full rights to 
collect and produce rubber, without payment, for its 
Belgian financial backers.69 
Unilever (formerly Lever Brothers) was given 
rights to choose 74,000 hectares of palm-bearing land, 
with rights to an additional 200,000 hectares after ten 
years.70 Firestone Rubber Company was granted a con-
cession from the Liberian government for one million acres 
of land at $.04 per acre (developed).71 out of this 
'gift', Firestone was able to bring into production so,ooo 
acres to create the world's largest rubber plantation.72 
One of the lingering influences of the 
concessional agribusinesses and the colonial approach they 
implemented was the impact they had on labor and land. 
Most important was the availability of "able-bodied" men. 
The shift of men working in conjunction with the women of 
their societies in subsistence agricultural activities, to 
that of working on cash-crop plantations or other related 
enterprises, had a deleterious impact on the effort of 
African people to avoid their dependency on food 
imports.73 The decline in Africa's population growth due 
to the slave trade and the diversion of the remaining 
African labor force forced self-sufficient production 
activities by Africans to a secondary status. 
Another significance of this period was the 
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appropriation of the very best, most potentially 
productive lands for cash-crop production. Given that 
much of Africa lies between the tropical zones, with soil 
that is not especially fertile, the control of land that 
is most conducive to production was vital. As land tenure 
shifted, many of the indigenous people, forced from their 
lands, had to begin production activities on soil that was 
scarcely supportive of such activities. Long held 
approaches to agricultural production had to be abandoned 
or were compromised in attempts to placate the new demands 
of colonial administrators (e.g.-taxes) and to offset less 
productive crop yield. For example, the tradition (tech-
nology) of allowing land to lay fallow over a period of 
time to allow for it to regain nutrients lost in the 
cultivation of a crop, or the usage of crop rotation have 
become limited.74 As more and more Africans were forced 
onto less and less land that was also limited in its crop 
potential, there was a need for African farmers to reduce 
the fallow periods for their land in order to meet the 
immediate needs of their families and their new rulers. 
The cooperative method of soil fertilization was 
also being denied as land tenure began to change. Pastor-
alists were decreasingly able to deploy their livestock 
upon farm land to assist in fertilization. These animals 
would beat stalks back into the earth and eat whatever 
vegetation that was suitable for their consumption. A 
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major obstacle to the cooperative farm cycle of production 
engaged in by the pastoralists and the small-scale food 
producers was the privitization and expansion of cash-crop 
activity.75 
The maxim of profits before people was the 
apparent clarion call of European governments and their 
trading companies as it was applied to the African 
inhabitants. The European approach to agriculture and raw 
material production was to divorce its significance from a 
society (e.g.-African). Those who labored in the fields 
and the mines were introduced to a new set of priorities, 
one that was alien to their culture and needs. The 
relevance of such resource exploitation was calculated to 
achieve the highest profit. Food is thereby no longer 
examined in the context of its meeting the basic survival 
needs of a people. The question from the European, 
capitalist matrix is the extent that growing a food crop 
can create profitable returns, in the nation wherein the 
crop is created, or for export to another country where 
the profit is often greater. 
As the profit potential was greater for cocoa, 
rubber, cotton and other products for export to (and 
consumption by) European markets, the domestic needs of 
African people languished. More labor time, land and 
technology inputs were invested in export crops, creating 
a void for African workers. This void was in the steady 
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decline of labor in areas which would provide for the 
essential food and other survival needs of the laborers 
themselves. 
The result of this planned neglect was soon to be 
obvious to all. Under normal conditions, food was stored 
after harvest, in the event of hardship. A colonial 
inspector expressed his bewilderment of the people of the 
then Upper Volta (now known as Burkina Faso), as they 
faced famine in 1932: 
one can only wonder how it happens that populations 
••• who always had on hand harvests in reserve and 
to whom it was socially unacceptable to eat grain 
that had spent less than three years in the 
granary have suddenly become improvident. They 
managed to get through the terrible famine of 1914 
without difficulty ••. (however, since the late 
1920s) these populations, once rich in food 
reserves are now living from hand to mouth ••• 76 
Labouret reported from Burkina Faso (c. 1950) of a 
dramatic drop in calories for rural workers. Calorie 
intake fell from 3,250 after harvest to 750, and below, 
before the new harvest could be consumed.77 He further 
states: 
The daily ration of an adult might even go down to 
208 calories per day, not during famines but simply 
at times of shortage. So great was the surprise of 
the personnel in charge of these calculations in 
France that they suspended their work, believing it 
to be in error on our part. There was no error.78 
How many Africans died, or whose babies were malnourished, 
so that. a person in London could satisfy their cravings 
for a chocolate candy, or so that a Parisian might be 




The unabashed icon of imperialism, Cecil Rhodes, 
offered his perception of the need for such practices: 
In order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants of the 
United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we, colonial 
statesmen, must acquire new lands to settle the 
surplus population, to provide new markets for the 
goods produced by them in the factories and mines. 
The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and 
butter question.79 
For Rhodes, the question of bread and butter was a matter 
of concern solely for Britain, even though by satisfying 
the British cravings, the same afflictions for the non-
European nations of the world are reproduced. It is to 
this end that African and Asian nations were in fact able 
to serve the needs of the 'Empire', at the exclusion of 
themselves. 
The rationale offered by Rhodes could also have 
been used by King Leopold and any other European ruler who 
sought to tie the nations and people of Africa to the 
impetus created by industrialization and the need to 
create new markets for the goods created. The role of 
Africa in the movement of European imperialism and 
colonialism is described by Paul Leroy-Beaulieu as: 
••• to supply the mother country's trade with a 
ready-made market, to get its industry going and 
to supply the inhabitants of the mother country 
••• with increased profits, wages or commodi-
ties.BO 
Africa's role has scarcely changed from this time. 
As the trading companies grew in their dominance 
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of the markets for agricultural and mineral resources, so 
did the opportunity to expand their control of the product 
from its source to the point that it is consumed in the 
marketplace. This attempt to control every facet of a 
product (vertical integration) includes: processing, 
trading, transport, marketing and distribution. This 
pursuit of absolute control was greatly assisted by the 
creation and activities of the International Fund. for 
Reconstruction and Development {World Bank). 
The introduction of the world Bank not only 
assisted the nations of western Europe in their post-
World War II recovery, but also attempted to facilitate 
programs that were consistent with the goals of the 
colonial economies in Africa.B1 An essential feature of 
enhancing the relationship between Europe and its colonies 
in Africa (and elsewhere) was the development of 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports) that would 
assist in the movement of cash-crops and extracted mineral 
resources to those nations which occupy the center of the 
capitalist order.B2 The emphasis that the World Bank 
placed on the development of infrastructure was more than 
just a casual investment (see Tables 11 and 12). The 
funds· proved to be the major incentive that baited the 
finance-starved nations into being led along the paths of 
a development which addressed the wants of domestic 
elites, foreign corporate enterprises and financial 
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institutions, at the expense of the needs of the newly 
independent nation. 
Table 12 identifies in greater detail the extent 
that infrastructural development has led the list of World 
Bank investments. Most of these plans, however, were 
directed towards urban areas, while agricultural 
investments were directed toward the cash-crop (export) 
sector. The World Bank acknowledged this imbalance 
stating: 
A large part of World Bank lending has been urban-
oriented. Most of the lending for port facili-
ties, urban expressways and industry has been for 
urban purposes. The major part of the transport 
and telecommunications lending had been to link 
urban areas. Bank lending in these categories 
which had been urban-related totals roughly $13 
billion or over three-quarters of total lending in 
the development countries. On a more restricted 
definition, excluding interurban transport and 
telecommunications, the proportion is still nearly 
half. 
Much of the lending has been concentrated on 
major cities. OVer $2 billion, or more than 10% 
of all lending, has been absorbed by 13 cities, 
each receiving $100 million or more. Projections 
for the next five years indicate no diminution of 
this effort.83 
The concentration of financial, administrative and 
technical resources in one spatial location was not only a 
primary factor of urban growth, but also an additional 
factor in the destabilization of less-profitable 
productive sectors. The lack of investments into food 
production sectors has greatly contributed to the 
deterioration of the rural economy and the resultant 
migration to the urban centers. The creation of urban 
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population growth was, and remains, staggering. Gerald 
Breese, citing United Nations statistics, indicated that: 
Between 1900-1950, the population living in cities 
of 100,000 or more in Asia mounted from an 
estimated 19.4 million (a gain of 444 per cent), 
and in Africa from 1.4 million to 10.2 million (a 
gain of 629 per cent).84 
A study conducted by Kingsley Davis on thirty-
four underdeveloped countries revealed that during the 
1940s and 1950s: 
••• average annual gain in the urban population was 
4.5 per cent ••• 4.7 per cent in seven countries in 
Africa, 4.7 per cent in 15 countries in Latin 
America. In contrast, nine countries during their 
period of fastest urban population growth (mostly 
in the latter half of the 19th century) the average 
gain per year was 2.1 per cent.85 
Estimates on future growth of urban areas in the Third 
World show continued population increases. It is 
projected that such areas will increase by more than one 
billion people by the year 2000.86 This figure represents 
80.8 per cent of the anticipated urban growth in the 
world. 
Such an emphasis away from rural sectors was not 
without its support in the more radically left camps, 
although for many different reasons. Kwame Nkrumah 
answered those who may have felt that Africa should 
forestall attempts to enter into the mainstream of the 
world's industrialized nations, by stating: 
There are, however, imperialist specialists and 
apologists who urge less developed countries to 
concentrate on agriculture and leave industriali-
zation for some later time when their populations 
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shall be well fed. The world's economic 
development, however, shows that it is only with 
advanced industrialization that it has been 
possible to raise the nutritional levels of the 
people by raising their levels of income. But even 
to make agriculture yield more, the aid of indus-
trial output is needed; and the underdeveloped 
world industrialized. This dependence must slow 
the rate of increase in our agriculture and make 
it subservient to the demands of the industrial 
producers.87 
The eloquence of Nkrumah's words, notwithstanding, certain 
tenants of his argument must be debated. One, it. is 
inaccurate to link improved nutritional levels to 
industrialization. Advanced industrialization has done 
little for the legion of the unemployed throughout the 
western world who must depend on government assistance to 
be fed (when and to the extent it is available). If 
industrial technology is not developed to utilize labor 
potential versus limiting the access of people into the 
labor market, ultimately, economic development and nutri-
tional levels will only show improvement to a limited 
number of people. Two, it is a mistake to assume that 
industrialization was the sole result of European 
technological genius. 
The industrialization of Europe and North America 
can be directly tied to the use of slave labor and the 
domination of foreign markets. The surplus created by the 
labor of slaves in the fields and the mines led to such 
domestic benefits as industrialization and rising incomes 
that culminated in better diets for both Europe and North 
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America. Unless African and other Third-World people are 
willing to invest themselves in the form of slavery 
developed by Europe, industrialization must be addressed 
along alternative paths. 
Third, although industrialization is a benefit, 
its wholesale introduction into an economy without an 
accompanying analysis of its impact upon other sectors 
would be a mistake. Industrialization efforts should 
supplement a nation's economic strength and diversity, not 
limit it. The deemphasis of one sector to enhance another 
sector does little to promote any serious attempt to 
approach self-sufficiency in an area that is vital to a 
nation's sovereignty. 
By accepting the economic model of industriali-
zation as the primary emphasis of national development, 
two assumptions were made: (1) the west and its inter-
national monetary institutions would support the idea of 
Africa becoming a competitive, more self-reliant, 
industrialized entity; and (2) the west would provide the 
nations of Africa with the means to develop this capacity. 
The extent that so-called development did occur was the 
extent that urban areas grew, albeit, at the expense of 
the food producing sectors of their economies. 
Such development was not promoted as expressions 
of domestic economic relationships but as appendages to 
those agricultural and mineral extractive sectors needed 
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by the west to further its own industrial development. 
These varied elements combined to enhance the point that 
growth can indeed occur without development. The 
industrialized base so coveted by African governments 
never materialized. As Richard stryker explained, World 
Bank efforts concentrated upon: " ••• the rapid penetration 
of corporate agribusiness from the wealthy capitalist 
countries into the new production frontiers of the Third-
World."88 These new frontiers which were not for the 
development of the host nation, but for the satiation of 
western markets and corporate profits. 
By relying upon the notion that development was a 
course that could only be followed along western paths, 
African and other newly-formed nations throughout the 
world, soon discovered that they had helped to expand 
their vulnerability to western economic domination. As 
the wave of political independence began to wash upon the 
African shores, the new governments of black rule were to 
find that the economic foundation of the country would 
prove to be their most formidable obstacle to overcome. 
The new rulers began to witness the decline of food crop 
production, while exports of agricultural goods held 
steady and in many instances, increased. Per capita food 
production has fallen by 1.1% during the 1970s and 2% in 
the 1980s (annually).89 Food items such as wheat, maize, 
rice, millet and sorghum have shown drastic decreases 
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since 1961,90 Food imports have shown corresponding 
increases during this same period, with one quarter of all 
grain consumed on the continent coming from foreign 
sources. 
To add to Africa's problems, the relative demand 
for many of its primary products (both agricultural and 
mineral) were in decline, as inflation was making itself 
obvious in the developed countries. Africa was now at a 
crossroad. The impact of generations of European activity 
on Africa was now apparent. It was no longer able to keep 
pace with the increasing demand for food, as the 
traditional food producers had been diverted to export 
production, or forced to turn to the cities as a means 
toward survival. Those entwined in the export production 
found that the market price for those items were not 
enough to sustain employment levels as in past years. 
The dependence on the old colonial economy was now 
being replac_ed by a dependency upon foreign agricultural 
producers for the most precious and basic of human needs, 
food. With its terms of trade faltering and the balance 
of payments to the disadvantage of Africa, debt began to 
mount to unheard of proportions. As balance of payment 
problems continued to grow, there seemed to be an even 
greater reliance on the export markets to offset the 
troubles the nations were facing with the shortage of 
food. Of the more conflicting images that have emerged 
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out of Africa during the famine crises of the past two 
decades has been the dichotomy of African nations 
exporting agricultural goods to Europe and the west, while 
dying from famine at home. In 1974, Tanzania faced a 
major food emergency, though at the same time 
demonstrating this strangeness of sectoral imbalance: 
••• the export sector of the Tanzania agricultural 
economy was flourishing, and the total level of 
production of export crops was approaching record 
highs. During crop year 1972-1973, just before 
the massive importation of emergency food 
supplies, Tanzania exported over 100,000 tons of 
coffee, about 235,000 tons of sisal, and nearly 
280,000 tons of cashews.91 
In Mali, one of the more troubled nations of all 
of those stricken by famine, the abundance of its export 
sector during the period of the Sahel famine of the 1970s 
raises the question of the importance of the food sector, 
Lofchie writes: 
Corn production, for example, fell by more than 
one-third between 1969 and 1971, and millet, 
desperately needed to take up the slack, showed 
no increases whatsoever. During the same 
period, Mali's export crops had attained bumper 
levels. During the crop year 1971-1972, cotton-
seed production reached more than a 400 per cent 
increase during a six-year period. Groundnut 
production totalled more than 150,000 tons that 
year, an increase of nearly 70 per cent during a 
four-year period. Rice production, also largely 
for export, reached a record high in 1972, 
amounting to about 174,000 tons.92 
It is clear that when the drought was being viewed 
as the primary reason for the Sahel famines of the 1970s, 
only food crops destined for domestic markets were 
affected, versus those agricultural products designed for 
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export. If nature was not the cause, then the question of 
priorities must be introduced. Why is it that export 
crops should receive their needed farm inputs (seeds, 
fertilizers, irrigation) while the most important purpose 
of agriculture (feeding the people) was not given the same 
attention? The answer is still to be found in the 
economic development plans of the above nations and the 
emphasis placed on obtaining foreign exchange, to satisfy 
foreign creditors and for the ongoing purchase of goods 
deemed significant by the governments. 
The implications for such a foreign-based strategy 
on the domestic needs of a people is also evident in the 
analysis done by the World Bank on the potential for the 
Sahel to provide Europe with vegetables during its winter 
season, the 1974 report states: 
European demand for vegetables is constantly 
increasing. In addition, consumers want to have 
throughout the year vegetables that were formerly 
not available in winter. Except for hothouse-
grown vegetables-which rank as luxuries-and early 
vegetables grown under glass or plastic one or two 
months ahead of the main season ••• The Sudan-Sahel 
region with its long dry season (November-March ••• 
is well placed to produce such plants under 
irrigation. It has the additional advantage of 
having inexpensive manpower available for these 
labor-intensive crops (some 300 hrsjha) .93 
At that time, the Sahel region was undergoing an 
incredibly brutal period of famine which claimed the lives 
of hundreds of thousands and destroyed the economies of 
most of the nations in the region. Still, in the above 
report, a major investment is seen as needed to assist 
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these nations to provide funds to raise vegetables for 
Europeans during the winter months. It is apparent to the 
world Bank and the nations that would be recipients of 
such funds, that the best way to offset the ravages of 
famine at home is to export food abroad. This introduces 
a new claim to the magical properties of trickle-down 
theory. 
World Bank initiatives as the above are not 
uncommon and are in keeping with most bilateral and 
multilateral aid from the developed nations to the 
underdeveloped nations. The structure of most aid is to 
benefit the donor nations. The World Bank mainly 
approaches funding for its projects in the context of 
western visions of development, rather than attacking 
poverty. As World Bank projects in the past have been 
tremendous supporters of agribusinesses (many of which 
were the former trading companies), in the creation of 
infrastructure and urban development to assist the export 
of agricultural goods, the design of operations tends to 
support orthodox, western economic thinking. The greatest 
impact that aid programs have had on African nations, 
subsequent to independence, is to the extent that they 
obligate vast financial resources of the recipient African 
nation. 
Bilateral aid has also been an important segment 
of aid donations, though covering more specific 
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commodities, rather than broad economic development 
structures (U.S. aid activity will be covered in the 
following chapter). Though individual nations act upon 
what is in their own best interests, the sum of western 
donations and lending of funds has often been in areas 
where Africa is in need of the least (e.g.-military 
hardware) and a dearth of funds in areas where it could be 
utilized in a most beneficial manner (small-scale farming, 
intra-African transportation systems). The sum of what 
has been given serves to inhibit the growth of producers 
(e.g.-farmers) and maintains the line of dependency upon 
the west for essential goods and services. 
The potential for African nations to reduce their 
indebtedness to the west and to financial institutions is 
compromised by the unavailability of funding sources and 
approaches that could expand those sectors of productive 
activity which have Africans as their primary consumers/ 
beneficiaries. A Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) 
report expresses this concern: 
Where are countries going to find the foreign 
exchange to import the fertilizer, pesticides, 
irrigation pumps, vehicles and so forth, on which 
their production pr~spects will in large depend in 
the next few years? 4 
The response can only lead to a greater reliance 
on small-scale farm production, whose inputs are not 
nearly as costly as those of their large-scale, high 
technology counterparts. As many of the inputs of large-
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scale farm producers are imported, there is an additional 
saving in foreign exchange if emphasis is placed on 
small-scale agriculture. The need for greater indigenous 
food production, minus the costliness of imported inputs 
is a major challenge to be faced. The food deficit of 
Africa has increased during the past two decades as cereal 
imports have grown from $666 million in 1971, to $5.9 
billion in 1981.95 It was estimated that by 1984 
approximately one-quarter of Africa's 531 million people 
were dependent on grain imports.96 
Attempts to restore small-scale farmers to a 
position of respect worthy of financial compensation, 
relative to the importance of their sector is a matter of 
political, as well as, economic, decision-making. With 
falling per capita incomes, African people, particularly 
those who reside in the cities, will be confronted with 
higher prices for food unless there are increased 
government food subsidies for consumers and price supports 
for food crop farmers. The supply of imported grains that 
are sold at below market rates cannot be guaranteed in the 
future. It is the responsibility of Africa's governments 
to not only respond to the urgent immediate demands to 
feed their citizens but to also prepare for their future. 
The extent that indigenous food production can 
alleviate a portion of the debt problem is still but the 
first of many steps that must be taken if the debt 
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situation is to be slowed. Given the need for peaceful 
settlements to a variety of problems of major regional 
importance and the needs for increased economic coopera-
tion, the prescription towards reducing indebtedness to 
the west is a call for internal settlement of issues, that 
promote a greater self-reliance upon Africans themselves. 
As former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere once stated: 
"self-reliance is part of liberation ••• •97 
iii. Militarization and Armed Conflict 
Militarization and armed conflict have been two 
ominously prominent features of nationhood in Africa in 
the post-colonial period. While militarization and armed 
conflict are distinct concepts and realities, there are 
significant parallels and convergences which exist that 
can be identified for their impact on hunger and famine. 
By accelerating the size and training of armed troops and 
the purchase of military and military-related equipment, 
the shift of economic and labor priorities to support 
militarization efforts has a significant impact on the 
structure of a nation and the nations in its region. 
Labor is impacted upon, as those most able to 
perform the rigors of food production are absorbed into 
military service. Beyond the young and able-bodied being 
involved in military service, there is the diversion of 
labor away from other sectors. The importance of this 
diversion of potentially skilled labor is evident by the 
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importation of foreign 'experts' to help solve Africa's 
food production and distribution problems. 
African economies are also threatened by 
militarization. African spending on militarization 
increased from $3.8 billion in 1973 to $16.9 billion in 
1983.98 The spending figures for Libya, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Morocco show an almost tenfold increase between the 
years 1973 ($763 million) and 1983 ($7.1 billion).99 
The increase of military spending in Africa during 
this same time was one of the most dramatic in the world. 
The continent's share of world military spending grew from 
$7.8% to 10% (a 35% increase).100 The gross dollars 
appropriated to a country's military are an indication of 
a nation's commitment. These figures may not give an 
accurate picture of the extent of this commitment, as do 
figures which indicate the percentage of total government 
spending. For the years spanning 1973 to 1983, the 
military as a percentage of GNP in Africa, rose from 2.7% 
to 4.5t.l01 The Middle-East is the only region in the 
non-European, North American world with a higher 
percentage of its GNP committed to the military. Of the 
ten nations in Africa with the highest percentage of their 
GNPs committed to the military, seven were on the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) list of famine-stricken 
nations (see Table 13). 
The potential that possibly awaits Africa should 
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TABLE 13 
PER CENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT SPENT BY AFRICAN 
GOVERNMENTS ON THE MILITARY 
(1983) 












Source: Center for Defense Information, Military 
Facts (Washington, D.C.: February, 1986). 
*Famine-Stricken Country 
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it choose to invest in socially productive sectors of its 
economies, rather than in armament, is evidenced in the 
example of Japan. Part of the reason for the strength of 
the Japanese economy rests in its constitutional 
restriction which limits Japan to commit no more than 1% 
of its GNP to its defenses. Zbigniev Brzezinski calcu-
lates the present Japanese commitment at from 1.4% to 1.8 
percent.l02 
While Japan has benefitted from massive infusions 
of aid, the resistance to marked growth in the military 
has allowed for labor, capital and natural resources to be 
kept in more productive areas of the economy. 
only the u.s. exceeded the Japanese GNP.lOJ 
By 1983, 
Of the 
twenty-four nations listed by the FAO as receiving 
emergency food assistance, ten have committed to the 
military more than fifteen per cent of central government 
expenditures, or as a part of their GNP (see Table 14). 
Though many nations are indeed faced with threats to their 
very sovereignty, and finances must be committed to the 
military, most of the economies are fragile and cannot 
sustain conflicts of nature and the failure of diplomacy. 
On both the diplomatic and economic front, the imperative 
for regional cooperation and tangible commitment are 
essential. 
The transfer of capital and human resources to the 
military has several corrosive features on a nation's 
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TABLE l4 
AFRICA EMERGENCY FOOD AID RECIPIENTS WITH SIGNIFICANT 
EXPENDITURES ON THE MILITARY 
(Percentaqes) 
co .. ntry Year 
Anqola 23.2 62.5 1983 
ao .. rHna Faso 2.8 20.2 l983 
Chad 2.4 20.5 1983 
Equitorial G .. inea 3.4 21.0 l981 
Ethiopia 8.6 16.8 U82 
l'la,.ritania 5.8 l7 .l 1983 
MOsambiq"e 3.5 29.1 l982 
Somalia 9.1 2Z. 7 1983 
Zambia 15.1 30.6 1980 
Zimbabwe 6.7 15.6 1982 
sz, 5&-7, u, 
a•Milltary Expendit..res/Groee National Prod,.et 
b•Military Expendit,.res/Central Government Expendit,.ree 
94 
economy. An emphasis on military growth is accompanied by 
the purchase of military hardware, goods and related 
services. This emphasis can only be satisfied by either 
the production or importation of the desired items. As 
industrialization and mechanization are not abundant 
features in African economies, the emphasis placed on 
militarization and its more capital-intensive, 
technologically advanced forms, leads to an increasing 
demand for imported weaponry. The total of arms imports 
to Africa grew to $27.870 billion between 1979 and 1983, 
almost doubling arm imports between 1973 and 1978 at 
$14.410 bil1ion.104 Africa's share of world arms imports 
has also risen sharply from 3.4% in 1973 to 12.9% in 
1983.105 Continental Africa's share of arms import 
overwhelms comparisons to Latin America, whose share of 
imports is at 6.8%.106 
The list of African nations that are major arms 
importers bears a striking similarity to the FAO list of 
famine-stricken countries. Of the ten nations cited as 
major arms importers, six are on the FAO famine list (see 
Table 15). Among the nations most severely impacted by 
famine, Ethiopia and Angola combine for more than one-
third of sub-Saharan arms imports.107 The significance of 
arms is more obvious when it is compared as a percentage 
of total imports. In Cape Verde, Somalia and Uganda, the 
importation of weapons are between thirty and sixty 
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TABLE 15 
AFRICA'S LARGEST ARMS IMPORTERS, 1979-1983 











Kenya* • 450 
Source: Center for Defense Information, Military 
Facts on Africa (Washington, D.C.: February, 1986). 
*Famine Stricken Nation 
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percent of all imports.108 The benefits to the importing 
nation(s) are limited. 
By providing an emphasis on the military, 
countries are focusing very valuable and very limited 
human and financial resources on a sector that does not 
contribute towards the enhancement of the domestic 
economy. The example of Kenya is illustrative of this 
point. Between 1977 and 1981, Kenya promoted the growth 
of its military expenditures from 10% to 16% of its 
GNP.109 About 70% of the entire budget was composed of 
imported military goods.110 
Unless there is an imminent threat of danger, the 
benefits of such military growth are illusive. African 
nations have not benefitted from the kind of technology 
transfer that would permit the production and employment 
associated with weapons creation, nor from skills that 
could be incorporated in the civilian sectors, and that of 
the military. 
Militarization also reinforces the dominance of 
its sector. With the opportunity for employment and 
advancement limited in civilian occupations, the military 
becomes one of the few institutions capable of providing 
both employment and economic mobility. In many countries, 
the military has become a career necessity rather than a 
career opportunity. The strength of the military in the 
economy also siphons many of those who possess the 
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potential to make significant contributions in the 
business or agricultural sectors of a nation, but whose 
skills are dedicated towards the maintenance of the 
military. 
one-half of the nations listed as 'severely 
affected' by famine are engaged in a major commitment of 
armed forces in a state of war (Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Mozambique). If the black populations of Namibia and 
South Africa were isolated statistically from the white 
populations of their nation, they too would be considered 
as famine-stricken nations. In South Africa, malnutrition 
is the cause for more than 60% of infant mortality among 
blacks, while being more than 31 times greater than the 
rate for whites.111 
Warfare contributes to the creation of famine and 
hunger by: (1) death and injuries to food producers and 
combatants; (2) intimidation of food producers, thus, 
restricting or eliminating production; (3) the conscrip-
tion of farmers into military service, again, reducing the 
available number of food producers; and (4) further 
limited investments of resources toward food production. 
From the time of the independence movements, 
Africa has been embroiled in a series of wars and major 
conflicts. One important consequence of European rule was 
the creation of artificial national boundaries, as evolved 
out of the Conference of Berlin. With independence has 
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come the unresolved problem of irredentist claims and 
secessionist movements which emerged from African 
acceptance of European designated borders. These 
inherited boundaries have served to prevent a peaceful 
transition from colonized rule to independent nationhood. 
Despite the creation of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), the existence of intra-African conflicts represents 
the inability of African nations to resolve, diplomatic-
ally, the legacy of European colonialism. With one of the 
major tenets of the OAU being the sanctity of existing 
borders, the opportunity for debate on this crucial point 
has been denied an important point of reference.ll2 It 
can also be said that the armed conflicts between Africans 
are also a statement of the extent that Africa has 
increasingly become embroiled in the global conflict 
between the capitalist and socialist nations of Europe and 
North America. 
separatist movements have fueled major conflicts 
in: Ethiopia (Eritrea, Tigray); Zaire, Congo, Cabinda and 
Angola (the Bakongo); Morocco (the Polisario) and Nigeria 
(Igbo). Irredentist movements also have been evident, 
involving Somalia (with claims to Djibouti and to parts of 
Ethiopia and Kenya); and Morocco (with claims to Western 
Sahara, Mauritania and the Tiouf region of Algeria). 
Regional conflicts have erupted in the areas known 
as: the "Horn" (Ethiopia vs. Somalia), southern Africa 
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(South Africa vs. all its neighbors) and east Africa 
(Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya). The most widespread of 
these regional conflicts has involved South Africa. 
Attacks on neighboring countries by South Africa have 
become a frequent reality throughout southern Africa. 
Since 1970, the apartheid regime has attacked every nation 
in the region, (except Malawi) and supports anti-
government forces in Angola (UNITA) and Mozambique 
(RENAMO). South Africa and its proxy forces have 
inflicted major damage on transport, communications and 
port facilities throughout the region. Such attacks are 
also an attempt to prevent regional economic cooperative 
activities among the independent black nations of the 
region under the plans for the Southern Africa Develop-
ment Coordination Conference (SADCC). 
The extent that SADCC could be effective 
economically, also could be a measure of how effective 
Africans in the region could be politically, as a base of 
effective support and military activity by anti-apartheid 
forces in south Africa itself. It is estimated that since 
1960, the destabilization efforts of South Africa 
(military and economic) have cost the SADCC nations 
between $25-$28 billion.ll3 A loss of $25 billion equals 
the total productive output for the SADCC nations.ll4 
Wars of liberation have been a prominent feature 
on the continent as the struggles for freedom consolidated 
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the efforts towards black rule during the 1960s. The 
former Portugese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and 
Mozambique waged effective wars of national liberation 
which culminated in their collective freedom in 1976. In 
Zimbabwe, majority rule was ultimately established through 
years of guerilla warfare. In South Africa and Namibia, 
the final vestige of the European colonial era is being 
challenged with increasing effectiveness. 
The stereotypical African ruler is often depicted 
as a military official who has gained access to power by 
the power of a coup. While such a stereotype does not 
indicate effective or ineffective rule, it does identify a 
source of difficulty in the governance of Africa. Twenty-
four African countries are under military rule. Between 
1960 and 1982, there were twenty-five coups in sub-
Saharan Africa.ll5 Three reasons are apparent for the 
prevalence of coups in Africa: (1) foreign covert 
intrusions into domestic governments (e.g.- Lumumba, 
Congo7 Amin, Uganda)J {2) the availability of arms (mainly 
imports) and their use to settle disputes, and {3) the 
emergence of the military as a self-contained political 
institution and as a major source for employment.ll6 
The frequent lack of a peaceful resolution to the 
transition of power in African governments has disrupted 
the management and effectiveness of these governments. 
The constant shift in political and economic priorities 
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and in those who must execute these programs and policies, 
is a formula for ineffectual governance. 
Since 1970, Uganda has had four different rulers 
and five different governments. Ghana's present ruler 
(Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings) has ascended to the pinnacle of 
his nation's political power three times. By 1988, of 
Nigeria's twenty-eight years since independence, only ten 
years have been spent under civilian rule. 
Though heavily militarized and faced with a very 
serious threat beyond their borders (and in some 
instances, within their borders) the nations of southern 
Africa are without military rule. Still, what southern 
Africa shares with the remainder of Africa, albeit for 
different reasons, is the diversion of precious labor and 
economic resources to aspects of the economy that are 
virtually nonproductive. 
What the military produces, cannot be consumed by 
people who are unemployed, without land, or the means to 
produce. With such fragile economies, it is difficult to 
keep a state of war and accomplish production increases in 
other economic sectors. What is needed most by Africans 
throughout all sectors, but most particularly its farmers, 
is peace and a deemphasis on militarization. It is highly 
probable that this needed design will not achieve reality 
until a solution is found to apartheid and the 
artificially-created national boundaries that are found 
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across the continent. 
The weight of militarization and armed conflict 
have increasingly become a burden that the nations of 
Africa are unable to bear. Though there are important 
reasons for conflicts in many regions (apartheid, 
inherited boundaries), many of the conflicts can be 
settled by the force of diplomacy, rather than the force 
of weapons. It is apparent from the investment of weapon 
sales by the west into Africa, that warfare is of a higher 
priority than negotiations. If militarization can be 
likened to a loaded gun, then armed conflict is the 
discharge of its contents. 
In the not too distant past, African rulers 
exchanged slaves for guns to fight a neighbor that also 
was supplied by the slavers with weapons of advanced 
technology.117 Both sides became dependent on the 
instigator of their difficulties. Today, the relationship 
is virtually the same. Vital foreign currency is spent on 
questionable western technology and commodity items that 
add litle to the capacity of a nation to pursue a truly 
independent posture. With the growing dependency on food 
imports, Africa is selling away its future, de facto 
economic and political independence to satisfy 
questionable desires. 
iv. Environment 
The uniqueness of the African environmental 
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disorders goes beyond the extremes of nature. It is the 
conditioning of the environment to make it most 
susceptible to the impact of nature that has magnified 
nature's unsettling design. Lloyd Timberlake succinctly 
states that: "more people are affected because human 
activities actually make the land more prone to these 
disasters.n118 An excess of nature becomes a natural 
disaster when the lives of people are either injured or 
threatened. As land tenure, restrictive borders, 
urbanization and war have altered the living environments 
of people, more families and individuals are increasingly 
living in locations that once were absent of major 
settlements and activity. 
From the Sahel famine of the late 1960s and early 
1970s to the more widespread famines of the African 
continent in the late 1980s, the environment of Africa has 
been held under close scrutiny as the provocateur of 
famine. The agents for this concerted degradation of the 
environment were principally seen to be in the form of: 
drought, desertification, deforestation and soil erosion. 
By assuming nature to be the culprit, the focus of the 
blame did not have to be directed upon the policies and 
programs of the famine nations, foreign governments, 
international lending institutions and development 
planners. 
The major environmental problem that has come to 
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the attention of the global society has been drought. 
over a period spanning three decades, the Sudano-Sahelian 
zone has been tragically affected by drought. To a lesser 
extent, the southern African region has also been pressed 
to deal with the impact of drought throughout its region. 
By viewing drought as the most major cause of 
famine, writers failed to set forth the opposing view of 
their logical structure, that is, once drought is ended, 
famine will end as well. The position that drought, or 
any other environmental cause, is at the base of famine, 
does not address the following: 
1. the apparent discriminating effect of such 
ecological forces upon the poor, versus the 
more wealthy, landed populations, whose more 
lofty economic status insulates them from the 
impact of such a disaster; and 
2. how food crops destined for domestic consump-
tion are more heavily affected by the extremes 
of the environment than are export-oriented 
agricultural crops. 
The discriminating effects of famine have been 
evidenced across the continent. The International Labor 
organization studied the 1973 Ethiopian famine (in 
addition to those of Bengal and Bangladesh) and discovered 
that famine victims were associated with the variables of 
class and occupation.ll9 An example of this inequity of 
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suffering, as it impacts upon the poor, comes out of 
Nigeria: 
What needs to be emphasized [sic) here is that, 
even before the 1973 drought struck, poor farmers 
were almost at the end of their defenses. They 
had eaten their seed reserves and depended on 
'friends' for gifts or loans of seed1 they had no 
more livestock to sell, as all animals had already 
died or been sold ••• For many of the poor the only 
resource left by mid-1973 that they could pledge 
or sell was their 1and.120 
Drought has not only had a discriminating impact 
upon the poor, but also on agricultural production. In 
Mali, between 1969 and 1971, corn production dropped by 
one-third, while export-oriented cotton-seed products 
increased to a high of 68,000 metric/tons between 1971-721 
a 400% increases.l21 This trend has continued through to 
the 1980s. The Sahel nations of Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal and Chad reported record harvests of cotton 
in the 1983-84 seasons.l22 
The record increases in cotton are indicative of a 
strong commitment to its production, a dedication that 
could have perhaps been better suited for food production 
during the simultaneous period of famine. R.E. Dummett 
writes of the difficulty in growing cotton, which he views 
as: 
••• one of the most demanding forms of crop 
production in terms of labor inputs because it 
entails carefully timed planting, sowing of seeds 
at regular intervals, periodic thinning of cotton 
plants, constant weeding, and rapid and careful 
harvesting to avoid spoilage.l23 
It is estimated that both southern Africa and the 
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Sudano-Sahelian zone are receiving rainfall averaging 60% 
below their long-term norm.l24 The lack of rainfall still 
does not address the question of priorities, nor the 
ability to continue production (though in more limited 
forms). For example, the average rainfall received in 
Sokoto (Northern Nigeria) was four inches more than the 
annual rainfall received in London.l25 Drought has been 
evident in the u.s., South America, the Middle East and 
North America (where in the case of the latter two, dry 
soil is in abundance). Is the problem drought, or is it 
the priorities assigned to the differing sectors of the 
famine stricken economies? Again, Michael Lofchie asks 
the important question: "If drought is the explanation, 
why has it not affected export crops?nl26 
Even in the best of years, the African climate is 
not the most cooperative to agricultural production. Of 
the 19 nations considered to be in the Sudano-Sahelian 
zone, 13 nations have approximately 75% of their total 
territory in arid and semi-arid climates (the exceptions 
are Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Gambia, Benin, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia).l27 These nations have a history of being able 
to manage life in such dry lands. The knowledge gained 
from such a history is obviously being challenged at this 
time. Fifteen of the sudano-Sahelian nations are also 
affected by decertification (except: Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea and Benin).l28 Another nine nations were 
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havinq to endure new/recurrent drouqht pressures in 
1982-83 (Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, Mali, Somalia, 
Sudan, Seneqal, United Republic of Cameroon).129 
Within the sudano-Sahel zone, there are a variety 
of differences among the nations and their ability to deal 
with desertification problems (see Table 16). In the 
areas known as sub-Sahelian West Africa (Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Benin, Nigeria and the United Republic of 
Cameroon) there has developed a serious deterioration of 
rangelands.130 If such land is incapable of supporting 
animal grazing, then it also becomes a prime candidate to 
be absorbed by the ever-growing Sahara. An additional 
concern is the deforestation of the region, exacerbated by 
the pursuit of firewood. In the Sahel West Africa (Cape 
Verde, senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Niger, Chad), there is a severe problem with the 
movement of sand dunes, which has been beyond the ability 
of these nations to manage.l31 
In the West African sub-Sahel, rangeland has 
deteriorated severely, as have crop lands and forested 
areas. The Sudan shows evidence of being under massive 
ecological deterioration, as every category (sand dunes, 
rangelands, croplands, forest areas) reflects negatively 
on the nation's chances of improving its economy based on 
food production.l32 The Horn of Africa and East Africa 
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crops, and shrinking rangelands.l33 
In Southern Africa, the advance of desertification 
is marginally evident in the area surrounding the Kalahari 
Desert, while being highly active in Lesotho. In Lesotho 
and in the eastern portion of South Africa, the erosion of 
cultivated land by water has pushed Lesotho into the 
category of having the worst land degradation problems of 
any nation, with the possible exception of Nepal.l34 With 
the ongoing land deterioration within the territories of 
South Africa, known as "Homelands," the prospect of 
increasing losses in productive land in Southern Africa is 
inching closer ·to the depths of environmental destruction. 
Deforestation is another major threat to the 
ecological stability of African nations. The expanses of 
tropical forests have diminished at a rate of 1.3 million 
hectares per year, with 55% occurring in West Africa.l35 
Ivory Coast has lost more than 70% of its forest land 
since the turn of the century.l36 Madagascar, southeast 
Guinea, southwest Cameroon, Zaire, Kenya and Tanzania also 
have experienced sharp reduction in forest land.l37 
Aside from the rapid spread of deserts and the 
commercial exploitation of forestry, deforestation is also 
created by the requisites for daily life. The fuels in 
common daily use throughout the continent are mainly 
firewood and charcoal.l38 The greatest environmental 
damage is done by the collection of firewood for the daily 
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preparation of foods. Very often, the firewood that is 
collected are branches broken from trees and shrubs. The 
consequence of such vegetation loss is the erosion of the 
soil.139 As most African families are unable to furnish 
their homes with electricity due to limitations of cost 
and availabilities, the gathering of wood (even in urban 
areas) is a regular part of life for African families. 
The death andjor removal of trees and other 
vegetation is not solely the result of the African people 
and their attempt to survive, it is also the result of 
attempts by farmers and agribusinesses to create and/or 
expand the acreage for production. In the example of the 
Ivory Coast and the loss of its rainforests, the main 
reason for the disappearance of the forest has been the 
sale of its timber to western markets. 
The linkage between the degradation of the land 
and the frequency of drought throughout Africa is 
suggested by Lloyd Timberlake, he states: 
Computer models suggest that when the earth is 
stripped of vegetation it becomes more reflective; 
rainfall decreases. When there is less water in 
topsoil and in vegetation, there is less evapora-
tion; rainfall decreases. When the wind blows 
dust off bare land, into the air, clouds do not 
form; rainfall decreases.140 
Although Timberlake acknowledges that this link between 
social activity and environment has yet to be proven, it 
heightens the alarm that human interaction with the 
environment in the modern world directly threatens human 
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life, as much as it threatens human environment. 
Questions have been raised about the extent that 
Africa can continue to expand the cultivation of its 
lands. Of the continent's more than 3 billion hectares, 
only 5.2t is under cultivation (see Table 17). Only the 
Australian and South American continent have lower 
percentages of land under cultivation. Large-scale 
agricultural production is not viewed as likely in Africa 
as most of the continent lies between the two tropics 
(Cancer and Capricorn). This latitudinal location 
contains soil that is largely deficient in the amount of 
biological activity necessary for good crop production, 
particularly large-scale production which often leads to 
damaged soil. Large-scale food production would 
necessitate the clearing of large tracts of land for the 
efficient use of mechanized equipment. This removal of 
groundcover increases the potential for soil erosion.l41 
P. Buringh, however, disagrees with the notion of 
Africa's limited capacity as a food producer. Buringh 
asserts that: "the most significant, cultivable reserves 
of land are to be found, not in North America and 
Australia, but in Latin America and Africa."l42 The FAO 
buttresses Buringh's argument, stating that it estimates 
that 27t of the continent's land area is potentially 
cultivable.l43 
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area are still prohibited from cultivation as disease-
carrying insects have created significant obstacles. In 
the Volta River basin, the black fly infects people with 
onchoceriasis (river blindness).l44 In various areas of 
Africa, the insect known as the tsetse fly infects 
livestock with the disease known as trypanossomiasis 
(sleeping sickness).l45 While the insect also harbors the 
disease for humans, the impact it has on animals precludes 
the sale and/or use of livestock in farm activity 
(e.g.-oxen for ploughing). 
Though environmental constraints on crop 
production are indeed formidable, they are not insurmount-
able. An integrative planning is vital if food crop 
production is to flourish in countries with a fragile 
environmental system. This planning should seek to 
preserve what exists of fertile land areas from further 
erosion, decertification and over-intensive land use. 
This may require a return to indigenous food crops in 
greater abundance, as opposed to the steady introduction 
of food crops (e.g.-wheat, corn) that are ill-suited to 
the climate of many African countries. This approach 
would be extended to a decline in production of cotton, 
ground nuts and other cash-crops which place a great 
demand on the soil. Funds must also be invested towards 
protecting lands by planting trees and other ground 
covering to prevent soil erosion and other known and 
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unknown environmental damage. Urban dwellers also do not 
escape their responsibility to the protection of the 
ecology. It is important that energy consumption be 
reduced to lessen the demand placed on non-renewable 
resources as trees. The development of more energy 
efficient cooking ovens has gained wider usage throughout 
the continent but simply needs the funding and training of 
individuals to introduce such technology to greater 
numbers of people. 
What may be the key to Africa's future is the 
extent that funding is made available to small farmers to 
introduce measures into their crop production activities 
that can arrest the resistance of nature to food 
production attempts, as is the case for cash-crop 
production. Given the difficult economic predicament of 
most African nations and the lowly status afforded small 
farmers in economic assistance and support, the 
opportunity to improve Africa's environmental relationship 
is tied to the very economic well-being of many nations. 
The decisions which many African nations must face, 
addressing long-term survival versus immediate economic 
demands, almost always yield to the pressures of the 
moment. African countries have not been without their own 
ingenuity and analysis to cope with the severe problems 
that they have confronted. The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
and the 1986 Programme of Action for Economic Recovery and 
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Recovery and Development 1986-1990 are but two examples of 
how African governments have come together to formulate 
strategies and analyses to create an effective response to 
famine, hunger and other related problems (see Chapter IV 
for further discussion). 
Chapter Summary 
The foreign and domestic relationships established 
by present day African nations are an integral part of 
those factors that have diminished the ability of many 
African governments to respond effectively to the food 
needs of their people. social, political, and economic 
relations are factors which have an enormous impact on 
most any form of production. The decline of Africa's 
ability to respond to its food needs is the gradual result 
of a series of tumultuous events, from the colonial era to 
its neocolonial present. If African nations are to truly 
be effective in responding to their present food crisis, 
it can only be with the accompaniment of substantive 
social, economic and political change. The change does 
. 
not exclude those nations which maintain ongoing political 
and economic relationships with African countries. If 
African countries are to be able to confront its famines, 
then the policies and programs of foreign nations must be 
made compatible in achieving that goal. The following 
chapter will examine the structure of foreign assistance 
at the disposal of the u.s. government, the primary 
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foreiqn assistance donor in the world. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUCTURE OF U.S. FOREIGN AID 
The creation and application of foreign aid to 
achieve specific political and humanitarian objectives 
have been an important factor in the growth of u.s. global 
influence in the post World War II period. By forging a 
coalition of domestic economic interests, humanitarian 
principles and an amalgam of political and security 
concerns, foreign aid has expanded the options of u.s. 
diplomacy beyond trade and the commitment of troops. 
During the early debate on whether foreign aid 
should be an area of u.s. activity, World Bank President, 
Eugene Black stated that aid: (1) provides a "substantial 
and immediate" market for u.s. goods and services; (2) it 
stimulates the creation of overseas markets for u.s. 
businesses; and (3) orients national economies of 
recipient nations along a more capitalist path that u.s. 
companies can prosper.l46 President Kennedy advanced a 
different rationale for the necessity of foreign aid, 
stating that it is: "a method by which the United States 
maintains a position of influence and control around a 
country which would definitely collapse or pass into the 
Communist bloc.nl4 7 Thus, it is evident that the foreign 
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policy agenda is shaped by definitions of national 
interests and these national interests reflect u.s. 
economic, military and/or political goals and relations. 
The term "national interest" is a legitimate 
concept that all nations must define for themselves, in 
order to identify and protect their vital political, 
economic and social priorities. Plano and Greenberg in 
the American Political Dictionary view the national 
interest as: "based on the use of power divorced from 
moral principles and values.nl48 The expressed goal is 
the use of that power to satisfy the "security needs and 
well-being of the state.nl49 
In the u.s., security needs and well-being 
converge on behalf of U.S. business interests. To the 
extent that these and other interests are consistent with, 
or accepted into, the national interest is a consequence 
of prevailing domestic societal forces. Barnett 
elaborates: 
••• the struggle of domestic political, economic, 
and social forces within a nation is the primary 
determinant of the national interest ••• foreign 
policy is more an expression of our society than 
a programmed response to what other nations 
do.lSO 
The national interest has thus become a euphemism 
for competing elements in u.s. society which seek the 
hegemony of their own issue and/or policy concern. Given 
the competing elements in the construction of a national 
interest, a policy that is neither unified nor coherent 
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may result. With respect to aid, the creation of a 
national interest forms the distribution, kind and extent 
of aid. 
The two themes that are prevalent throughout the 
formulation of foreign aid have been strategic and 
economic concerns. The strategic theme involves foreign 
aid in the competition between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. This view addresses all actions on the 
international stage in the context of the global tensions 
between the superpowers. The importance of a nation to 
the u.s. is often based upon several dynamics: political 
and economic relations with communist nationsr military 
cooperationr trade relations and a nation's geographic 
location relative to important trade routes, adjacent 
countries, or military vantage positions. Humanitarian 
resolve is normally a victim of the above hierarchy. 
The constituencies for each of these interests are 
normally those which can influence the outcome of 
elections and sectors of the economy, they include: (1) 
commercejtrade; (2) regional/local economic considera-
tions; (3) defense industry and contracting; (4) ethnic/ 
racial interests. Conflict arises when humanitarian 
interests are excluded, or held as secondary in 
importance, to u.s. strategic/economic goals (e.g.-
Mozambique/Angola/Ethiopia). Legislative devices such as 
the Higgenlooper amendment, which was originally devised 
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to punish governments that nationalize u.s. property and 
businesses, delayed efforts to respond to the Ethiopian 
famine crisis.151 Another legislative restriction, the 
Brooke amendment, prohibited assistance to nations that 
are in default on u.s. loans.152 The Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that " ••• the policy 
concerns raised with regard to the provisions of food aid 
to Ethiopia directly influenced the time it took to 
approve the CRS (Catholic Relief Service) (sic] 
requests.ul53 
Much of the food assistance to Mozambique was 
provided under the condition of payment, despite its 
precarious economic situation (see Chapter 4). Angola was 
rewarded with greater contributions by the U.S. to the 
provocateurs of famine, UNITA, at a time when their 
intimidation of farmers (via the use of u.s. made Claymore 
anti-personnel mines) has greatly affected food production 
across Angola.154 
The extent that aid can be directed towards causes 
of hunger and famine may not be supported by u.s. concepts 
of national economic and security interests. The 
strongest support that can be expected for development, 
food and humanitarian aid can come by combining one or 
more of ongoing strategic and economic imperatives as part 
of a rationale, which was done in the very formation of 
the Food for Peace program (see Eugene Black statement). 
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Foreign aid is divided into four categories: Food 
Aid; Development Aid; Economic support Fund; and Military 
Aid. Each category reflects a unique area of historical 
circumstances and purposes. categories of aid such as 
Food and Development, at their best, serve to lessen the 
worst manifestations of hunger and famine. 
The distribution of food aid is directed from 
either bilateral or multilateral accounts. Bilateral aid 
is linked directly from the u.s. to a recipient nation. 
The benefit of bilateral aid from the donor's perspective 
is that it alone can set the terms on an agreement with a 
recipient nation. This is significant in areas where 
advantages can be won (e.g.-security agreements). From 
the perspective of the recipient nation, the major benefit 
can be in having only a single donor to satisfy in 
negotiations. The directness of the aid relationship can 
be most significant if the need is urgent. 
From the donor's perspective, the benefits of 
bilateral aid are diminished when an aid agreement falters 
due to the inability of the recipient nation to comply 
with the terms of the accord (e.g.-payment). This is a 
particular concern when the single donor must fully absorb 
the loss of economic assistance. The collection and 
direction of funds towards a single nation or project may 
limit the flexibility of donor nations to involve 
themselves among a number of potential aid recipients. 
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For the recipient nation, the shortcomings of 
single-donor relations arise from the same set of 
circumstances that produce the more positive aspects of 
bilateral aid. In the era of global •superpower' 
relationships and conflicts, the acceptance of funding 
and/or commodities from a single source may limit 
recipient nations from establishing accords with a wider 
variety of funding and trade sources. As indicated 
earlier in this chapter, aid was not a passive source of 
funding. It most definitely had significant political and 
economic overtones. The ultimate goal of U.S. aid was to 
create a dependence on u.s. agricultural exports. 
Of the bilateral food programs, the most noted is 
the PL-480, Food For Peace. With the creation of PL 480 
in 1954, under the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act, a new approach towards the expansion of 
u.s. economic and trade dominance was institutionalized. 
The introduction of the Act defined its objectives as: 
••• to expand international trade; to develop and 
expand export markets for u.s. agricultural 
commodities; to use the abundant agricultural 
productivity of the United States to combat hunger 
and malnutrition, and to encourage economic 
development in the developing countries, with 
particular emphasis on assistance to those 
countries that are determined to improve their own 
agricultural production, and to promote in other 
ways the foreign policy of the u.s.l55 
The goals of PL 480 were to be attained in 
accordance with the framework provided under its three 
titles. Title I permits the sale of u.s. agricultural 
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goods !&exchange for foreign currencies, which can be 
used for the following purposes: (1) Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) economic development; (2) u.s. 
agricultural market development; (J) payment of debts owed 
to the U.S.; (4) purchase of strategic materials; (5) 
purchase of u.s. military goods; (6) facilitate programs 
of u.s. government agencies and (7) purchase of goods and 
services from other countries.156 
For those able to participate in the Title I 
program, it was felt that the importation of food 
commodities would free financial resources for other forms 
of development projects.157 Those projects assumed the 
need to focus on industrialization and other non-food 
producing efforts. The primary beneficiaries of Title I 
sales were U.S. farmers who, by virtue of Title I, were 
able to secure a reliable outlet for their accumulating 
farm products.158 The stated beneficiaries, developing 
countries, accumulated greater debt and dependency on 
foreign shipments of food.159 
Title II of PL 480 addressed the need for food on 
an emergency basis by providing for food commodities as 
funded by u.s. government grants. Under the original 
legislation, food commodities were provided directly from 
government to government. This was changed in 1966 to 
facilitate the distribution of food through private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs), in addition to 
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governmental channels. The inclusion of PVOs (e.g.-
catholic Relief services, CARE) under Title II, was a 
departure from the original legislation, as PVO 
distribution was included under Title III. With the 
creation of the World Food Programme (WFP), congress 
permitted access of the U.N. affiliated body to food 
commodities for export in emergency situations. The 
essential feature of Title III was that it provided the 
u.S. government with the flexibility to barter food 
products for strategic goods and materials not commonly 
found or produced in the u.s. 
The emergence of the u.s. in the post-World War II 
era as the major global food producer and care-taker of a 
growing economy, led the u.s. to be the dominant country 
of the 1950s and beyond. The u.s. economy was so 
thoroughly dominant that until economic recovery could be 
fully maintained by Europe, its hungry population was 
considered by u.s. food producers as "our market. 11 160 
With the approach of the 1950s, European farmers expanded 
their production capacity and sought to reclaim their 
domestic markets. What resulted were u.s. farmers creating 
ever-increasing supplies of food without a market outlet. 
The period of the 1950s were also marked by the 
rise of Wisconsin senator Joe McCarthy, who was in the 
vanguard of anti-Communist doctrine, symptomatic of the 
so-called Cold War between the u.s. and the Soviet Union. 
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The 195~PL-480 provision carried a clause stating that 
sales of food commodities were permitted to "friendly 
nations," which were defined as: "any country other than 
the soviet Union or any nation or foreign organization 
controlling the world Communist movement."l61 As an 
essential feature of PL 480 was market creation, the 
prospect of such huge markets being unavailable to u.s. 
grain was contrary to the needs of middle-American farmers 
and the u.s. balance of trade. 
The economic advantages were not lost on a number 
of congressional legislators, none moreso than the senator 
from Minnesota, Hubert Humphrey. In a series of hearings 
orchestrated throughout 1957, Senator Humphrey laid the 
foundation for the direction of the PL 480 program and the 
agendas of future president. The most revealing of 
perceived advantages in the program came from a statement 
by the then Senator Humphrey, extolling advantages of the 
program, absent of its humanitarian importance. Humphrey 
stated: 
I have heard here this morning that people may 
become dependent upon us for food. I know that 
was not supposed to be good news ••• To me that is 
good news, because before people will do anything 
they have to eat. And if you are really looking 
for a way to get people to lean on you and to be 
dependent upon you, in terms of their cooperation 
with you, it seems to me that food dependence 
would be terrific.162 
Though Senator Humphrey was later to be reknowned 
for his more humanitarian instincts, he displayed a very 
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shrewd insight and instinct for security applications of 
this program that was later to be known as "Food For 
Peace." The potential of the program as a tool to be used 
in the development of markets for u.s. farm commodities 
was not lost upon the other senator from Minnesota, Edward 
Thye. Thye stated: 
If they [recipient countries] ever develop the 
taste for powdered milk or for butter ••• or if 
they develop a strong habit for wheat, where 
they are rice consuming, then we will always have 
a market there ••• we put these foods at their 
disposal for a period of six months or a year, 
after which they are always going to be looking 
for that type of a product.l63 
In sum, the composite thinking of Black, Kennedy, 
Humphrey and Thye supported the notion that u.s. foreign 
policy and specifically, the PL 480 program, can be all 
things to all people. The aims of the PL 480 program were 
not conceived to be an abberation from overall u.s. 
foreign aid and policy, but as an extension of the same. 
If an objective of u.s. foreign policy was to 
maintain and expand its security role in global affairs, 
then PL 480 can support that objective. If the objective 
of u.s. foreign policy was to expand and maintain u.s. 
markets for economic gain, then the PL 480 again offered a 
set of options. If the objective of u.s. foreign policy 
was to provide humanitarian support, then PL 480 could 
provide further outlets for u.s. surplus farm commodities. 
The PL 480 program is one of those rare programs in which 
the multitude of interests involved in the formation of 
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both domestic and foreign policy converge. 
The expansion of u.s. foreign assistance also 
coincided with the emergence of newly-independent African 
and Asian nations. These nations forged a new reality for 
their former colonial rulers, who were forced to confront 
the need to design other methods to advance their 
political and economic agendas. The u.s. was also 
motivated by the competition with the U.S.S.R. for the 
ideological soul of these new nations. 
The Food For Peace Act of 1966 supported this 
emphasis by claiming a more humanitarian posture through 
expansion of the Title II program. Strong support was 
also advanced to maintain the barter concept as part of 
Title III. A new Title IV program was also created that 
would provide opportunities for u.s. farmers to teach food 
production techniques to farmers of the more malproductive 
nations. This program feature, however, was never funded. 
What was perhaps most unique about the "new• emphasis was 
in Title I. 
Previous Title I programs featured clauses which 
supported recipient nations in the purchase of u.s. food 
commodities by allowing them to pay for such purchases in 
their national currencies, rather than in dollars, or some 
other major medium of foreign exchange. This was vitally 
important to European nations whose own currencies had 
declined from their pre-World War II value.l64 By the 
136 
decline~ from their pre-World War II value.l64 By the 
mid-1960s, the number of newly-independent African nations 
of Africa and Asia began to increase rapidly, possessing 
currencies whose value was not at all comparable to that 
of the dollar. This prompted the u.s. to demand compar-
able foreign currencies in exchange for u.s. goods.165 
Payment for u.s. goods would greatly hinder development 
and food production efforts that Title I and the remainder 
of the PL 480 program were supposed to assist. 
The 1970's influenced the level of food 
commodities and the "Food For Peace" program in three 
important ways. one, the proliferation of adverse weather 
conditions throughout the world (Africa, USSR) contributed 
to the rise in world grain prices.l66 Two, due to 
shortages in Soviet food production, the USSR entered the 
global market to purchase huge quantities of grain.l67 
Three, the closing years of the Vietnam war revealed 
manipulations of the PL 480 program for political, 
non-food purposes, resulting in significant changes in the 
program (will be discussed below) • 
With the drop of global food production levels 
during the 1970s, the objective of PL 480 that was focused 
upon the disposal of surplus food commodities became 
irrelevant. Commodity levels under the PL 480 program 
fell from 9.8 million metric tons in 1972 to 3.2 metric 
tons in 1974 (see Table 18). u.s. funding for the PL 480 
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TABLE 18 
ANNUAL VOLUME OF TOTAL PL 480 SHIPMENTS, FY 1955-1981 
(Metric Tons/Metric Ton Grain Equivalent) 
Fiscal Year Grains Nongrains 
1955 3,101,948 316,.518 
1956 9,207,440 863,128 
1957 12,965,169 1,306,159 
1958 8,253,239 975,320 
1959 10,438,493 1,049,794 
1960 13,543,473 781,798 
1961 15,458,030 884,040 
1962 17,686,602 1,091,605 
1963 16,055,762 1,310,815 
1964 15,637,926 1,138,072 
1965 17,307,701 1,103,331 
1966 17,390,714 766,714 
1967 12,994,477 962,670 
1968 13,530,784 1,048,277 
1969 8,911,786 1,084,672 
1970 10,088,604 929,589 
1971 8,927,958 906,879 
1972 8,993,769 911,864 
1973 6,637,482 663,526 
1974 2,961,470 352,517 
1975 4,522,477 304,828 
1976 6,215,112 437,488 
1977 6,016,913 417,083 
1978 5,632,300 462,400 
1979 5,851,600 438,014 
1980 5,524,025 543,024 
1981 4,829,255 801,308 
SOURCE: Lawrence Fuell, "The PL 480 (Food for 
Peace) Program: Titles I/III Terms and Conditions: 
Planning and Implementation Procedures," April, 1982, 
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program_ also fell slightly during the period from 1973 
~ 
(see Table 19). With the demand for u.s. grain at 
extremely high levels and the attempts by u.s. farmers to 
fill those orders, the surplus that was required to fill 
the various titles of the food aid programs declined 
dramatically. For the nations of the Sahel region, this 
convergence of events could not have happened at a more 
inopportune time, as drought exacerbated an already 
tenuous situation and led to the death of more than 
100,000 people in this sparsely populated region.l68 
In partial response to the lack of available 
commodities and to the continued politicization of food 
aid accounts (see below), the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act 
restricted the use of food aid commodities to countries 
that were defined as "most seriously affected" by acute 
hunger conditions, to no more than 30% of food aid.l69 
The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 
1975 furthered restrictions by limiting food aid 
commodities to nations, whose GNP was less than $300, to 
no more than 25% of commodity totals.l70 
Of related importance was the establishment of a 
minimum level of food commodities (1.3 million metric 
tons).l71 The World Food Programme and the PVOs were to 
be granted one million of the above total. The importance 
of these actions were to: (1) protect food aid programs 























AHNUAL VALUE OF PL 480 SHIPMENTS BY TYPE OF TRANSFER, FY 1955-1981 
(Thousands of Dollars) 
Title 1/111 Conc:essional Sales Title II Donations 
Long-Term Dollar 
Credit (DC) and Gov't-to-Gov't Private Barter for 
Convertible Local and World Voluntary Strategic 
Local Currency Currency (CLCC) Food Program Agencies Materials 
73,000 ------- 52,000 135,000 125,000 
824,000 ------- 38.000 105,000 149,000 
1,142,000 158.000 55,000 183,000 32,000 
866,000 181,000 87,000 180,000 32,000 
803,000 178,000 110,000 157,000 23,000 
723,000 300,000 100,000 150,000 6,000 
346,000 427,000 111,000 154,000 1,000 
309,000 506,000 113,000 128,000 ---------
204,000 539,000 138,000 142,000 ---------
143,000 535,000 228,000 152,000 ---------
6,000 661,000 159,000 128,000 ---------
---------- 575,000 147,000 145,000 ------------------- 762,000 148,000 191,000 ------------------- 966,000 83,000 143,000 ------------------- 760,000 92,000 250,000 ------------------- 739,000 112,000 223,000 ------------------- 793,000 128,000 265,000 ------------------- 853,000 185,000 217,000 ------------------- 770,000 234 ,ooo 275,000 ---------


























and finances; and (2) set minimum food levels under which 
~ 
the program would allow those PVOs to be able to gauge 
their organizational capacity, as a means to meet expected 
food allocations. This would assist in reducing much of 
the ad hoc organizational efforts to which PVOs must 
frequently adhere. 
Congress' most immediate response to the 
politicization of food aid occurred as the result of the 
Nixon administration's manipulation of the food aid 
process to allow south Vietnam and Cambodia funds for 
direct military use. The significance of such covert use 
of funds had broad implications: 
Nearly half of the 152 million in PL 480 Title II 
food aid during 1974 went to South Vietnam and 
selected parts of Kampuchea (Cambodia], while only 
about 1/6 went to all of Africa and Latin America 
combined. (The U.N.'s list of 32 countries most 
affected by the global economic crisis includes 
neither Vietnam nor Kampuchea (Cambodia].172 
In 1977, the International Development and Food 
Assistance Act offered less dramatic, but important, 
changes in the Food For Peace Program. The 1977 
legislation established criteria for a new poverty level, 
as based on the International Development Association 
(IDA). The IDA annually sets a statistical per capita GNP 
that it uses to define poverty.173 What was undoubtedly 
attractive about the IDA statistical minimum was that it 
factors inflation rates into its calculations. These 
attempts to identify poverty levels were extremely 
141 
important in attempting to direct Title I food aid to 
countries where poverty is most widespread. As will be 
discussed below, there are still shortcomings in the 
approach. 
A change was also created under Title III 
provisions of PL 480 as "Food For Development" was 
initiated. This new Title III sought to promote food 
production in Title I recipient nations by promoting the 
application of a country's Title I food sales to respond 
to the development needs of small farmers and the rural 
poor.l74 Under this title, food aid commodities can be 
limited if disincentives to domestic food production are 
determined.l75 Eligibility is also established by the 
ability of recipient nations to identify or create 
"self-help" actions that serve to increase food 
production. These "self-help" actions range from 
improvements in transportation to birth control,l76 
The ·arrangement of foreign food aid in the context 
of the PL 480 program masks a process that is intimately 
woven in the web of political considerations. Of the many 
important factors involved in the creation of u.s. food 
aid policy, the three most prominent are: the President, 
congressional committees charged with oversight and 
legislative responsibilities (Foreign Affairs and 
Relations, Agriculture, Appropriations), and the 
Inter-Agency Staff committee (ISC) which is comprised of 
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ExecutiVe branch representatives (AID, Department of 
Agriculture, commerce, State, Treasury and the Office of 
Management and Budget).l77 
Removed from the glare of public scrutiny, the ISC 
is charged with making the policy decisions and approval 
of programs, which direct the management of the PL 480 
program.178 Most important of their judgements are the 
decisions which permit nations access to food assistance 
programs and the quantity and/or cost that the u.s. would 
be willing to allocate.179 
Geopolitical concerns rival and frequently 
dominate humanitarian ethics, as the debate and political 
response to the African famine makes evident. While AID 
is charged with the management of food and development 
operations and analyses, the extent that one could expect 
AID to play an effective role in reducing famine is 
handicapped by its interplay with other agencies. 
Though the Food For Peace program (PL 480) is the 
centerpiece of u.s. bilateral food aid, there also exists 
two lesser known food distribution programs: Section 416 
program provision of the Agriculture Act of 1949 and the 
Commodity Import Program (CIP). Section 416 program 
serves to assist u.s. farmers in the reduction of surplus 
dairy (and to a lesser extent, wheat) products to "needy 
people."180 The method of payment by the recipient nation 
includes the barter or exchange of resources considered 
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strategfc by the u.s.lBl 
As part of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and 
the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Commodity Import 
Program assists AID in financing the export of what are 
considered to be essential commodities, including: 
agricultural, construction and transportation equipment, 
fertilizers, chemicals, raw materials, semi-finished 
products and foodstuffs.l82 The financing is provided in 
the form of loans or grants. Food Aid under CIP is not 
considered tied to emergency assistance criteria or rates 
of extreme impoverishment, thus permitting such nations as 
Israel and Egypt to receive major allocations of food aid 
commodities.lSJ Though the CIP does include commodity 
exports, it is the capacity of the program to finance the 
importation of commodities to offset balance of payment 
problems.l84 
Another bilateral food assistance program which no 
longer exists but deserves mentioning is the Food Security 
Wheat Reserve. Although it was created in 1980, the 
history of the reserve has its origins in the Sahel famine 
of the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. The Act was created 
during the African famine to establish the authorization 
of four million metric tons of u.s. government owned wheat 
which would be held in storage and disbursed for nations 
in need of emergency, humanitarian assistance of food.l85 






faced cdhtroversy for a variety of reasons. One, those 
informed of the dietary habits of most African and Asian 
people argue that wheat was not a normal part of the 
dietary habits of the average person in these food 
recipient nations.l86 Rice, millet, maize (among other 
foods) are more widely consumed grains that people of 
these endangered nations are accustomed. 
The distribution of wheat not only posed problems 
for people unaccustomed to such a grain but also posed the 
additional problem of how to educate people on its 
preparation.l87 Given the urgency of emergency famine 
situations and the all too frequent shortage of labor 
involved in these efforts, the choice of wheat wastes 
valuable labor time and effort. 
There was also resistance from u.s. wheat 
producers who feared that the creation of such a reserve 
would result in its being reintroduced onto the grain 
markets and thereby, depress the price of wheat. An 
additional fear was that such reserves would be 
established for other popular, u.s. grown farm commodities 
and would again add to the threat of potential price 
deflation. 
The above arguments notwithstanding, the creation 
of a wheat reserve was as much the result of opportunism 
as it was the result of extended debate on the merits of 
the legislation. In January 1980, President Jimmy Carter 
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imposed~ embarqo on u.s. qrain sales to the Soviet Union 
as a response to the invasion and occupation of 
Afqhanistan by the Soviet union. 
With contracts to the USSR now cancelled, the fear 
existed that u.s. farmers would no lonqer have a mechanism 
to sell the tons of wheat and other qrains that neqoti-
ations with the Soviets had created. With the spectre of 
fallinq qrain prices, the marriaqe of convenience between 
the humanitarian need for some kind of a food reserve and 
the economic need to keep the surplus qrain from findinq 
its way back onto the market, led to the passaqe of the 
Food Security Wheat Act, in December of 1980. For reasons 
which will be explored in the next chapter, the Food 
Security Wheat Reserve was denied reauthorization in 
September, 1986. 
The "Presidential Reserve," as passed in March, 
1985, by Conqress as part of the Food Assistance for 
Africa Aqricultural Act (FAAA), was to establish famine 
relief and inland transportation support. Two conditions 
were to be met before the reserve could be released: (1) 
AID must introduce a plan of action to conqress and 
indicate how reserve funds would be utilized before 
relief; and (2) the President must qive approval and 
verify that such funds are imperative for famine relief 
funds.188 
The need for a reserve that could be used in 
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famine ~ergencies is a response to the difficulties in 
getting grains moved from u.s. silos, to export harbors, 
across an ocean, to the recipient country and, ultimately, 
to the areas (mainly in rural regions) where famine has 
often had its greatest impact. Most important is the 
provision for funding to be used for transport. The 
historic problem for food assistance is the lack of 
commitment to, and the shortage of, vehicles to transport 
food from the docks to the areas of need.l89 
In some respects, the passage of the Africa 
emergency food bill represented the most hollow of 
political victories. It had only come after the worst 
period of the famine had laid waste to Africa's people and 
lands. The existence of the Presidential reserve was only 
guaranteed through september 30, 1985, reducing the u.s. 
capacity to effectively respond to the famine crisis. 
Multilateral aid programs have also served a 
functional capacity in the assignment of food commodities, 
funding and the development of a nation's food producing 
potential. The structure of multilateral assistance would 
appear to give certain advantages to both donor and 
recipients. Under such arrangements, donor countries are 
able to 'share' any financial risks involved in assistance 
activity, as well as, have the ability to commit smaller 
sums of money while freezing the uncommitted funds for 
investment programs across a wider spectrum. 
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-The multilateral approach advances the view that 
with a wider number of nations as donors, there would be a 
lesser likelihood of recipients having to yield to a 
single donor's demands. In theory, one would suppose that 
there would also be larger sums of money available for 
food activities, as a greater number of nations would have 
pooled their resources. After years of experimentation and 
interaction, the supposed advantages of a multilateral 
approach for recipient nations have not kept pace with its 
reality; the contrary can be said for donor nations. 
The largest source of emergency food aid is the 
u.s., under P.L. 480. The World Food Programme, a 
multilateral agency, does not match the size of PL 480. 
The capacity of multilateral organizations to influence a 
single nation has been limited in a variety of forums 
where voting is weighed in accordance to financial 
contributions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund), 
or where the defacto distribution of power is with the 
nation that has the largest financial investment 
(e.g.-International Fund for Agricultural Oevelopment).l90 
The most dominant force at these gatherings has been the 
u.s. For the recipient, the selection of multilateral, as 
opposed to bilateral, aid is more a matter of the 
availability of commodities than of a selection based upon 
policy considerations. 
One multilateral respondent to the immediate and 
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long-teEm challenge of hunger and famine is the World Food 
Programme (WFP). Established in 1962 with the support of 
the United Nations, FAO and the u.s., the primary focus of 
the WFP is to provide food for social and economic 
development. There are four primary areas on which WFP 
seeks to address: 
1. Human Resource Development (includes direct 
food assistance) ; 
2. Infrastructure Development (food is substituted 
as wages in development projects); 
J. Production Development (use of commodities in 
such a manner as to support development 
activities, e.g., feed grain for livestock); and 
4. Resettlement Programs (use of food aid to assist 
communities that are involved in crop production, 
whose plantings had not reached maturity).l91 
There were fears expressed by many of the donor 
and the recipient nations that WFP distributions of food 
would lead to reductions in bilateral food assistance. 
Donors argued that WFP would lessen the influence of their 
bilateral accounts (via conditionalities) upon recipient 
nations.l92 If the need was not massive, a recipient 
nation would simply go to the WFP (or so it was reasoned) 
and receive the needed assistance. With the u.s. being 
the largest producer of food commodities during the 
inception of the WFP, such concerns were not of sufficient 
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weight to block the maintenance and expansion of the 
program. 
In its early years, it was the u.s. which provided 
the necessary levels of food commodities to build the 
reserve capacity of the WFP (about half of all 
contributions).l93 Much of what was provided for WFP 
comes from the Title II of PL 480. From the perspective 
of the u.s., the WFP provided another outlay for its food 
commodity producers by changing the food consumption 
patterns of the world's poor to one that would be more 
reliant upon western producers to satisfy their needs and 
preferences. 
i. Food Aid As Weapon 
The structure of u.s. food aid has a long history 
of being merely an accomplice to the motives of u.s. 
economic and political dictates. u.s. food aid serves 
major domestic u.s. food producers and security interests 
much more than what is expressed as its stated intentions 
of serving the poor of foreign lands. Development 
assistance is another important feature of u.s. foreign 
aid, which AID defines as an attempt to: "promote 
economic growth and equitable distribution of its 
benefits.nl94 This AID-supplied definition limits the 
measurement of development to the criteria of economic 
growth. As a criteria, growth is woefully inadequate to 
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weigh tae perceived distribution, integration and 
participation of the various sectors into a nation's 
economy. Economic growth has been achieved in nations as 
diverse as Brazil and Kenya, while simultaneously offering 
evidence of a steep decline in health, education and 
housing benefits to their people.195 The implied thrust 
of AID's definition of development is that growth would be 
of primary concern. AID avoids the questions of: (1) how 
growth is created; (2) what sectors of the economy are to 
be designated to promote growth; and (3) who are the 
beneficiaries of growth? 
The last portion of AID's definition of 
development suggested that any benefits accumulated from 
such an approach would then be distributed "equitably" 
across society. Development assistance repeats the 
longstanding theme of "trickle-down" economic theory, 
which has proven its ineffectiveness since the u.s. 
depression of the 1930s. 
It also reveals the bias of development thinking 
in the u.s. which claims to seek resolution of poverty, 
hunger and famine crises by avoiding the people most in 
need of being served. The bias towards economic growth 
supports those projects and plans which lend themselves to 
statistical indices which may have little relevance to the 
poor. such projects and plans are most apparent in the 
emphasis placed on macro-economic planning and projects 
-------------------------- -
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which address the chronic nature of poverty and the 
collective rises of famine in an obtuse manner. 
The macro-project approach further estranges the 
poor from participation, and ultimately, the benefits of 
development assistance. The ownership of land and other 
inputs are important requisites for becoming a beneficiary 
of food production assistance.l96 In Africa, as elsewhere 
throughout the world, land ownership is a powerful lure to 
attract financial investments.l97 
The third implication of the AID's definition of 
development is the absence of foreign aid considerations 
to nations whose indicators of poverty would make them the 
primary recipients of aid but whose economic and/or 
political leanings are not favored by the u.s. Of 
particular concern is the priority given to nations that 
are more closely aligned to U.S. foreign policy interests, 
than for those that assume a more non-aligned posture.l98 
As will be discussed below, it appears that humanitarian 
imperatives are not as highly considered in u.s. aid 
deliberations as advantages in u.s. interests. 
In 1973 and again in 1975, this concern prompted 
Congress to impose language in the Foreign Assistance Acts 
to limit AID's release of food development funding of 
nations, based upon security relevance to the u.s., rather 
than considerations of poverty and emergency needs.l99 
This legislation came to be known as the "Four Pillars" 
----------------------- ~--
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approacwto u.s. bilateral development assistance. 
The goals of the "Four Pillars" as found under the 
1973 Foreign Assistance Act were: 
(a) alleviation of the worst physical 
manifestations of poverty among the world's 
poor majority; 
(b) promotion of conditions enabling developing 
countries to achieve selfsustaining economic 
growth with an equitable distribution of 
benefits; 
(c) encouragement of development processes in 
which individual civil and economic rights 
are respected and enhanced; and 
(d) integration of the developing countries into 
an open and equitable international 
system.200 
While the ultimate stated aim is to reduce poverty, the 
bias inherent in accomplishing this task is a growth 
first, distribution second, approach. The ingredient most 
essential for growth is implied as the "free market." 
There is evidence to suggest that from the 
standpoint of AID, the most effective means to reduce 
poverty, promote economic growth, and encourage the 
development of a "free market" system is to further 
integrate/encourage countries into the global, capitalist-
dominated, international economic system. It is 
questionable that the same system that has so ably 
assisted and benefitted from the existing economic and 
political inequalities would be the vehicle for 
deliverance of underdeveloped nations. 
The effectiveness of the New Directions approach 
must also be viewed as questionable. Congress exempted 
--------------------- -
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the Economic Security Fund (ESF) and multilateral 
development banks from New Directions legislation.201 As 
the former is the fastest growing account in u.s. 
bilateral aid and the latter includes substantial u.s. 
allocations to the World Bank, these exclusions are of 
major importance to development and political decisions 
and activities. Further attempts were sought to install a 
more 'poverty focus' on the allocation of aid. 
In 1981, congress passed the Hunger and Global 
Security bill which contained provisions to require AID to 
increase international development bank allocations that 
would benefit those in poverty.202 In 1982, Congress also 
passed the "Targeted Development Aid" amendment to 
instruct AID to provide at least 40% of the goods and 
services it provides in development projects to directly 
benefit people in poverty.203 
Despite these attempts, there is still doubt as to 
the effectiveness of these measures. Although New 
Directions and other subsequent legislation were an 
improvement over the structure of prior assistance 
programs, major flaws still exist. While the expressed 
intent was to insure a 'poverty focus' in assistance 
programs, development dollars followed military aid to 
many of the Least Needy Nations (LNNs). 
The most prominent of the LNNS are Israel and 
Egypt. Though the listing for the ten largest recipients 
··---------------------------------------------------
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of u.s. =bilateral aid have changed, Israel and Egypt have 
remained as the top aid recipients (see Table 20). Israel 
receives the largest share of its aid in military 
assistance, while Egypt receives the bulk of its aid from 
development accounts. Turkey and Pakistan are also two 
nations whose presence is featured regularly on the list 
of major aid recipients. If GNPs were to be taken into 
consideration, only Pakistan would qualify for aid under a 
poverty focus. 
According to the World Bank, the per capita GNP of 
the remaining three nations range from $5320 (Israel) to 
$670 (Egypt), Turkey's GNP is a relatively comfortable 
$1360.204 The imbalance of aid distribution and the bias 
of u.s. aid is evident as: (1) the total amount of 
bilateral aid to Africa, minus Egypt, is exceeded by the 
amount of aid given to Israel; and (2) Sudan is the only 
African nation, other than Egypt which qualifies regularly 
as a recipient of u.s. foreign aid (see Table 12). 
Though a stated purpose of u.s. aid is to 
alleviate the worst vestiges of poverty, the means by 
which this is to be achieved do not correspond frequently 
with the desired goal. The evidence suggests that it is 
much more advantageous to to be considered vital to u.s. 
security needs than it is to be considered in need of 
either humanitarian or development support. 






TOP TEN RECIPIENTS OF U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID-ACTUALS 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
Total Economic 
and Military 
Year Rank Assi-stance Security Development PL 480 
1980 1 1,184,228 865,845 318,381.0 
1981 2 1,683,741 1,319,792 303,949.0 
1982 2 1,980,300 1,671,400 286,900.0 
1981 2 2,343,700 2;076,900 418,000.0 
1984 2 2, 479,883 2,251,675 238,208.0 
1980 2 1,786,000 1,785,000 1,000.0 
1981 1 2,164,000 2,164,000 
1982 1 2,206,000 2,206,000 
1983 1 2,485,000 2,485,000 
1984 1 2,610,000 2,610,000 
1985 1 3,350,000 2,350,000 
1980 ] 406,129 406,239 90.0 
1981 3 453,815 705,540 4 5.0 
1982 3 704,100 I 703,000 . l 
1981 l 688,800 687,800 
1984 l 857,717 856,777 








Securi.ty Country Year Rank Assistance Development PL480 
Pakistan 1982 8 203,300 100,600 -- 100,000 
1983 4 543,100 468,800 -- 78.400 
1984 4 579,133 525,783 -- 50,000 
1985 4 538,013 525,970 50,000 
BanC)ladesh 1980 6 175,563 116 80,280 95,000 
1982 8 172,600 200 74,400 98,000 
Indonesia 1980 5 229,857 33,090 82,721 114 '04 6 
1981 7 167,209 32,240 68,812 66,157 
...... 
India 1980 4 232,141 273 103,200 128,668 lJ1 <J' 
1981 4 104,499 4 --- 170,558 
1982 7 221,900 .1 98,500 12 3' 300 
1983 9 209,000 • 1 89,000 120,500 
1984 10 202,754 126 87,500 40,000 
s. Korea 1980 7 162,899 130,560 --- 30,000 
1981 5 191,699 162,737 --- 27,000 
1984 9 231,786 231,786 
1985 10 231,943 231,943 
Phillipines 1980 8 160,181 95,539 39,679 20 '0 2 4 
1981 6 173,134 75,591 38,523 2 4, 04 2 
Portu9ua1 1980 10 100,864 74,864 --- 29,000 
Country Year Rank 









Costa Rica 1983 8 
Honduras 1985 8 

















408,831 316 '784 
561,076 421' 250 
218,000 161,600 
231,943 214 '904 
121,980 65,409 







36;200 34 '900 
58,800 7,700 ...... 













Country Year Rank ASSISTANCE SECURITY DEVELOPMENT PL480 
Greece 1982 4 281,300. 281,300 
1983 7 281,300 281,300 --- ---
1984 5 501,406 501,406 
1985 6 501,366 501,366 
SOURCE: u.s. Agency for International Development, Congressional 
Presentation, Fiscal Years 1980, 1981, 1982 1983, 1984, 1985, Halo Volume 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Offfce, l9SO, l981, 1982, l983, 1984, · 
1985). 





u.s. development assistance is diverted into 
bilateral and multilateral assistance programs. u.s. 
bilateral development is administered by AID. The 
accounts which have the greatest pertinence to African 
development are: (1) African Development Foundation; (2) 
Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition; and (3) 
Sahel Development Fund. The African Development 
Foundation (ADF) provides grants to locally-initiated, 
micro-enterprise programs. These programs may range from 
farmer cooperatives to adult literacy.205 Though ADF is 
modestly funded, it is effective in its approach of 
engaging in a working partnership with those who are the 
intended beneficiaries of aid. 
The Agriculture, Rural Development and Nutrition 
account forms the more traditional outlet of rural sector 
assistance for developing nations. Commodities produced 
under this account tend to span the breadth of agri-
culture, with food production being only a segment of the 
agricultural activity promoted. 
This portion of the Agriculture, Rural Development 
and Nutrition program is known as "Functional Assistance 
Accounts," which includes: (1) Population Planning; (2) 
Health; (3) Education and Human Resource Development and 
(4) Energy, PVOs and 'Selected Development Activities.•206 
The Sahel Development Program is AID's response to the 
extended hunger and famine conditions in the Sahel region 
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of Africa during the 1970's. The goals of the program are 
stated as seeking to: (1) reduce the difficulties to the 
economies of the Sahel brought about by the famine; (2} 
achieve food production self-sufficiency in the region; 
and (3) the stabilization of the Sahel's natural 
environment.207 
These above goals are supported by u.s. 
cooperation with the two primary development structures in 
the Sahel region. The Permanent Interstate Committe for 
Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) is one such agency, 
which includes: Cape Verde, Chad, the Gambia, Mali, Niger, 
Mauritania, senegal and Burkina Faso.208 The other major 
organization in the Sahel is the Club des Amis du Sahel 
(Club), which is supported by twenty Sahelian nations and 
the u.s.209 u.s. geopolitical interests are in the 
forefront of seemingly innocuous aid distributions. 
According to AID, among the many reasons for the u.s. role 
in the region is to " ••• preclude Libyan expansion-
ism ••• n210 With the Sahel region bordering along Libya's 
southern flank and the desperately weakened people and 
economies of the region unable to find relief, the fear of 
Libya's potential to exploit the situation to its 
advantage magnified. 
iii. Multilateral Assistance 
The largest area of u.s. development assistance is 
to be found in its multilateral aid programs. Funds are 
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provideq_to international organizations for the purpose of 
supporting development projects. The major benefactor of 
u.s. multilateral assistance is the World Bank, for the 
stated purpose of providing both intermediate and 
long-term development loans. The origins of the World 
Bank date to the post-World War II, Bretton Woods 
agreement, which provided funds for war-ravaged Europe to 
rebuild its infrastructure and industries.211 The u.s. 
was the major supplier of capital, as its economy was 
easily the most dominant of the post-war era.212 
A consequence of the post-war period was the 
emergence of national liberation movements in the nations 
colonized by Europe. The perceived need by the rulers of 
these new nations for finance capital lead to the creation 
of the 'soft' (low-interest) loans to be found in the 
International Development Association (IDA). The creation 
of IDA was actually an alternative idea that developed 
when the u.s. and other western nations resisted the 
notion of having a U.N. sponsored agency administer loans, 
thus diluting potential u.s. leverage in any loan 
agreement.213 
The position of the u.s. as the major funding 
source of the World Bank further translates into dominant 
voting strength in the operations and policies of the 
Bank. · The formula used to calculate the share of voting 
strength for donor nations gives the u.s. a full 27% of 
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the votes in IDA.214 These votes may also allow the u.s. 
the capacity to exercise political leverage to influence 
World Bank and IDA policies by: (1) being able to admit or 
block nations from participating in World Bank/IDA 
affairs; (2) supporting or preventing aid to nations which 
correspond to u.s. national interests; (3) identifying the 
conditions for membership; and (4) setting the priorities 
and agenda of the Bank institutions. 
The Bank's priorities have assumed some of the 
same characteristics of u.s. foreign aid, including: (1) 
macro-development emphasis; (2) promotion of export-
oriented agriculture at the expense of domestic food 
production; (3) lack of substantive funding support for 
the inclusion of women in the development process; and (4) 
overall lack of participation offered to those in poverty 
to participate in the development process. The major 
recipients of IDA funding are mainly nations that are 
generally supportive of u.s. goals and objectives 
internationally (Table 21). 
Under A.W. Clausen's tenure as World Bank 
president, the Bank began to retreat from its more 
poverty-focused leanings of his predecessor, Robert 
McNamara. Under McNamara, loans moved from the bias 
displayed in favor of the urban sectors to infra-
structure development. Clausen called for a greater 
emphasis on 'growth' sectors and activities. Sheldon 
TABLE 21 
IDA'S TEN LARGEST BORROWERS, 1961-1981 
AS ' OF GROSS 
COUNTRY GNP/CAPITA 1961-91 DOMESTIC INVESTMENT 
INDIA 240 9,566.0 21.6 
BANGLADESH 110 1,788.2 13.1 
PAKISTAN 300 1,446.9 1.8 
EGYPT 580 981.2 .9 
INDONESIA 430 931.8 • 3 
TANZANIA 280 611.5 3.1 
SUDAN 210 595.5 1.6 
SRI LANKA 270 516.6 1.5 
KENYA 420 458.3 1.5 
ETHIOPIA 420 443.1 7.9 
SOURCE: World Bank, IDA In Retrosp~c~ (Washington, D.C.: 






Annis interpreted this new emphasis as steerinq towards: 
(1) greater emphasis on free market economies; (2) 
privatization of public sector functions; and (J) 
promotion of 'efficient' policies that would entice 
investments by commercial banks and developinq 
countries.215 
The sum of Clausen's approach is one of 
traditional capitalism in economies that are vulnerable to 
more mature capitalist institutions. If the object is for 
developing nations to be more capitalist, then they must 
have more control of their own national markets if the 
foundations of capitalism are to take root. The object of 
Clausen's remarks were clearly to open developinq 
economies to further economic penetration from the more 
developed countries. 
The African Development Bank (ADB) is one of the 
many regional development banks that emerged during the 
1960s as a response to the perceived inadequacies of the 
World Bank lending structure.216 Other parallel 
structures included the Asian Development Bank (ADB); and 
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The stated 
objectives of the ADB are to: "increase resources, offer 
greater flexibility in lending policies, and provide more 
local control in the determination of policies and the use 
of finances."217 Though the regional banks and IDA are 
different in their focus, there is little difference in 
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their iritent. 
The intent of the World Bank does, however, 
provide a separate course of direction. Cheryl Payer 
identifies one such difference in the Bank's definition of 
who would be recipients of Bank funding and project 
support: 
In its projects the Bank has found it easiest to 
devise a way to assist the poor with some tangible 
assets, however meager (a small farm, a cottage 
industry, or a small-scale commercial operation in 
the urban centers.218 
The ultimate goal of the Bank in its rural 
programs is evident by its statement of intent for 
rural development: " ... the modernization and monetization 
of rural society, and with its transition and traditional 
isolation to integration with the national economy.n219 
Rural development, as designed by the Bank, is still the 
perpetuation of the economic dominance of the developed 
nations at the expense of the poor and underdeveloped 
nations. 
Another response to emerge from a multilateral 
framework is IFAD. With origins in the 1974 World Food 
Conference, IFAD possesses a unique approach towards 
alleviating hunger. From its view, the development focus 
is directed towards the following themes: (1) increasing 
food production; (2) improving nutritional standards; and 
(3) alleviating poverty in rural areas.220 The IFAD 
approach addresses two vital factors in the impoverishment 
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of people: (1) landlessness; and {2) credit access to the 
poor. 
The IFAD perspective accommodates the belief that 
people who are poor are not without productive 
capabilities for their own development. This approach is 
based on two important assumptions: {1) growth can 
neither be maximized nor sustained without the utilization 
of the productive potential of the mass of small 
producers, and without guaranteeing them a minimum share 
of output; and (2) output is a function of five factors of 
production, namely: land, labor, capital, entrepreneur-
ship and knowledge, and the access to them.221 
These assumptions and approaches give IFAD the 
appearance of engaging socialist methodology to achieve a 
capitalist production environment. Whatever the root of 
!FAD's approach and the base of its assumptions, it is 
clearly a departure from the macro-enterprise, high-
technology bias of the World Bank and other development 
institutions. 
The membership of IFAD is divided into three 
categories. Category I is comprised of economically 
developed countries (Organization for Economic Development 
and cooperation); Category II countries are those oil-
exporting nations (mainly those of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) and Category III countries, 
which are mainly those nations that are seeking to lift 
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themselVes from their poor economic condition. 
The first two categories are the donors, the 
remaining category consists of recipients. Those in 
Category III are of the very poorest of the food deficit 
nations (identified by per capita GNP). The division of 
nations into these three categories also represents the 
structure for voting and decision-making within the 
organization, thus insuring that both recipients and 
donors have a representative voice in the establishment of 
policy. It is also significant that OPEC nations are 
participants, expanding the list of traditional donor 
countries, with what is hopefully a fonder appreciation of 
the problems inherent in development programs from the 
view of a recipient. 
By the end of 1984, !FAD contained 20 members in 
Category I; 12 in Category II; and 107 in Category III.222 
These combined three categories of official giving 
produced a total of 160 projects (57 in Africa) by the end 
of 1984.223 Most of the loans are provided at rates of 
lt, 4t and at per year, over a period from 15 to 50 
years.224 The funding sources of IFAD originated from the 
first two categories, in which the category I nations were 
expected to provide 58% of funding, with Category II 
nations providing 42%. This formula served to initiate 
intense debate as the u.s. argued for changes in the 
funding formula to more closely approximate an even 
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division of financial commitment during the 1985 
replenishment (funding contributions). IFAD's 1981-1984 
budget was $1.1 billion (see Table 22). African nations 
have received 28% of the loans and grants offered for 
projects, with Asia receiving the largest share at 41% 
(see Table 22). These projects are expected to yield more 
than 20 million tons of grain annually equalling one-
fourth of 1981 cereal deficits of all underdeveloped 
nations.225 
Landless women have also been active loan 
recipients, receiving 52% of all available loans.226 The 
effort by IFAD to incorporate the rural poor at the center 
of their project activity demands a much greater 
involvement by the local populations themselves. In many 
instances, new social institutions have to be created in 
order to sustain project activity. These institutions may 
not have previously existed in certain areas, due to the 
distrust of land-owners, disruption brought about by the 
creation and perpetuation of colonial rule and also by the 
pressures created by nature (drought, desertification). 
By whatever means social institutions have eroded, 
creating a void in social relations and activity, it 
became imperative that the local recipient groups be 
formed to support the IFAD approach. IFAD underscores the 
importance of people by stating: 
••• experience had proved that the response of the 
poor tends to be greater when opportunities to 
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TABLE 22 
LOANS AND GRANTS PROVIDED BY IFAD, 1978-84 
(S~ecial Drawing Rights Million) 
Reqion Number Amount Percentaqe 
Africa 57 466.4 (28) 
Asia 44 687.3 ( 41) 
Latin America • the .:ar.:.bbean 31 24 5.1 (14) 
Near East & North Africa 28 286.6 (17) 
Total Loans 160 1,685.4 
Tntal Grants 73.6 
Grand Total 1,765.0 
SOURCE: Internatinnal Fund for Agrlcultur3l Development, 
Annual Regnrt-1984 (Rome: IFAO): ~· 8. 
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pa~icipate in decision-making are enlarged, 
particularly in respect to decisions concerning 
what is produced, how much should be sold, when it 
should be sold, and at what price.227 
Though the approach may be different, the aim of 
the program does not extend to the more fundamental, 
systemic problems of the historically underdeveloped 
nations. It is instructive to note how the goal(s) of 
IFAD in Latin America and the Caribbean are understood: 
!FAD's interventions in the region have focused on 
the backward areas in aneffort to integrate the 
indigenous population and small farmers into the 
national economy and to raise their productivity 
and income.228 
The u.s. interests in IFAD are almost paradoxical. 
At the time that it is encouraging the granting of loans 
to the landless and the poor for farm production in 
developing countries, it has done little for small farm 
owners within the u.s. As the plight of African-American 
farmers (synonymous with small farm production) has always 
met with insensitivity from local and state banking 
authorities, the pursuit of policies designed to organize 
landless peasants, provide land, farm implements and low 
interest rates would never be attempted in the u.s., due 
to fears of being cast as either Marxist, idealist, or an 
idealistic Marxist. 
For conservatives who stress self-help, IFAD poses 
an interesting dilemma as it still requires lending from 
external sources, but the amount of money usually needed 
by poor farmers to produce is almost insignificant (as 
------------------------
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little as $30), while demonstrating effective results.229 
IFAD's simple dictum that " ••• one cannot bypass people in 
order to reach people ••. " may help to erode the 
entrenched, institutional support for macro-development 
projects and encourage the investment into micro-
development activities.230 A great deal of apprehension 
has been frequently expressed on the subject of whether 
food aid creates damaging effects on the food production 
capabilities of developing nations. 
Theodore Schultz was one of the earliest to 
publish what he considered to be the link between the 
importation of large quantities of food and the fall of 
domestic food prices for the farmer in the importing 
country.231 Edward Schuh identified four areas where food 
imports may impact upon the food production capacity of an 
importing nation: agricultural prices, farm and food 
policies, nutritional levels and population growth.232 
Based on the above information, the potential for 
declines in food prices would depend on: (1) the 
significance of food aid relative to domestic suppliers; 
(2) whether food aid assumes preeminence in the domestic 
market over commercial imports; (3) the manner that food 
aid is introduced to the local economy; and (4) the 
institutional arrangements which prevail. In short, if 
food aid is introduced over a short span of time and does 
not regularly add to total food supplies, then the impact 
172 
is minimal1 if food aid is applied over an expanded period 
of time the impact of food aid is magnified, thus keeping 
food prices low for domestic producers. 
The impact of food aid is also felt in the policy 
making arenas as such aid delays the government from 
making decisions in the vital area of land reform, an 
essential for creating a reversal in the downward trend in 
rural development. As the poorest of the poor are those 
without land, or access to it, land reform is a concern 
that governments must face with the utmost urgency. 
The connection that is thought to exist between 
food aid and population was initially drawn to underline 
fears that if poor people are properly fed, they would 
have even more reasons to not show restraint in the growth 
of their families and the subsequent growth of a nation. 
This view holds that people are a hindrance to a society 
and are, therefore, nonproductive. 
There also is the very important debate on whether 
food aid will lead to dependency and whether such a 
dependency is negative. Given the comparative advantage 
of the food producers of developed nations to produce food 
at a cost that is lower than what farmers of under-
developed nations are able to produce, the advance of such 
an ~rgument limits the potential of importing nations to 
be self-sufficient producers. 
The perspective that the savings earned from 
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receiving cheap food imports can then sustain development 
projects in other sectors ignores the cost of food aid and 
the ever larger share of food commodities. With the 
increase in transport costs since the 1960s and the 
general rise in farm prices, food aid becomes threatening 
to nations that are in the midst of a debt crisis and 
which must face what the prospect of reprisal would be if 
debt repayments were to unilaterally cease (e.g.-the 
elimination of food exports from the U.S.). 
Whether the major concern is the potential 
disincentives of food imports, or the potential for a 
nation to be exposed to a dependency relationship, at the 
root of such anxiety are the governmental policies that 
support cheap food for urban dwellers, and low returns for 
the farmers. 
iv. Security Assistance 
The largest share of the u.s. foreign aid budget 
rests in the category identified as Security Assistance. 
The intent of funding under this category is to distribute 
funding and material support for those nations and regions 
of the world which fit into the confines of U.S. political 
and security interests. 
The primary emphasis has been to countries that 
are part of a u.s. definition of national interests. 
Security Assistance is arranged into two classifications: 
(1) Economic Support Fund: and (2) Military Aid. The 
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Economic Support Fund (ESF) was created for the express 
purpose of giving Congress and the President a budget 
account which can be used for foreign policy and security 
objectives. AID identified the broad applications of ESF 
as the following: 
Under special economic, political, or security 
conditions the national interests of the u.s. may 
require economic support for countries which can 
not be justified solely under a Development 
Assistance rationale.233 
Aid was to be distributed via ESF to nations that 
were perceived as 'friendly' or vital to the national 
interest. Loans or grants for such purposes include: 
infrastructural development, balance-of-payment supports 
and non-military development support. Many other 
development programs prioritize the distribution of 
assistance to countries whose economies are maladjusted or 
which are in need of emergency assistance. 
ESF purports to reward those nations whose foreign 
policies, geographic location andjor natural resources are 
considered to be of vital national interest. The 
political reality of ESF is a part of and not simply apart 
from U.S. military interests. With the great number of 
u.s. diplomatic and military agreements, ESF funds become 
an important part in concluding bilateral arrangements. 
ESF also has become indispensible in the 
forwarding of u.s. military goods to u.s. allies. The 
listing of major ESF recipients is strikingly similar in 
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appearance to the list of major recipients of military aid 
(see Table 23). In Congressional testimony during 1985, a 
State Department representative stated that the payment 
for u.s. arms deliveries to many underdeveloped countries 
is largely'financed by ESF funds.234 
The examples used by AID that cite the objectives 
of ESF are also revealing of the intent of the ESF 
program: 
••• to support our continuing efforts to promote 
peace in the Middle East by helping to maintain 
the economic stability of Israel and Egypt, by 
financing reconstruction efforts in Lebanon, 
selected development activities in Jordan and in 
the West Bank and Gaza, and in promotion of 
regional cooperation between Israel and its Arab 
neighbors; •.• to provide balance of payment 
supports to important u.s. allies, such as Turkey 
and Pakistan, which are experiencing serious 
economic difficulties: .•• to provide economic 
assistance to countries heavily burdened by the 
expense of regional defense or countries with 
which the United States has security asistance 
relationships; •.• to provide assistance in meeting 
the basic human needs of the poor and averting the 
threat of social unrest and political instability 
in countries of special security interest.235 
The location and intent of the examples chosen by 
AID closely corresponds to the basic question concerning 
this type of foreign aid: should it exist? With security 
needs having primary consideration in the u.s. foreign aid 
budget and the allocation of development dollars to 
nations of security importance to the u.s., the call for 
the support of New Directions contradicts overall u.s. 
foreign aid strategy. 
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of the total foreign aid budget (see Table 24), hunger and 
development needs of the poor are increasingly irrelevant 
to the u.s. foreign policy agenda. The importance of ESF 
became fully apparent during the Nixon administration. 
When former Secretary of state Henry Kissinger developed 
the scheme to provide South Vietnam and with PL 480 funds 
to support military operations, Congress responded by 
placing new restrictions in .the eligibility and use of 
programs funds and commodities.236 Though this was indeed 
a reversal for the State Department, the Nixon 
administration still sought to provide U.S. allies with 
funding for a variety of programs and purposes without the 
restrictive reins of Congress. 
A feature of ESF legislation that supports these 
aims lies in the Special Requirement Fund. As a part of 
ESF, the Special Requirement Fund enables the president to 
respond quickly to unforeseen events that may impact upon 
the "stability of areas strategically important to the 
United States."237 The danger for foreign food assistance 
accounts is that they must compete for foreign food aid 
funding with yet another program that does not service the 
needs of the poor as its intended goal. 
With the Congress being pressured to meet the 
targets of the new Balanced Budget Act, all appropriations 
are under tighter scrutiny to comply with the mandate. 
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Representatives' Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, stated the political problem of too weighted 
an emphasis on foreign aid: 
The country will not tolerate increasing foreign 
aid by paying for it by gutting cancer research, 
gutting educational opportunities, squeezing 
highways and squeezing the investment portion of 
the budget here at home.238 
The conflict within foreign aid appropriations is deciding 
which programs within its appropriated amounts to reduce: 
Food, Development, ESF or Military. 
v. MAP. IMET. fMS 
The other half of the Security Assistance 
programming is to be found in the three programs which 
constitute u.s. military aid: (1) Military Assistance 
Program (MAP); (2) International Military Education and 
Training (IMET); and (3) Foreign Military Sales (FMS). 
Grants for the purchase of arms, support equipment and 
related services are provided under MAP. Military 
training and education have now become even more popular 
as there is a concern about the capacity of recipient 
nations to be able to properly operate the equipment they 
have purchased. 
Foreign Military Sales provides credit 
arrangements for the purchase of military arms and related 
equipment. This has been the most commonly used program 
for the sale of military goods, helping to promote the 
u.s. to the top position as the world's largest supplier 
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of military goods. In 1968, the Foreign Military Sales 
Act was created and subsequently, divided military 
assistance into its present grant and sales programs. As 
a distinct area of u.s. arms sale activities, FMS proved 
to be a minor part of not only u.s. foreign policy, but 
also the u.s. economy. 
The sale of military hardware and related items 
also creates an economic need, Gen. Michael Rogers writes: 
It is a fact of life that many nations must 
purchase from foreign sources at least some of 
their military hardware and supporting services; 
they do not have the industrial base to provide 
all of the equipment they need.239 
As technology advances, there has also been a consistent 
trend to provide goods that are capable of laying greater 
waste to human life but at ever-escalating economic costs 
to the importing countries. 
This relationship is even more apparent as the 
battlefield has moved to the skies, whereby, fighter 
aircraft (and anti-aircraft ground systems) are becoming 
increasingly expensive. The costly nature of modern 
military equipment has been a major contributor to the 
Third-World debt crisis and has prompted discussion and 
attempted legislation to eliminate the FMS program and 
transfer all sales of military equipment to grants 
(MAP).240 
There is also an increasing discussion on 
"offsets", ·a term used to describe a remedy for the 
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payment of military goods and services by granting 
recipient nations "a range of industrial or commercial 
compensation.u241 In order to satisfy military 
commitments and sales agreements, the u.s. forfeits a part 
of its domestic production by permitting greater foreign 
competition. In many respects, u.s. producers in other 
areas of the non-military economy are having to pay the 
cost of U.S. arms sales, to the profit of U.S. military 
producers and foreign policy strategists. 
With an expansion of u.s. military base 
commitments since 1980 in Honduras, the prospect of new 
facilities in Zaire and Kenya, the continuance of 
operations in the Philippines, and the promise of 
additional u.s. aid, there is the potential for these new 
commitments to be locked into the budget, increasing u.s. 
Security Assistance funds. Whether the Food and 
Development Programs will be able to withstand assaults 
from aid to both Israel, Egypt and other nations 
considered to be of primary strategic military importance, 
as overall foreign aid is declining, is a significant 
question for aid recipients. 
Chapter Summary 
Though there is a broad based range of bilateral 
and multilateral assistance programs, the evidence of u.s. 
assistance suggests that responding to those in greatest 
danger, or in assisting nations in promoting broad-based 
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development, is often at odds with its role as a 
complementary instrument of u.s. foreign policy to promote 
the expansion of the u.s. economic and political agenda. 
The decline of development assistance and the ambivalence 
toward programs which empower a nation's poor have 
occurred as the investment in military goods and training 
have increased steadily. 
The intent of u.s. foreign aid is revealed in the 
allocation of its funds, an allocation whose gross 
dollar amounts approximates the listing of nations who 
benefit from u.s. military investments. The challenge 
ahead for those concerned with the delivery of u.s. food 
and development must not only rest on higher dollar 
figures but on an equitable effort to change the purpose, 
direction and beneficiaries for which aid is intended. 
Any notion of u.s. humanitarian assistance must be 
tempered with its subordinate position as yet another 
facet of u.s. foreign policy. By establishing the nature 
and development of u.s. foreign assistance programs, the 
activities of the Reagan administration in responding to 
African emergency and development needs can more clearly 
be examined. The policies and priorities of the Reagan 
administration from 1981 through 1986, a period of immense 
need throughout Africa, can be seen as either an 
elaboration of past u.s. policies formations, or a 
departure from earlier precedents. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO 
FAMINE AND HUNGER IN AFRICA, 1981-86 
The Department of State has followed since the 
early 1970's a conceptual framework for addressing 
development activity in the Third World, known as the Four 
Pillars approach. The four areas that support this 
framework are: (1) policy reform1 (2) strengthening the 
indigenous private sector1 (3) institution building: and 
(4) technology transfer.242 With the appearance of the 
Reagan administration there has been a heavy emphasis 
placed on the first two aspects of the approach. What has 
occurred under the Reagan been a more strident emphasis on 
global security (defined as military growth) as the 
preeminent feature of all u.s. foreign policy and 
assistance programs. 
Policy reform and attempts to strengthen 
indigenous private sector activity in underdeveloped 
countries have been placed in the overall framework of 
immediate u.s. security interests. The Reagan 
administration's response to causes of famine has proven 
itself to be captive of the attempt to restore the primacy 
of the u.s. in global politics by the introduction of a 
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more confrontational, combative approach. This new 
foreign policy design sought to win greater political and 
economic concessions from u.s. and inflict punitive damage 
to those it identifies as its enemies. 
One of the major factors in the election of Ronald 
Reagan in 1980 was the spectacle of the pre-eminent global 
superpower being manipulated due to the capture of u.s. 
embassy employees in Iran. With the wounds of the Vietnam 
War still felt by the u.s. electorate, the vision of u.s. 
political and military impotency, as further expressed by 
the Iranian hostage situation, engendered the demand for a 
more muscular foreign policy. 
Much of the public's dissatisfaction with U.S. 
foreign policy was vented towards U.S. government dealings 
with Third World nations. With the inability of the u.s. 
to retrieve desired policy outcomes in international 
forums as the U.N. (due to the post-World War II growth of 
decolonized Third World nations), support was building in 
the u.s. for a more vengeful response to what were viewed 
as anti-u.s. activities. 
Under the Reagan administration, u.s. foreign aid 
began to reflect the u.s. pursuit of unquestioned 
political, economic and military hegemony. The management 
of u.s. foreign policy activity has since reflected the 
long held conservative view of international forums by 
increasingly distancing u.s. participation in multilateral 
---------------~--~-
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relations. The shift to more bilateral agreements is in 
an attempt to create greater unrestrained policy options 
and effects. This shift also has an impact on foreign 
assistance fund distributions and categories. 
The President is not the sole advocate of 
employing development assistance to achieve foreign policy 
goals. The General Accounting Office (GAO), a 
congressional agency, acknowledged the use of aid as a 
means of achieving u.s. foreign policy aims.243 The uses 
of U.s. foreign policy with this purpose include: 
1. promoting regional and economic 
stability; 
2. encourage democracy; 
3. secure or maintain access to strategic 
facilities; 
4. countering Soviet influences; 
5. encourage cooperation with the u.s. on 
international issues.244 
The beneficiaries of the Reagan approach have 
clearly been the programs under Security Assistance: 
Military Aid and Economic support Fund (ESF) • Security 
Assistance has increased from $5.288 billion in the first 
Reagan budget in FY 1981 to $9.7 billion in fiscal year 
1985 (see Table 24). This represents an increase of $4.4 
billion from 1981 and more than 67% of the total increase 
for foreign assistance. 
Military assistance represents more than 61% of 
the $4.4 billion increase in Security Assistance. The big 
loser in foreign aid has been development aid, as it has 











U.S. FOREIGN AID BY PROGRAM 
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Congressional Presentation, Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1983, 
19.85.,.198.7 (Washington, 0 .c.: Government Printing Office, 
1983, 1985, 1987). 
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in 1985. Though food assistance shows a slight drop in 
its overall percentage of foreign aid, it has only 
maintained its position due to the evidence of famine, and 
the pressure to provide emergency assistance. 
Table 25 shows that u.s. foreign assistance to 
sub-Saharan Africa also reflects the trend of the entire 
foreign aid account. Though the total u.s. foreign aid 
budget increased by 48% since 1980, economic assistance 
declined by 12.8% between 1980 and 1985 (see Table 25). 
This decline was primarily the result of a 19.7% decrease 
in food assistance to Africa. Table 26 shows that during 
the very height of the African famine disaster, 1984-1985, 
food assistance actually declined from $271 million to 
$235 million. 
While much of the publicly stated intent of Title 
II PL 480 centered upon its capacity to provide 
humanitarian food assistance during a time of emergency, 
nations demonstrating such extreme food emergency needs as 
Angola and Mozambique received either limited, or no Title 
II food aid (see Table 26). Despite the desperate 
condition of the Mozambique economy, brought about by the 
south African-backed army of the MNR (Mozambique National 
Resistance) and a series of poor weather conditions, 
Mozambique was obliged to pay for Title I food aid in 1985 
(see Table 26). Although the sale of Title I food aid is 









U.S. PORBIGN BCOMOKIC AND HILITARr ASSISTANCE TO SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, Fr 1980-1985 
(In Hillions of Dollars) 
Total ECOnOID.iC 
and Hi 11 tar~ Total Economic Dttvelopment 
Assistance Assistance Assistance ES~' PL 480 "ilitar-y 
8H.l 614.3 282.2 132.7 291.3 77.2 
908.8 659.0 300.2 162.9 322.1 84.7 
l,06f.l 57.8 328.8 294.8 208.6 191. 3 
1,015.6 592.6 315.3 286.1 236.3 134 .o 
1,141. 7 655.1 340.3 3]].1 271.2 153.5 
1,220.5 535.6 352.2 U7.8 235.4 16 7. 4 
SOURCE: u.s. Agency for International Development, Confressional Presentation, 
Haln Volume, Fiscal rears l982i 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986
6 
1987 (Nash ngton, D.C.: u.s. 
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Mozambique to provide payment in order to receive the food 
items, versus food provided as a grant under the Title II 
provision of PL 480 creates serious demands on a country 
that is economically strained by its conflicts with the 
MNR. Any benefits derived from the Nkomati accords are 
not widely evident.245 
At the same time that PL 480 food aid experienced 
a significant drop in funding, military aid grew by 1980 
(see Table 25). ESF, the other portion of Security 
Assistance, grew by an as 53.8% over the same period. The 
seven Sub-Saharan African nations that have received the 
bulk of ESF funds are: Botswana, Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, 
Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe (see Table 27). The average 
per capita GNP of these nations is $524.2 (Table 27). 
With nineteen (19) African countries possessing economies 
of less than $300 per capita (see Table 8), the growth of 
Security Assistance and, in particular, ESF, siphons 
needed funds from development program accounts. 
The major recipients of u.s. military funds in 
sub-Saharan Africa also coincide with the leading 
recipients of ESF funding (Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Liberia 
and Zaire, with Botswana, cameroon and Chad gaining 
rapidly). The rise in ESF dollars and the related rise in 
the sale of military goods substantiates the claim that 
ESF serves primarily as a means to provide balance of 






















ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND RECIPIENTS IN AFRICA 
(Millions of Dollars) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total 
829.0 771.0 750.0 852.9 1,065 5132.9 
50.0 100.0 82.2 120.0 114 506 .o 
24.9 75.0 60.0 40.0 28 249.9 
32.0 35.0 32.0 35.0 43 182.2 
20.5 20.0 15.5 21.3 40 141.3 
----- 20.0 21.0 35.0 30 111.0 
5.5 10.7 30 .o 21.0 25 106.7 
10.8 ll.O 10.0 .8 10 56.6 
----- ----- 5.0 1.5 20 26.5 
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Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total Capita Rank 
Niger ----- ----- ----- ----- 5.0 5 10.0 240 19 
Seychelles ----- ----- 2.0 ----- 2.0 2 6.0 2430 20 
Madagascar ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 3 3.0 310 21 
Uganda .3 ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- .3 220 22 
SOURCE: u.s. Agency for International Development, Congressional Presentation, 
Main Volume, Fiscal Years 1982A 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 (Washington, D.C.: 




u.s. arms too much of an economic hardship. 
The Rural Development Institute (RDI) recognizes 
the significance of such a shift in aid fundin9 
allocations. The RDI, which performs an annual evaluation 
of U.S. bilateral and multilateral programs and the extent 
that such aid programs respond to the needs of the poor in 
recipient countries offered its assessment of u.s. 
bilateral aid: 
The quality of both major components of America's 
economic assistance has declined significantly, 
and that assistance now appears by any plausible 
measure to be less likely to meet the needs of the 
poor than at any time since our assessments 
began.246 
Of the total amount of funding distributed to 
development andjor food assistance, the dollar portion 
that is directed to the poor has fallen from its zenith of 
$.64 in 1982, to its nadir of $.38 in 1985.247 The 
performance of ESF in providing assistance to the poor is 
virtually non-existent. In 1982, ESF funded projects had 
committed only $.19 of each dollar to the poor of aid-
recipient nations; by 1985, this figure had declined to 
only $.07 of each dollar.248 
As providing support for the poor is not the 
intention of ESF, the results are less than surprising. 
Subscribers of targeted development aid view the 
introduction and rapid growth of ESF as further evidence 
of how the loose application of development assistance 
continues to estrange the poor from the development 
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process. The expansion of ESF has also helped to rob the 
potential for true development as it comes at a time when 
there is greater awareness and support for programs that 
aid the poor (e.g.-IFAO). Despite the New Directions 
mandate codified into law, the emphasis on ESF operations 
further injures those nations with the greatest need for 
development dollars. 
While ESF has made rapid gains in budgetary 
allocations and programming to Africa, military assistance 
has also shown significant increases. From 1973 to 1984, 
u.s. arms exports to Africa have increased from $300 
million to $900 million respectively.249 u.s. military 
sales and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have increased greater 
than eight times the 1975 amount, from $35 million in 1975 
to $288 million in 1984.250 Under the Reagan administra-
tion, military sales and aid to Sub-Saharan Africa have 
grown to greater than three times fiscal year 1981 funding 
of $136 million to $389 million in 1986.251 
The number of African nations receiving military 
aid have also grown during the Reagan tenure from 19 in 
1980 to 39 in 1985 (see Tables 28-30). Since fiscal year 
1981, the Reagan administration has also emphasized a 
shift in the purchase of military goods by advancing the 
opportunity for grants, in lieu of cash sales or loans. 
In 1980, military grants amounted to $30 million, while in 
1985 this category of aid grew to $101.5 million (see 
Countcy 
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TAILB 28 
U.S. HILITARY ASSISTANCE TO APRICA-Itll 
(Thouaanda ot Do11ara) 
(FHS) 
roral9n (IHBT) 
Hilltuy (HAP I lnt'l 
Sa lea HIUtary Hilltary 
Aaalatanoa Education 
Harket Conceaalonal PrOIJUa Tralnln9 
0 s.o • J .l 
0 z.s 0 • I 
us 900.0 ' 0 l.t 
0 1.0 0 .1 
0 0 .l 0 
0 10 .o 10.] 1.4 
0 6.0 6.0 .1 
0 0 .a 0 
0 0 • 1 0 
0 10.0 20.0 .6 
0 81.0 1].7 l.l 
0 2.0 7.5 .6 
0 I. l 1.0 .] 
0 0 • I 0 
0 1.5 • I 0 
0 0 • I 0 
0 0 • I 0 
0 o.o 1.] 0 
0 0 • I 0 
us IOH. 1 10 J. 00 9.5 
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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA-1984 
(Tboueanda of Dolla~•l 
(FNS) 
ro~eign liMIT) 
MiUtuy (MAP) lnt'l 
Sale a MiUtuy MiUltuy 
Aaaiatance Education 
Market Conceulonal P~ogcaa Treining 
7,000 0 z,ooo ZlZ 
0 0 0 lt 
5,000 0 0 109 
900,000 U5,000 0 1,657 
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0 0 0 54 
u.s. Agency for lnrenw:tanat Develop.ent, 



























Foreign Military (MAP) Int•l 
Sales Military Military 
Assistance Education 
Country Market Concessional Program Training Total 
Swaziland 0 0 0 50 50 
Zilllbabwe 0 0 0 150 150 
Seychelles 0 0 2,000 477 2, 477 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 40 40 
cape Verde 0 0 0 47 47 
Burundi 0 0 0 135 135 
Central African 
Republic 0 0 0 99 99 
Chad 0 0 2,000 169 2,169 
Guinea 0 0 0 100 100 
Lesotho 0 0 0 1,621 1, 621 
Total 912,000 465,000 94.0 00 9,680 l,4B0,6BO 
Sub-Saharan 12.000 0 94,000 8,023 114,023 
Source: u.s. Agency for International Development, 
Presentation\ FY 1987, Main Volume (Washington, D.C.: 
O!iice, iii 7 . 
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TABLE 30 
u.s. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA-1985 
(Thousands of oo lla rs) 
(FMS) UMET) 
Foreign Military (MAP) Int'l 
Sales Military Military 
Assistance Education 
Country Market Concessional Pro9ram TraininCJ Total 
Botswana 0 5,000 4,000 287 9,287 
Burkina raso 0 0 0 17 17 
Cameroon 0 5,000 0 147 5,147 
Egypt 0 117,500 0 1,675 1,176,675 
Gabon 0 0 0 1Z5 125 
Ghana 0 0 0 293 29 3 
Guinea Bissau 0 0 0 4 4 
Kenya 0 0 20.000 1, 693 21,69 3 
Liberia 0 0 12,000 1,157 13,15 7 
Malawi 0 0 1, 000 218 1, 218 
Mali 0 0 0 156 156 
Rwanda 0 0 0 62 6l 
Senegal 0 3 ,ooo 0 524 3,524 
Somalia 0 33,000 0 1,132 34,132 
Sudan 0 0 45,000 1, 430 46,430 
Togo 0 0 0 43 4] 
Zaire 0 0 7,000 1,341 8,341 
Ivory Coast 0 0 0 161 161 
Mauritania 0 0 0 77 77 
Niger 0 5,000 0 214 5,214 
Uganda 0 0 0 6 6 
Djibouti 0 2,500 126 2,626 2,626 
Madagascar 0 0 2,050 55 2,105 
Source: u.s. for International Development, 
(Washington, 0 .c.' 
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TABLE 30--continued 
(FilS l (!!lET) 
Foreign llilitary (!lAP) Int 1 l 
Sales Military Military 
Assistance Education 
Country llarket Concessional Program Training Total 
Equitorial 
Guinea 0 0 0 71 7l 
Central African 
Republic 0 0 0 108 lOB 
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 60 60 
Seychelles 0 0 0 17 17 
Cape Verde 0 0 0 70 70 
auruncU 0 0 0 141 141 
Benin 0 0 0 83 83 
Algeria 0 0 0 64 64 
Total 0 1,226,000 101,550 12,142 1,339,692 
Sub-Saharan 0 51, 000 101,550 10,403 162,953 
SOURCE: Ibid. 
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Tables 28-30). The proposed Reagan budget for FY 1987 
seeks to approve more than 90% of the purchase of u.s. 
military equipment via grant provisions.252 
The u.s. has tenured military agreements that 
permit the use of air facilities (Liberia, Somalia); port 
facilities (Somalia, Liberia, and Seychelles); and 
military assistance personnel (Liberia, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire and Seychelles).253 More 
than $60 million of ESF funds have been spent on military 
applications in Kenya and Somalia (building and improving 
airfields and port facilities).254 The provision of 
military assistance to these countries not only provides 
the u.s. with a southern flank to the Middle East (a 
region where it has been having increasing difficulty in 
maintaining a presence outside of Israel and Egypt) but 
also a very high visibility in east Central Africa. 
The occurrence of ongoing military exercises 
provides defacto u.s. military bases throughout the 
region. Operation nsright Star 83" involved Oman, 
Somalia, Egypt and Jordan, and continued for a total of 45 
days.255 This military exercise involved more than 8,000 
u.s. troops, honing their skills in amphibious assault, 
B-52 raids and desert maneuvers.256 
The full investment of arms supplies to Africa is 
not limited to existing African governments. The widely 
publicized support of anti-government forces in Angola 
----------- ------
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(via UNITAl is not a common practice of u.s. covert 
funding operations. The shepherding of UNITA leader Jonas 
savimbi by the Administration and its supporters, before 
Congress and the world, to boldly proclaim the intentions 
to overthrow an existing government has become the 
standard of u.s. relations towards Third-World nations.257 
Recent attempts to implement a coup against Ghana also 
suggests possible u.s. complicity through mercenaries and 
arms suppliers.258 
Mozambique is yet another African government 
facing eminent danger due to direct South African support 
of anti-Mozambique forces (RENAMO), despite denials to the 
contrary. In 1981, six u.s. embassy officials were asked 
to leave Mozambique by the FRELIMO government, on charges 
that they had helped supply intelligence information to 
South Africa military officials which lead to attacks by 
South Africa earlier that year.259 In reprisal for 
Mozambique's ouster of the embassy officials, the Reagan 
administration ended all food shipments to Mozambique for 
six months.260 These covert and overt escapades may not 
reveal the full extent of u.s. financial and material 
support but they do bring into question the extent of 
actual concern for the victims of hunger and famine; 
specifically, as it results from the militarization and 
ensuing conflict aided and abetted by the global 
superpowers. 
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With the advance of military technology has come 
an increase in the cost of military and military-related 
goods.261 The purchase of each new advance in military 
equipment brings new anxiety to bordering nations and/or 
opposing political forces. In supporting this cauldron of 
fear and danger, the u.s. government is creating a vast 
and expanding market for u.s. arms and supplies for 
Africans to be more efficient about the killing of one 
another. 
The relationship between developed and under-
developed countries is a study of who profits and who 
pays. By 1983, the developed countries controlled 88.9% 
of the world's export of arms1 developing countries 
imported 77.9% of arms available on the export market.262 
While u.s. arms are increasingly being offered as grants, 
versus sales, there is often a need for expanding arms 
sales purchases above the amount of grant funded arms. 
There are also significant contracts awarded to u.s. firms 
for the maintenance of arms equipment. In much the same 
manner that the u.s., through the PL 480 program, created 
and currently maintains a market for u.s. food purchases, 
u.s. military aid and grants programs are also creating 
and sustaining markets for u.s. military goods. As a 
growing military and/or shrinking commercial sector 
absorbs the limited amounts of foreign exchange available 
to most African countries, the ability of these nations to 
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invest in food production for domestic consumption is made 
increasingly difficult to provide for their needs. 
The competition for foreign exchange to purchase 
imported goods, ultimately creates a path to the IMF. As 
debtor nations in need of still further loans, the 
prospect of engaging in discussions leading for loan 
agreements comes with the prospect of major changes to the 
loan recipient nation. With the demands of IMF 
conditionalities doing injury to the poor of most 
societies (see also Debt and Trade section in Chapter 
III), the poor suffer a double inequity. It is the poor 
who must pay for the arrest of their potential to lift 
themselves from the suffering which can be attributed to 
militarization. 
The legacy of the Reagan administration will have 
been the expansion of u.s. military equipment to offset 
perceived Soviet political and military advantages in the 
region, as well as, the support an even more favorable 
balance of trade with Africa. Though the u.s. continues 
to be a significant force in the export of arms, it is 
steadily losing its share of the export arms sector. At a 
time that development needs targeted to the domestic 
markets of aid recipient countries are crucial, the Reagan 
administration offers private sector investment to replace 
public sector financing. 
The priority given security assistance over other 
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forms of assistance is indicative of the self-perceived 
mission that Reagan and his supporters view their role to 
be in the new conservative era. Frustrated by actions 
taken by the House Appropriations Committee to shield 
popular development assistance programs from the 
budget-cutting axe of those who support a conservative 
agenda, Under Secretary of state for Security Assistance, 
William Schneider, Jr. angrily referred to such aid 
accounts as: "a large number of low-priority, foreign aid 
pet rocks."263 security assistance was defined in a very 
narrow domain for Schneider, leaving little doubt as to 
whose security .he was primarily interested. 
Diplomatic reactions to African countries over 
relatively minor disagreements has been particularly harsh 
under the Reagan administration. Zimbabwe under the rule 
of Robert Mugabe has been an uncompromising supporter of 
those who wish to overturn the apartheid state of South 
Africa. Several times, he and the Reagan administration 
have debated over policies in international forums which 
have their base in the concept of the sanctity of black 
life and the genuine pursuit of freedom under apartheid 
that is inseparable from the pursuit of freedom anywhere 
throughout the world. 
Comments by the Zimbabwean Foreign Minister, 
Witness Mangwende, during a July 4th dinner in Zimbabwe 
which former President Jimmy carter attended, criticized 
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u.s. inaction and complicity in maintaining the apartheid 
government in South Africa.264 There were particularly 
harsh words for the Reagan administration and its role. 
carter took exception that Manqwende would use the 
occasion to denounce u.s. foreign policy in the region and 
soon exited from the dinner. With all of the options open 
to the u.s. to employ upon Zimbabwe as a means of 
demonstrating its displeasure with the remarks, the u.s. 
cut all food aid to the country.265 
With Zimbabwe suffering through its worse drought 
this century, the cessation of food aid was designed to 
strike a death blow at Zimbabwe's people, to make amends 
for an action by their government. In the case of 
Zimbabwe (as with Libya) the implementation of sanctions 
were never discussed in the context of a loss of 
influence, or injury to local populations, as was done 
when sanctions against South Africa were demanded by 
various elements of the American public. Zimbabwe 
officials also interpreted this action as a signal to 
those representatives who were gathering at Harare for the 
Non-Aligned conference.266 The Conference was to commence 
days after the announcement of the withdrawal of u.s. aid 
from Zimbabwe. 
The disdain for life, particularly those of 
Africans, as opposed to attempts to placate defense 
industries and nations which fit into the U.S. global 
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security framework, has created a skepticism which 
suggests that Reagan administration policies for reducing 
the incidence of hunger and famine are merely insincere 
propositions. 
ii. Security Aid to central America As An Obstacle to 
U.S. Emergency Food Aid to Africa 
By January, 1985, a number of legislative vehicles 
had been introduced to combat the African famine (see 
Table 31). congressmen Weiss (0-NY), Wolpe (O-Mich.) and 
Leland (0-Tex.) introduced the most comprehensive 
anti-famine legislation (HR 100) with almost $900 million 
and substantial food and non-food aid. Republican members 
of Congress Silvio Conte (N.Y.) and Marge Roukema (N.J.) 
responded with their version of famine assistance, HR 606 
(see Table 31). The conte-Roukema bill had higher totals 
in food aid but lower figures in non-food aid. It 
differed significantly with the administration bill as HR 
606 contained provisions for inland transport. 
The President's response to calls for greater u.s. 
emergency aid was well below the established need. In 
addition to the lowest food aid figures offered, non-food 
aid was almost non-existent. The lack of emphasis on 
non-food aid was viewed with amazement, as one of the most 
frequent charges heard in opposition to the u.s. providing 
food aid is the lack of transport vehicles to move food to 
its rural destinations.267 
TABLE 31 
A COMPARISON OF 1985 AFRICA EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL LEGISLATION 
($ Hi Ilion) 
Program/Assistance HR 100 
Emergency Food Assistance 
PL-480, Title II (Tota 1) $492 
Emergency Non-Food Aid 406 
Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance 70 
Outreach/Enhancement Grants 25 
Refugee Assistance 50 
Recovery Assistance 80 
Inland Transportation 177 
AID Operating Expenses 4 
Grand Total $898 

































Bread for the World, "A Comparison of Africa Emergency 
Bills," (Washington, D.C.: Bread for the World, February 4, 
*includes: $34 million for Bangladesh, $89 million for Inland 
Transportation, $372 million for Food Aid. 
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By not offering transport aid, the administration 
could impose even greater obstacles in blocking food aid, 
on the grounds that it would be either mismanaged or 
diverted, versus being delivered to those in the greatest 
of need. This particular notion had been supported in at 
least one European daily newspaper during the u.s. debates 
to decide the extent of u.s. aid commitment.268 The 
arguments against sending aid (or providing aid in small 
quantities) echoed many of the same arguments used against 
domestic welfare spending. 
The administration's food assistance plan also 
suffered by not offering any substantive additions to 
combat the famine problem. Congressman Ted Weiss noted 
that half of the Reagan proposal was in assistance that 
was already committed.269 More than $176 million of the 
Reagan famine bill was merely shifted from existing, 
development accounts (versus security accounts).270 
Though the situation in Africa is of crisis proportions, 
that still does not diminish the very real needs in other 
desperate parts of the world. Reagan, in essence, sought 
to have Congress to choose between which lives to save 
with u.s. aid. 
The administration's legislative vehicle was 
further damaged by the Conte;Roukema bill, which offered a 
higher budget to facilitate relief activities than did the 
administration's proposal. The ContejRoukema bill also 
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gave Republicans a politically safe alternative to the 
President's plan, without being seen as totally abandoning 
the President. Of related importance was the total lack of 
funding obligations to AID for its' operating expenses 
towards implementing relief plans. This area of expense 
has also been a center for debate as large food shipments 
have the potential of not being totally accounted. By not 
offering related funds for AID administrative costs and 
the oversight of such food aid activity, the Administra-
tion was again establishing the environment for a self-
fulfilling prophecy of food-aid waste, thereby, creating 
the basis upon which to either cut or eliminate food aid 
funding. 
John Melchor (D-Mt) introduced the Senate version 
of the African Emergency Supplemental bill. Melcher's 
supplemental would offer approximately the same funding 
levels and distribution of aid as HR 100. The Reagan 
proposal provided one-third the metric tonnage of food 
grains as that provided under, HR-606, ContejRoukema (see 
T8Dle 31). 
It was not until April 4th, after a tremendous 
amount of political haggling that the African Emergency 
Supplemental for FY 1985 (also known as the Food 
Assistance for Africa Agricultural Act) was approved for 
$800 million.271 One of the key elements of the FAAA was 
the creation of the $225 million "Presidential" 
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reserve.272 Under the discretion of the President, the 
reserve was to provide a means for rapid response to the 
emergency food needs of African nations. Valuable time 
would be saved by the collection and storage of food 
(mainly grains), and having it ready for shipment. The 
formation of the reserve was not, however, without its own 
political dimensions. The reserve was formed over the 
objections of many farm groups that feared its reserve 
being released onto the domestic market, at an inopportune 
time, which would further depress the value of return on 
their individual food commodities. 
Safeguards were established to placate u.s. 
farmers, which made the release of the reserve commodities 
by the President contingent upon two main factors: (1) 
AID is required to introduce to Congress a plan for the 
release of reserve funds: and (2) the President must 
verify that the essential need for famine relief does 
exist.273 Despite the eminent need through the first half 
of 1986, the reserve was never released. 
In constructing relief effort, time becomes the 
chief adversary. The processing and delivery of food is a 
tremendous, but time consuming, logistical effort. The 
process normally involves from 4 to 6 months of effort, 
that includes: 
1. identifying and collecting food products for 
transport; 
2. transport from storage facilities (frequently 
by rail and truck) to departure site: 
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3. storage, then loading of food aboard ship/ 
plane; 
4. personnel with emergency relief experience are 
drawn to famine affected countries from around 
the world to assist in the oversight of 
operations; 
5. transport of food from donor nation to 
recipient nation; 
6. disembarkation of food in a recipient country; 
and 
7. loading of food onto overland transport vehicles 
for ultimate destination.274 
The problems of food shipments are exacerbated by 
factors that are structural, as well as, economic. The 
multiple complications involved with the delivery of 
emergency shipments of food from another country are 
enormous. With millions of lives threatened by famine 
conditions and millions more threatened by economic 
dislocations caused by the creation of famine, the 
willingness of administration officials to place ideology 
above the lives of innocent people reveals much of what is 
wrong with Conservative thinking and American politics, in 
general. 
The principal culprit of this form of guerrilla 
warfare against foreign food programs has been the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), which is directly 
responsible to the President. The influence of OMB stems 
from its role on the Development coordination Committee 
(DCC).275 The members of the DCC have the option to delay 
fund approval of country requests for development 
activities. By late August, OMB had frozen $502.2 million 
in approved emergency assistance.2 76 These funds 
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included: 
1. $167.2 million in food and transportation: 
2. $110 million for seeds, tools and emergency 
assistance to be distributed by the Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); and 
3. $225 million for the "Presidential" African 
Famine Reserve Fund.277 
By engaging in such actions, OMB was not only 
violating the letter and the spirit of a congressional 
mandate but had also lifted itself above the internal 
decision-making process of the DCC, as the DCC had already 
approved the dispensation of funds.278 OMB had awarded 
itself the power of the veto. 
The basis for OMB's decision to delay funds was 
expressed as a failure of AID to provide OMB with the 
needed reports on how each country was to use its 
allocation of emergency funds.279 AID responded by 
stating that the reports in question had been completed 
and given to OMB ten days prior to the day that OMB 
deferral notifications were to be sent to Congress.280 
OMB offered the rejoinder that the reports were 
inadequate.28l Despite Congress ruling that the AID 
report was sufficient, OMB delays were still in force.282 
OMB became the final arbiter of food aid by introducing 
its demand for a case-by-case review, the process severely 
impeded the responsiveness to famine stricken African 
countries.283 The net effect of OMB actions was to reduce 
Congressional appropriations for African famine food aid 
to the levels originally introduced by the President.284 
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The numerous political ploys engineered by the 
White House had a disastrous impact on inland transpor-
tation, a crucial factor for the survival of those most 
victimized by famine. Funds that were delayed and 
intended for use by OFDA were to have been spent on seeds, 
tools and emergency medical aid.285 These and other goods 
are essential for the short-term recovery efforts in 
Africa. 
The single-mindedness of the Reagan foreign policy 
architects to make u.s. security issues the paramount 
concern of u.s. foreign policy prompted several strategies 
by the President. A major feature of the Reagan 
administration's embroglio over the authorization of 
emergency famine funds for Africa was the result of 
determination to fund u.s. allies in Central America, 
particularly, the Nicaraguan anti-government forces known 
as the Contras. 
Since 1984, when u.s. public awareness about the 
famine crisis grew to massive proportions, the Reagan 
administration has repeatedly provided obstacles for the 
dispensation of emergency aid that either unnecessarily 
slowed the aid process or buttressed his foreign policy 
agenda. 
This unwanted dialogue of humanitarian imperatives 
and security posturings became apparent from the first 
congressional response to the African crisis. on March 
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6th, the House of Representatives passed a $150 million 
supplemental (H.J. Res. 492), earmarked for Africa, to 
Title II food aid for FY 1984; which was $60 million more 
than the administration requested.286 on March 14th, the 
Appropriations Committee of the senate passed the $150 
House supplemental but only after having approved $92.8 
million in military aid to El Salvador and $21 million in 
covert aid to the contras.287 
On March 15th, the senate moved $80 million of the 
$150 million in emergency food aid and amended it to H. J, 
Res. 493, the Domestic Heating Subsidy Bill, which passed 
by voice vote.288 A Conference committee set for H.J. 
Res. 493 agreed to $90 million in the African aid and 
another $90 million in food commodity credits.289 The 
fate of the remaining $60 million was still in limbo due 
to the attachment of military aid to pro-u.s. forces in 
Central America. A compromise fashioned by Sen. Daniel 
Inouye (D-Hi-) would obtain the release of the $60 million 
by agreeing to the passage of aid to El Salvador,290 The 
agreement also included the separation of covert aid to 
the Contras from the Africa food aid bill. The House 
agreed to those terms on May 24th; the Senate concurred on 
June 25th. 
By ultimately signing emergency food aid to 
Africa, the President had secured another round of 
military aid for pro-u.s. forces in Central America. The 
221 
President exchanged $60 million of famine aid to preserve 
life in Africa for almost $93 million in military aid to 
Central America, to destroy life. The number of lives 
lost in Africa during the famine because of this 
unwarranted delay are a tribute to the priority given to 
"security" issues by the President. 
Later in 1986, on September 9th, OMB again 
introduced an request to defer $97.20 million in Title II 
funds and $53 million of funds from the Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance.291 Ten days after this arrest of 
Congressionally obligated funds, the House sub-committee 
on Africa held emergency hearings to summon USAID before 
it and demand their accountability for not having 
responded to an urgent cable, sent by congressman Howard 
Wolpe on August 19th, which reflected an appeal by the 
USAID missions in Sudan and Ethiopia for additional 
transport assistance.292 
The cables point to either one of two possible 
conclusions: (1) collusion of AID with OMB on the 
prohibition of transport aid (thus crippling relief 
efforts); or (2) the intimidation of AID by OMB. The main 
agency that is capable of coordinating transport for 
emergency foods exports, OFDA, is not directly responsible 
to the DCC. AID has sole authority over OFDA; therefore, 
the decision to respond to emergency transport needs by 
authorizing the release of funds belongs solely to AID.293 
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Despite this fact, AID did not exercise its prerogative of 
spending congressionally appropriated funds for OFOA. 
African famine funds and military aid to Central 
America again commanded center stage as issues of 
conflicting political interests. The passage by the House 
of aid to the anti-government forces in Nicaragua 
(Contras) involved more than supplying forces that are 
directed by u.s. global strategic strategy. The 
Contra-aid legislation (HR-5052), as part of the military 
construction appropriations legislation, provided $300 
million in military aid to Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala 
and El Salvador, by deleting "unused" appropriations from 
the following three accounts: 
1. $225 million Presidential Africa famine 
reserve; 
2. PL-480; and 
3. development and humanitarian assistance 
(health, education, transport) accounts.294 
The extent that such funds were "unused" was not due to 
and absence of need but because of the deliberate 
machinations and defacto veto power of OMB in the 
policy-making and implementation process. 
The plan as conceived by sen. Robert Kasten's 
staff member, Jim Bond, and Senate Budget Committee staff 
person, Charlie Flickner, would grant the $300 million in 
aid by attaching the funds to the African Famine 
Reserve.295 The advantages for pro-Contra members of 
Congress were: (1) the famine reserve was controlled by 
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the President and did not need Congress to verify its 
release of funds; (2) in adding $300 million (by adding 
another title to the legislation), it avoids having to 
negotiate considerations in a conference committee; (3) 
improves the funding authority of the reserve and, 
thereby, gives the impression of being active on the 
behalf of those suffering from famine in Africa. 
Despite the political chess play, victory for the 
pro-Contra forces was short-lived. The length of time 
involved in attaching Contra-aid to the famine reserve 
conflicted with the onset of the next fiscal year. 
Appropriation for Contra-aid spending had to be won in the 
next session. The famine reserve, without the Contra-aid 
amendment, was dismantled. 
iii. African Debt, Trade and President Reagan 
The span of Ronald Reagan's two terms of office 
has given witness to the application of conservative 
economic themes onto the international arena, in addition 
to their introduction onto the domestic agenda. The 
argument against centrally-planned economies as being a 
substantive cause of poverty and hunger in underdeveloped 
countries received even greater exposure during the Reagan 
tenure.296 
The tonic for Th1rd World development and debt 
woes was analyzed to be the shrinkage of government 
activity in the economic sectors in concert with an 
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expansion of private sector initiatives. The ideological 
stance of the Reagan approach achieved the following: (1) 
shifted the focus and blame from western complicity in the 
factors which have led to the debt crisis to that of being 
solely an African creation; (2) emphasized growth, rather 
than development, which, subsequently, served as a pretext 
for reductions in food and development aid below basic 
needs assessments; (3) acceptance of IMF styled 
conditionality that advances the capitalist mode of 
production in centralized, underdeveloped economies; and 
(4) reductions in public sector activities, which have 
ultimately led to higher costs, increased unemployment, 
and a shrinkage of basic and emergency government services 
to the nation. 
The importance of Third-World trade is not lost 
upon the Reagan administration. It is this category of 
countries which has formed a significant basis for the 
growth in u.s. exports from 1975 through 1980.297 
Agriculture, an area of major trade activity, is directed 
towards the export sector. One out of every five acres 
planted in the u.s.298 More than seventy per cent of 
bilateral u.s. assistance and fifty per cent of u.s. 
contributions to multilateral development banks are spent 
on u.s. goods and services.299 For every billion dollars 
of farm· exports 25,000 to 35,000 jobs are created.JOO 
Though much of the world's attention has been upon 
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the importance of South Africa's mineral wealth to global 
industrialization, the African continent is replete with 
nations whose mineral importance to the u.s. and the world 
is substantial. The u.s. imports ninety per cent of its 
cobalt, bauxite, and manganese.301 Zaire and Zambia are 
leading world producers of cobalt and together supply 
about fifty per cent of u.s. import requirements.302 
Guinea possesses more than a quarter of the world's 
bauxite reserves and provides about thirty per cent of 
u.s. import needs.303 The nation of Gabon provides 
twenty-six per cent of total u.s. import requirements of 
manganese; by 1983, this total reached ninety-nine per 
cent.304 u.s. trade, as with u.s. aid to Africa and other 
underdeveloped nations is not simply a matter of 
humanitarian concern. These relations form a very 
important feature of u.s. economic growth, industrial 
production and economic security. The decisions by the 
Reagan administration to punish even its allies, in 
addition to those it regularly perceives as its foes, over 
the perceived role of the u.s. in the international arena 
forces downward all aspects of u.s. foreign obligations 
save those of security. 
The release of the 1981 World Bank study on 
African development, Accelerated Development in Sub-
Saharan Africa, (commonly referred to as the Berg report) 
supplied the Reagan administration with additional support 
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for directing its emphasis on factors that are internal to 
African nations. With the Berg plan focused on African 
governments as themselves the cause of maldevelopment and 
debt, the criticisms and solutions followed a familiar 
orthodoxy: (1) the need for production to become increas-
ingly export-oriented; and (2) the preponderance of public 
sector economic investment, at the expense of private 
sector dynamics. Berg's solutions to Africa's development 
crisis included substantial increases in: (1) the amount 
of aid money available; and (2) the movement from project 
aid distribution to program distribution of aid,305 
The emphasis subscribed to by the Berg Plan found 
its adherents in the Reagan camp. The Reagan response to 
the development needs of the world's poor focused squarely 
upon the internal factors of a nation. The cure (as with 
domestic u.s. policy) is the release of private sector 
forces by lifting regulations and laws that are seen as 
inhibiting economic growth. In 1984, the President's Task 
Force On International Private Enterprise recommended a 
series of changes to encourage more capitalist forms of 
development in the Third-World. Among some of the points 
raised in the report was one which crystallized the 
purpose of the Task Force: "Foreign assistance programs 
should substantially expand their efforts to help 
developing countries adopt policies that will strengthen 
the opportunities for private enterprise.n306 
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At a 1986 Howard University/United Nations 
sponsored conference on Drought and Desertification, Peter 
McPherson, AID administrative director, underscored those 
internal factors that have inhibited economic activity 
from prevailing in Africa as the factors most prevalent 
and detrimental in creating famine and hunger in Africa. 
As seen by McPherson, these internal forces are: 
policies that discriminate against farmers in 
production, pricing and marketing; inefficient, 
centralized government planning; growing 
population pressures; civil disorders; and short-
sighted agricultural practices, the misuse of 
fragile lands, and excessive cutting of trees for 
firewood.307 
McPherson's solution calls for African governments to 
"reform and implement policies that: reinforce a strong 
private sector; [develop) a tax structure that encourages 
savings and investment; (promote] a greater reliance on 
market forces; and (sustain] reasonable profit incentives 
for farmers.308 
All of the points raised by McPherson, without 
exception, relate to what the perceived impact of African 
policies and actions have been on their own societies, 
without an appreciation of those external (foreign) 
influences and areas of control which have promoted the 
existence of those 'internal' dimensions. The 
recommendations forwarded by McPherson do little to 
reverse the same causes of Africa's famine and, equally 
important, limits the prospects for Africa to create a 
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truly self-reliant continent of nations. Former Secretary 
of Agriculture, John Block, stated in a 1985 speech on the 
Farm Bill of that year: 
The push by some developing nations to become 
self-sufficient in food production may be remini-
scent of a by-gone era. Those countries could 
save money by importing more of their food from 
the u.s. Modern trade practices may mean that the 
world's major food producing nations, especially 
the u.s., are the best source of food for some 
developing countries.309 
The implication is that these countries will never develop 
the benefits that producing and trading for essential 
commodity goods can offer a nation. 
Though the cost of food may indeed be higher in 
the short-term, it is also likely that as nations develop 
their own technologies to more effectively produce food 
crops and as markets expand, the cost for food will 
decline. The potential benefit to non-crop producing 
sectors hastens the overall employment and development of 
a country. The potential benefit for African counties 
that have surplus food commodities (e.g.- Zimbabwe) and 
are able to market these (commodities to countries within 
its region (e.g.- Mozambique) could lead to an Africa that 
is fully capable of stemming the tide of famine and 
provide a more stable political and economic environment. 
These potential benefits and the subsequent impact 
on u.s. farm producers (and global strategists) is evident 
from a letter signed by Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.), he 
stated: 
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If we do not (lower our food prices) to discourage 
these countries now, our world-wide competitive 
position will continue to slide and be much more 
difficult to regain. This (discouragement) should 
be one of the foremost goals of our agricultural 
policy.310 
It is plain that there are major limitations in 
defining the economic and political interests of Africa 
out of the conceptual framework of u.s. policy interests. 
No nation, or group of nations, can truly call themselves 
independent if they must depend on foreign governments 
(particularly those that have a dubious history of 
international support) for the essential food needs of its 
people. 
The Reagan administration has only followed that 
which fits its rhetorical stance and is appealing to what 
people wish to believe about Africa and its people, to 
justify decreasing levels of assistance. The program of 
the World Bank most directed to the poorest of the Third 
World, IDA, was cut drastically under the 1984 Reagan 
budget.311 Until alternative measures are devised to 
promote development and respond to Africa's debt problems, 
the relatively easier credit terms of IDA highly coveted 
by a wide range of African countries.312 
The World Bank initiative was designed to provide 
economic incentives to African nations seeking to reorder 
economic policies in accordance with expanding activity 
and involvement by the private sector. 
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The direction of the initiative mirrored one of 
the recommendations advanced by the aforementioned Task 
Force on International Enterprise. The Task Force wrote 
that: 
The United States should sharply increase its 
efforts to guide developing countries towards 
market-oriented policies; it should reward those 
countries that adopt strategies that will lead to 
a positive climate for business and investment.llJ 
Though one would imagine the Administration to be quite 
comfortable with the World Bank's approach, the U.S. has 
not invested in the program to date. Programs such as 
IFAD, which could easily be embraced by free market 
advocates have also suffered heavily under the Reagan 
reign; !FAD lost more than $46 million during its second 
replenishment.314 
A program designed to encourage African countries 
to design their economies to be more in keeping with 
market forces (i.e.-capitalism), the African Economic 
Policy Reform Initiative (AEI), has had only $75 million 
set aside as incentive.315 Even for African countries 
that are experimenting with the prescriptions of a market 
economy, such levels of assistance would only provide a 
modicum of incentive to promote substantive change in 
their economies. 
The nations that have benefitted the most from AEI 
have been: Malawi, Mauritania, Mali, Rwanda and Zambia.316 
Only Mali and Mauritania were listed as nations most 
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harshly impacted by famine. At a time when African 
nations were suffering from severe drought and famine, the 
Reagan administration sought to promote capitalism under 
the guise of a new program. 
In December, 1984, the Reagan administration 
further demonstrated the extent of its sensitivity to the 
urgent needs of Africa during its famine crisis by 
offering budget cuts that proposed to eliminate the total 
$49.9 million of u.s. contributions to the FAO during 
1985.317 The reasons cited by the administration were 
similar to the charges levelled against the United Nations 
Educational and Cultural organization (UNESCO), that the 
FAO was too heavily weighted with administrators and that 
it held an ideological bias that conflicted with u.s. 
national interests.318 The FAO was the central 
international organization that coordinated the anti-
famine efforts in Africa, as part of its continuing role 
as the international agency most intimately involved with 
global anti-hunger activities. 
The only other alternative set forth by the Reagan 
administration to provide relief to Africa's debt (and by 
implication, trade) problems has been the plan advanced by 
Secretary of the Treasury James Baker. This plan sought 
to encourage commercial banks to provide an additional $20 
billion in new loans to 15 of the leading debtor 
nations.319 The regional development banks 
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(Inter-American, African) would be responsibile for 
raising the amount of disbursements to the ascribed debtor 
countries by $3 billion per year.320 In effect, the Baker 
plan is performing a political form of triage by providing 
partial debt relief (of sorts) to the major debtor nations 
while either ignoring or, resigning as hopeless, most of 
the other Third World nations which suffer grievously 
under their indebtedness (see Table 32). Nigeria would be 
the only African nation that would receive what is seen as 
support under the Baker plan. 
The prescription that Baker advances comes with 
its own set of conditionality terms, primary of which is 
the reduction of state authority over the economy (e.g.-
removal of import restrictions).J21 While the terms of 
the Baker plan are viewed as a means of propelling 
economic growth in the Third-World, the Baker plan is 
merely a thinly disguised attempt to expand the market for 
u.s. exports and provide relief to major, privately-held, 
u.s. banks. 
The pressure felt by the u.s. in global trade 
activities from nations as diverse as: Japan, Argentina, 
Australia, w. Germany and South Korea for new and existing 
markets is of studied concern for u.s. trade officials. 
In order to offset the loss of markets abroad (and at 
home) to these and other competitors, the U.S. is anxious 
to expand its economic dominance and prevent inroads from 
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its other competitors.322 In addition to identifying the 
importance of securing its economic markets at home, the 
u.s. also feels that it is incumbent to create new markets 
or expand existing ones.323 
There is little to suggest, either from the Baker 
plan or from other concoctions that have emerged from the 
Reagan White House, that Africa is intended to serve 
anything more than a peripheral role in discussions on 
global trade and debt. This translates to defining for 
Africa a role such that its only importance is to the 
extent that it is willing to place more of its economy 
under the control of western corporate producers for the 
extraction of raw materials at ever cheaper prices to 
further reduce the cost of industrial production. The 
Baker plan also ignores the development plans initiated by 
African nations themselves in pursuit of developing their 
own economies, in the context of the political realities 
which exist in these nations. 
The Reagan remedy for the debt crisis of Africa 
and the Third World is not to be found solely in exploring 
the potential for internal development. Though the Baker 
plan calls for increased contributions from development 
banks (IBRO, African, Inter-American), the Reagan budgets 
have reduced u.s. contributions to these and other 
agencies. The African Development Foundation, for 
example, had contributions from the u.s. withheld, 
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eliminating the ability of the AOF to provide new loans 
after 1985.324 
The solution to this seemingly chronic debt has 
included several harsh responses to African and Third 
World debt. The World Bank has become more active in its 
discussions on conditionalities with the IMF. Wilfred 
Thalivitz, World Bank Vice-President for Eastern and 
Southern Africa stated: 
I know that countries are worried about us 
(IMF/World bank) ganging up on them-cross-
conditionality-I'd say that they had that for 
years, they just didn't know it.325 
Bilaterial u.s. aid also reflected these biases in 
conditionality arrangements. In the Sudan, this could 
have contributed to the downfall of President Nimeiry (see 
below). 
The Baker Plan also propositions commercial banks 
which are already exposed financially to Third World 
nations that are on the brink of calling for default, to 
commit additional funds. There is no reason to believe 
that commercial banks are willing to further commit funds 
to indebted nations without more concrete guarantees for 
the return of their investments. 
It therefore remains for Africa to lift itself by 
its own strapless boots, though it does not possess an 
alternative to an absence of finance capital. With a 
private sector unable to accomplish many of the larger, 
economic functions that nations require, the prospects for 
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the kind of self-help that the u.s. administration 
envisions is bleak. The very reason that the debt of 
African countries is primarily public, as opposed to the 
privately-held debt of South America, is because of a lack 
of broad-based private investment; especially, those 
investors that would be willing to enter into a 
partnership with an African government, rather than with 
local investors. 
With low per capita income, and a generally small 
labor force, Africa does not have a large middle-class 
(nor the foreign exchange generated by domestically 
produced and owned goods) capable of broad-based purchases 
of a variety of goods and services. As reported in Africa 
Recovery, "the combined Gross Domestic Product of all of 
the member states of the Preferential Trade Area of 
Eastern and Southern Africa is only 60% of that of 
Oenmark.n326 For the short-term gain of having u.s. 
financial investments, African nations are being asked to 
return to the days of colonialism and, at a minimum, the 
strenqtheninq of traditional neo-colonial relations. 
In "The Two Faces of Third-World lendinq, the 
editors of the Monthly Review describe how the pursuit of 
financial loans can create a situation, whereby, debt 
servicing exceeds the amount of new loans received.327 
The article further states that even at low interest 
rates, the amount of capital exported from the borrowing 
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country exceeds the levels of capital imported. Only the 
investment of further finance capital, internally 
generated growth in the economic sector, or the 
continuation (and expansion) of loans can fill the deficit 
gap among Third World nations. If a nation shows a 
negative balance-of-payments, securing new loans at 
whatever the interest rate can only lead to further 
indebtedness. 
The nature of the Reagan response to the economic 
causes of Africa ignores not only the external causes of 
the problem but also ignores the potential major 
contributions that the public sector (in tune to the needs 
of the poorest of a country) can make alleviating the 
worst vestiges of famine and hunger. To the degree that 
capitalism (indigenously formed) has lead to a nation's 
economic growth, official (public sector or foreign) 
investment and controlled markets of trade have been 
important contributing components in its success.328 With 
official investments showing sharp declines, the avenue of 
trade would seem to be one of the few choices available, 
but this too is denied to most African countries. Few 
foreign or domestic markets are dominated by African 
countries. A fair return on the price of the given 
commodity is not normally the rule, as the declining terms 
of trade have given witness (see Table 9). 
Internal markets for even the most basic of goods 
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have also avoided the African grasp, as ever rising food 
imports have also given testimony. Some of the choices 
available include: 
1. Debt Moratorium (Unilateral). The difficulty 
here is that high levels of imports for essential 
commodities and the current inability of African countries 
to adequately provide the minimum levels of such goods, 
would undoUbtedly result in massive starvation during the 
short term. Unless the major debtor nations can be 
convinced to enter into a debtor cartel, this option is 
effectively a non-option. 
2. Debt Restructuring. The purpose would be to 
establish debt payments to approximate economic and 
political realities. Though many nations have already 
engaged in such negotiations, it is still a matter of only 
further delaying the repayment cycle of debt. 
3. Acceptance of Conditionalities. such steps, as 
orchestrated by the lending institutions and countries 
have the great potential to risk the very government of 
the ruler seeking to comply with western demands. Even if 
successful, such steps mean that the primary concern for 
an aid recipient government would then become the 
servicing of its official debt, even at the expense of the 
basic health, employment, food, and educational needs of 
the debtor country. The affront to Third-World debtor 
nations to subscribe to IMF conditionality terms while the 
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world's largest violator of good economic practices, the 
u.s., decides the distribution of payments was not lost on 
former Nigerian ruler and general, Olusequn Obasanjo, who 
stated: 
••• it is far from clear that an American adminis-
tration, currently unable to qualify for an IMF 
program because of its high deficits, over-valued 
currency, and import restrictions, would willingly 
meet IMF conditions.329 
In 1985, Sudanese President Nimeiry's visited the 
u.s. in hopes of gaining economic relief to assist in the 
transition of his nation's economy to one viewed as more 
compelling to the west and its financial institutions. 
Discontent had become increasingly evident at the time of 
his trip to the u.s. The basis for such disapproval had 
two main sources. One, was the imposition of Islamic law 
on non-Islamic segments of the country.330 The other was 
the worsening economic hardship in the country, as created 
by the devaluation of the Sudanese currency by 48% and the 
elimination of price subsidies on essential goods,331 
Though President Reagan released $67 million in previously 
held economic aid to Sudan and praised Nimeiry's draconian 
actions as "worthy of international support," it proved to 
be too late to salvage Nimeiry's rule.332 Before Nimeiry 
could return to sudan with his agreement, his rule had 
ended: Nimeiry had been deposed.JJ3 
President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia rescinded the 
imposition of IMF inspired "reforms" after a number of 
violent reactions by segments of Zambian society,334 
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President Kaunda, on the occasion of reversing his 
economic measures, is quoted as having stated: 
You've got your choice, all of you. If you want 
to eat maize, go out and grow it, because the 
government cannot deliver maize to you people 
anymore. We'll lower the price of maize again, but 
that means fewer jobs, that means fewer school tea-
chers, that means clinics without medicine, that's 
what this means, gentleman and ladies. Just get it 
straight, you've got your choices.335 
Not all economic reforms have been imposed from 
western sources. The severity of the decline in domestic 
food production is also evidenced by the government of 
Mozambique's ideological concessions to promote national 
economic development. The Mozambique government, known as 
FRELIMO, rescinded its decision of the Third Congress 
(February, 1977) to centralize production in the form of 
state farms, for an apparatus which would permit greater 
reliance upon private ownership in the production of 
food.336 The stated objective of this move was to permit 
the government to direct its scarce resources upon its 
major development projects.337 Despite such movements 
towards a more market economy and the imposition of the 
Nkomati accords with south Africa, u.s. economic, 
political and emergency assistance to Mozambique have been 
restrained. 
Possibly the most important set of African reform 
initiatives have emerged from the Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA) and the U.N.'s Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery. Developed during the 1980 Extra-
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Ordinary session of the OAU, the Lagos Plan of Action 
offers what is perceived to be a blueprint for Africa's 
economic development. The differences between the LPA and 
the Berg Plan are essentially in their scope, though the 
LPA is quick to identify those manifestations of economic 
backwardness that are seen as developed under African 
governments, such criticisms and the exploration of other 
shortcomings are placed in a setting of Africa in a world 
that has been dominated by western political and economic 
interests. 
Factors such as the declining terms of trade for 
African countries are approached, whereas, the Berg report 
does not even address this concern.338 Contrary to the 
Berg report, the LPA expresses a fundamental urgency for 
Africa to develop its own self-sufficient food production 
system, for domestic consumption. The LPA also seeks to 
further the linkages of regional economic cooperation to 
assist in better communication, transport and labor 
activity. 
In May, 1986, a special session of the U.N. 
General Assembly was called to focus attention on Africa's 
economic duress and proposals for its resolution. African 
countries specified the causes of its underdevelopment 
(which in itself is a very important conceptual 
proposition) as " ••. aggravated by exogenous and endogenous 
factors."339 
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These factors range from disparities in income 
distribution, to refugee growth and the heavy debt burdens 
with which many African nations shoulder. In addressing 
these areas of concern, four main sectors were 
highlighted: (1) agricultural: (2) agriculture support: 
(3) drought and desertification: and (4) human resources. 
The total package of programs and reforms were totalled at 
$128.1 billion, covering a period from 1986-1990.340 The 
emphasis on producing food and creating structures to 
respond to emergency food needs is clear with the 
targeting of 44.8% ($57.4 billion) of the proposed 
recovery program for agricultural development.341 Of the 
$128.1 billion total, $82.5 billion (64.4%) will be drawn 
from the national budgets of African nations.342 Though a 
very concrete framework had been offered before the world 
by African nations to direct significant changes in their 
economic and, subsequently, social and political 
structures, African countries have had little response to 
their proposals. The u.s. has, in fact, not approved the 
adoption of the proposal from the African countries, 
despite these governments having made significant 
overtures toward altering their governments' policies to 
meet western approval. 
Though African governments are offering programs 
for economic development, even in areas where western 
nations have sought changes, these measures have not 
243 
motivated the u.s. and many other western nations to 
support Africa in self-determined development approaches. 
The u.s. and the west appear to prefer the approaches 
fermented in the intellectual vats of the IMF, and as 
increasingly offered bilaterally by nations as the u.s. 
The choice of the more harsh reforms as instigated 
by the major financial institutions has often been the 
bane of its recipients. coups and coup attempts have been 
spawned over the effects of such impositions (Ghana, 
Liberia, Nigeria, Kenya). Despite this distressing 
reality, IMF-directed economic reforms have been adopted 
in Ivory Coast, Mali, Senegal, and Tanzania,343 Even 
those nations that view themselves as being socialist are 
experimenting with private enterprise measures. Tanzania 
and Mozambique are just two examples of self-defined 
socialist nations that are experimenting with free market 
solutions or infusions of private sector investment.344 
Reform measures are themselves limited. The 
lament of the Zambian Planning Minister is indicative of 
the problems faced, even after the imposition of 
western-styled reform measures: 
We have devalued our currency, we are cutting the 
public sector drastically, we are reducing 
subsidies. But I have a debt of $5 billion. Over 
50% of my export credits are going to service debts, 
not to pay it off~ only to service it ••• what am I 
supposed to do?34~ 
In sum, the Reagan administration is promoting 
private sector investment, on a continent that has, at 
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best, an underdeveloped indigenous private sector. While 
the President seeks to promote a greater role for the 
World Bank and other development banks to help offset 
tragically high debt rates, the administration also 
drastically cuts u.s. contributions to these funds. At a 
time of continent-wide crisis, Reagan seeks to force 
severe shrinkage in the public sector when the need to 
address the life-threatening vice of famine is at its most 
dangerous level. 
The Reagan administration also seeks to win 
concessions that amount to the African nations leaving 
themselves vulnerable to foreign imports, at the same time 
that it is trying to develop indigenous businesses and, 
especially, food production. The changes proposed are the 
very type of concessions that U.S. strategists hope to 
avoid in its trade relations with Japan. 
Without a hint of change under the u.s. 
Generalized System of Preference to accommodate a greater 
flow of imports from those Third World nations who are 
attempting economic reform, there can be little hope for 
expanded trade opportunities to better Africa's debt 
problems with the west. The intransigent of western 
nations have rendered deliberations under the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the 
Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
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virtually useless as forums to resolve debt and trade 
imbalances. 
At a time that African nations have taken very 
serious steps to alter economic policies to fit the 
demands of western governments and financial institutions, 
African countries have experienced substantial cuts in 
u.s. bilateral economic development aid. From an 
administration that is always sensitive to send the right 
"signal", the message that the Reagan administration is 
indeed sending is one which merely seeks to enhance the 
expand and advantages and options of the u.s. and the west 
in Africa. 
An important obstacle for Africans to provide for 
their own food needs has been their integration into the 
global development activities of the numerous 
international organizations. The proliferation of aid 
programs and the need by aid-recipient countries to 
coordinate their activities and personnel expends an 
inordinate amount of administrative hours by the recipient 
country on projects and programs whose history of 
effectiveness is not on par with expectations.346 
The application of assistance must be consistent 
with the perception of the needs of the region to be 
served, as developed by the people who themselves are 
products of the area. Donor assistance must therefore 
respect the indigenous culture and technologies that exist 
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and must seek ways of integrating changes into the 
activities of the local populations while respecting what 
is native to the recipients. 
iv. Environment 
In the African famines of the 1970s and the 1980s, 
the initial response by the world media has been an 
emphasis upon the environment as the primary culprit of 
this form of human tragedy. Bill Rau expresses the view 
that environmental degradation is the result of "economic 
and political factors which are designed to serve the 
interests of dominate groups inside the Sahel and without, 
i.e., donor nations."347 This may account for the lack of 
attention placed on correcting the degradation of Africa's 
environment. 
For every one tree planted, twenty-nine trees were 
felled due to the impact of human and natural causes.348 
Since 1965, drought in famine-stricken Sudan has 
contributed to a loss of twenty-five per cent of its 
forest cover.349 Environment technology such as agro-
forestry, mixed farming and low-input agriculture suffer 
from a lack of investment. 
The Sahel Development Program of which the U.S. is 
a contributor has faced ongoing attempts to eliminate its 
funding. The Reagan administration has been accused of 
appointing administrators with responsibility for the SOP, 
who have limited expertise for the positions in which they 
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are asked to serve, in an attempt to limit and reverse the 
effectiveness of the organization's work.350 u.s. 
financial contributions to the U.N. Environment Program 
have also declined during the Reagan tenure. 
If drought, deforestation, and 
desertification are indeed significant obstacles to 
development, then the question of international and 
indigenous investment becomes relevant. From between 1975 
and 1982, donor nations and affected countries have 
invested $160 million in forestry projects.351 Only 
25,000 hectares have been reforested.352 Mohammed 
El-Ashiry of the World Resources Institute strongly claims 
that environmental concerns are least prioritized in both 
the donor and the recipient, famine communities.353 
Though there have been numerous reports, congressional 
hearings and international forums, the money allocated for 
the purpose of correcting the advance of environmental 
decline is an example of the art of minimalism. 
With governments seeking to balance foreign debts 
and profits to be made from the harvesting of forests, 
concerns for the proper balance of the environment do not 
receive proper priority. What remains is for those who 
must ·live in the raped landscapes of Africa to survive as 








The investment of u.s. economic and political 
resources clearly reflect a bias towards those nations 
which embrace western prescriptions of governance, finance 
and geopolitical leanings. The extent that the Reagan 
administration so blatantly forfeited humanitarian 
responses that could have aided the lives of famine 
victims, brought into sharp relief the thrust of Reagan 
foreign policy. 
Despite the many programs that the u.s. has at its 
disposal to address the emergency crisis, African lives 
proved to be of secondary importance to geopolitical 
concerns. Though a number of glaring needs exist if 
African countries are to be able to prevent future famines 
and the decline of their environment, the increased 
emphasis by the u.s. on exports of military equipment and 
services has assumed priority under the Reagan 
administration. Though western modes of development have 
a history of serving western nations better than those 
they are intended to serve, African nations are facing 
declines in development dollars at the very time that 
alternative modes of development have been successfully 
attempted (e.g.-IFAD, African Development Foundation). 
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CONCLUSION 
By investigating causes of famine in Africa, and 
the u.s. response, there is an opportunity to identify 
specific areas of major importance that are within the 
grasp of people and governments to resolve. The tragedy 
of the African famine reveals a series of controllable 
human factors which have helped to forge famine conditions 
and have limited a response that is equal to the challenge 
of such devastation. The range of factors include: the 
inheritance of colonial governments, economic systems, and 
political boundaries: mammoth debt; disadvantages of trade 
with developed nations and anemic trade relations among 
African countries: militarization; warfare; deserti-
fication: and deforestation. The primary victims of this 
onslaught are the landless and the poor, mainly those live 
in rural communities. 
Food security must encompass an early-warning 
system of famine prevention, development of food producing 
and supporting sectors and an emergency response structure 
that is able to reach those people in the greatest threat 
of losing their lives. As shown in earlier chapters, the 
structure of u.s. food aid and development assistance 
prior to the arrival of the Reagan administration has not 
supported programs and projects which support the creation 
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of self-sustaining food security as defined by the newly 
independent countries of Africa and the world. 
u.s. food and development assistance are subject 
to the imprimatur of u.s. foreign policy. This 
consolidation of u.s. governmental authority is itself 
guided by the ideology of what constitutes the u.s. 
national interest. Melvin Gurtov writes that three 
elements constitute u.s. national interests: 
(1) America's domestic tranquility depends on 
security and structure abroad. 
(2) Security and stability abroad for the forces 
of freedom depend on America's willingness 
to carry out the mission and responsibilities 
entrusted to it. 
(3) Fulfillment of America's mission and security 
responsibilities depends on a willingness and 
ability to intervene in the domestic affairs 
of other Peoples.354 
At its root, the structure which defines U.S. 
national interests resists the claims of nationalism as 
expressed by foreign countries but claims for itself the 
basis for intervention on its own terms. As a nation with 
a wide variety of means to fulfill its policy options, the 
u.s. may choose to intervene in a nation's affairs via 
possibilities that are economic and political, as well as, 
military. The u.s. may also affect a nation's domestic 
and foreign policy agendas by demonstrating the national 
interest of the u.s. as the foundation for conflict and 
for the promotion of the U.S.: 
••• the American role leads American policy-makers 
to subordinate the aspirations and national self-
interests of other societies to those of the 
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United States, and to define them in terms that 
harmonize with American globalism.355 
The importance of u.s. national interests in 
defining emergency and development assistance is evident 
in the application of u.s. aid. Humanitarian assistance 
had been ill-defined and misapplied from its earlier 
construct. Proper humanitarian concern seeks to insure 
the survival of hunger victims without regard to political 
ideology or the fear of market competition. If this 
concern were indeed the salient feature, then the 
composition of u.s. foreign assistance would support 
attempts to meet basic food needs. From its inception, 
u.s. food and development policies and programs have 
subordinated support for those most affected/threatened by 
famine to buttress u.s. economic and strategic interests. 
The essential question that such foreign assistance has 
posed in the guidance of programs and projects is the 
extent that aid programs and projects advance u.s. 
economic gain, political strength and military advantage 
(vis-a-vis the Soviet Union) . 
The approach taken by the u.s. and its western 
European allies towards foreign assistance has been to 
control the manner of its distribution and the access to 
its potential benefits. Though these nations identify 
themselves as democracies, they have yet to democratize 
the development process to include greater participation 
by the recipient countries in the design and 
259 
implementation of development projects and programs, 
especially, the supposed object of their attentions, those 
in advanced stages of hunger, poverty and duress. 
By introducing political and security aims to a 
purely humanitarian effort, u.s. assistance has 
contributed heavily towards the strangulation of the 
African potential to evolve beyond its problems during its 
post-colonial period. The thrust of foreign assistance by 
the U.S. and its western allies cling to the primacy of a 
nation's vested self-interest. In this context, actions 
taken by the Reagan administration are consistent with how 
food assistance was first conceived and utilized, that is, 
as yet another tool of u.s. diplomacy. 
Actions taken by the Reagan administration have 
invested little in attacking major contributors to famine 
and hunger and have shown an ongoing reluctance to provide 
emergency food relief. In many respects, Reagan's foreign 
policy treatment of Africa has reflected his solutions to 
domestic hunger in the u.s. One, a reduction of u.s. 
governmental assistance, policy reform (creation of a 
better climate for foreign businesses), the promotion of 
'boot-strap' capitalism and the participation in 'free 
market' forces to resolve economic deficiencies. Two, a 
greater emphasis on militarization in the region, versus 
diplomatic recourse. In the former, attempts to reduce 
the u.s. government role both bilaterally and 
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multilaterally in matters of financial sponsorship of food 
security and development programs which are to be replaced 
by the promise of 'free enterprise.' Promises are cost-
effective; funds need not be committed. 
While touting the joys of the 'free market,' 
programs such as IFAD continued to be savaged by the 
Reagan administration, despite an approach that could 
easily be claimed by free market gurus. Though IFAD, ADF 
and similar micro-development programs are alternative 
approaches to development that do not require large budget 
outlays as the more traditional approaches of AID and the 
World Bank, there has not only been little enthusiasm from 
the Reagan camp but actual hostility toward the programs. 
These alternative development models which address the 
needs of some of the poorest of a society directly, are 
avoided by Reagan. 
Providing for an effective food security program 
has been viewed by many as endangering the food export 
market of the u.s. to African countries, thus threatening 
one of the major aims of the PL 480 program, the expansion 
of overseas markets for u.s. agricultural goods. At a 
time of mounting trade deficit and the decline of the U.S. 
farming industry, food self-sufficiency on the continent 
is an anathema to the so-called business interests of the 
u.s. 
Debt relief would reduce the pressure that the 
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u.s. can apply on a debtor nation to comply with desired 
policy interests. The effectiveness of the conditionality 
attached to loans is such that the u.s. is increasingly 
engaging in bilateral program efforts while affixing its 
own conditionalities that are much more in tune with 
Administration goals. With trade to Africa being to the 
advantage of the u.s., there has not been any internal 
interest in negotiating increased access to u.s. markets, 
nor to increase profit ratios for African commodities. 
This approach does not differ with past U.S. 
administrations which had not yielded to the logic of the 
call for a New International Economic Order or to 
discussions at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. From the administration's view, the 
traditional western approach towards Africa reigns, that 
is, as a sources of revenue to be derived from the import 
of cheap primary resources and the marketing of finished 
goods for export to Africa. 
The perceived loss of prestige overseas and a 
decline in self-esteem at home contributed to the creation 
of a more combative foreign posture. In international 
forums such as the U.N., the u.s. has been more aggressive 
in its anti-socialist, anti-Marxist rhetoric and has 
displayed an unwillingness to work cooperatively with 
adversarial nations on issues that are truly humanitarian. 
There has also been a desire to seek to confront, 
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militarily and diplomatically, those nations and organi-
zations that challenge perceived u.s. foreign policy aims 
and interests (Zimbabwe, SWAPO, ANC). 
Urged by its 'New Right' constituency, the Reagan 
administration has also engaged in several attempts to 
unseat Marxist/Socialist leaning governments (Angola, 
Ghana). The advantage in pursuing such tactics has been 
that with Africa's inability to coalesce effective 
external economic and military pressures. The u.s. is, 
therefore, immune from the possibility of punitive counter 
measures being employed by African countries. 
The U.S. does see potential in Africa being a 
fertile market for exports of u.s. military equipment. 
With the expansion of the sale of military goods to 
African nations, the potential for increased warfare by 
the governments upon their own citizens, as well as on 
neighboring countries, threatens and delays Africa's 
recovery from the onslaught of famine and hunger. There 
is also the threat of a diversion of funds from 
development and food sectors to pay for military growth, 
again endangering food security efforts. With the rise of 
the ESF, there is a greater prospect that aid will be 
directed to those nations that favor U.S. policies in the 
region, rather than to those in need. 
Evidence of the lack of esteem held for African 
life was further demonstrated by the prohibitions placed 
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on u.s. food exports to Zimbabwe and Mozambique during 
their famine. It is difficult to imagine what definition 
of humanitarian aid the Reagan administration declare its 
allegiance to people with such an obvious need. Despite 
the numerous political and economic tools that could have 
been used to voice u.s. government displeasure, Reagan 
chose food aid to make his point. The decision to 
eliminate all funding for the FAO at the height of the 
famine is also a clear message to anyone willing to 
interpret it, that the u.s. government is not particularly 
interested in saving the lives of Africans. By 
withdrawing food and development assistance during a time 
of famine, and subsidizing the availability of military 
assistance, the u.s. has taken broad measures to threaten 
the future survival of African people gripped by the 
prospect of starvation. 
Beyond the question of the priority given u.s. 
assistance to food security is the process which certifies 
nations for eligibility. As the deficit continues to 
grow and sectors of the u.s. economy continue to decline, 
there will be an even greater call for the u.s. to command 
its resources for the interests of the domestic economy. 
Development and food aid will be distributed to fewer 
countries and for fewer dollars. With the process that 
approves assistance closed from the scrutiny of the 
general public and the basis for approval further 
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politicized by the executive branch, decisions on the 
distribution of both emergency and long-term assistance 
will increasingly yield to political mandates rather than 
humanitarian intentions. 
Though from the onset, u.s. foreign assistance had 
contaminated the very concept of humanitarian aid and 
development assistance, the Reagan administration has 
seized upon these shortcomings in a manner that could only 
be described as ruthless. Emergency food assistance was 
calculated as only another budget item to be cut. Even 
among U.S. allies in Africa, apart from official u.s. 
antagonism with Ethiopia, emergency food assistance was 
slow in coming. The intentional delay in qualifying 
nations for emergency food shipments, providing needed 
transport for the distribution of food shipments, and the 
delay in distributing congressionally-approved funding, 
guaranteed the needless deaths of countless thousands of 
people, at the same time that the Reagan administration 
congratulated itself on the funding spent on emergency 
food relief, was one of the most bizarre actions taken by 
an American government. Without the incredible (though 
short-lived) response by the American people, it is 
doubtful that famine in Africa would have ever received 
its due attention by the u.s. government. 
With the movement towards a greater reliance on 
ESF as the mechanism to distribute bilateral foreign 
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assistance and as the retreat from multilateral to 
bilateral accounts further politicizes development 
financing, aid from the u.s. will only further demand a 
quid pro quo relationship with the recipient nation. Add 
to this schemata the overtones of racism in the 
president's dealings with African countries, and it would 
appear that Africans are only able to attract attention 
from the u.s. while dying in massive numbers from famine 
or in demonstrating a willingness to kill one another with 
weapons of foreign purchase. 
There are many advocates on both the political 
left (Susan George, Frances Moore Lappe') and the right 
(Heritage Foundation) who would argue for greatly reduced 
foreign assistance from all nations and development 
institutions. Susan George recommends the reduction of 
all aid to only 15% of current levels, with that being 
directed towards emergency food assistance.356 However, 
this call for the virtual cessation of aid would be 
devastating to those nations which are the current 
recipients, without major adjustments to the debt crisis 
and trade imbalances so common among African nations. 
There is a need for investment capital which would 
be prioritized towards developing sectors of Africa's food 
production and distribution sectors. Transportation 
routes linking rural markets, even across national 
boundaries, are also vitally needed. Regional common 
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markets, though without past successes, are an integral 
part of Africa's future needs. The emphasis of this 
approach must be wholly inclusive of the rural poor and 
landless, integrating communities of people into a 
development process which addresses domestic needs. 
The picture of Africa as hapless victim undermines 
the heroic efforts by African people to respond to the 
urgent demands that the famine crisis has made upon them. 
on a governmental level, the special Session of the U.N. 
in May, 1986 was significant as the continent identified 
areas of priority and commitment, as well as, areas of 
error on the part of its governments. 
The Southern Africa Development Coordinating 
Conference (SADCC) predated its famines of the 1980s and 
continues to lay the foundation for a regional coopera-
tion, despite the reality of warfare and economic 
disruption coordinated by South Africa. The framework of 
the Lagos Pl~n of Action also provides a basis upon which 
Africans have come together to plan their future out of 
despair. 
By understanding that u.s. emergency and 
development assistance is guided by u.s. foreign policy, 
the inability of u.s.-initiated programs to efficiently 
and effectively identify and respond to the substantive 
needs of those most vulnerable to famine (and other) 
disasters, is no longer surprising. The Reagan 
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administration can only be faulted for not being more 
blatant in its view of development and emergency 
assistance as yet another tool of u.s. foreign policy 
aims. From the perspective of the Reagan administration, 
the African famine produced still another opportunity to 
seek revenge upon nations that have not been entirely 
supportive of u.s. foreign policies, particularly, in 
international forums. 
For those nations which claimed themselves to be 
socialist, or which counted the Soviet Union as their 
ally, the opportunity of famine and droughts gave the 
Reagan administration the exposure to compare the 
ineffectiveness of these modes of governance, as opposed 
to capitalist forms. The crucial omission of transport 
assistance in administration proposals demonstrated the 
tensions between military needs and assessments versus 
those requirements for effective disaster relief. Upon 
examining the limited amounts and variety of assistance 
proposed by the Reagan administration during the famine, 
it is evident that even those who claim to be allies of 
the u.s. were of less significance as consumers of food 
than as military personnel. Africans, no matter what 
their political or economic bias, are not of a very high 
priority as people to those manage and design u.s. foreign 
policy. 
The effectiveness of AID as the prime respondent 
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to development and emergency efforts must also be 
questioned. u.s. assistance programs still reflect a 
national interest which seeks to limit development funding 
or emergency relief unless it is in the orbit of u.s. 
priorities of economic, political or military needs. 
There is ample evidence to demonstrate that even when 
effective, cost-saving development and disaster programs 
do exist, there is a tendency for them to be underfunded. 
The direction of u.s. assistance towards bilateral 
activities gives witness to the dominance of u.s. 
political priorities over humanitarian needs. 
The extent that u.s. foreign food and development 
assistance is inconsistent in addressing the causes of 
African famines is not due to a lack of awareness of the 
causes of such devastation. This lack of policy cohesion 
is because of the very intimacy of knowledge that the u.s. 
has over the causes of food crisis as has been witnessed 
in the earlier part of the 1980s. When faced with the 
choice of ending its support of UNITA and South Africa in 
Angola, erasing the debt owed by Africa to public and 
private u.s. institutions, reducing trade barriers to 
promote African exports to the u.s., such remedies are not 
viewed as serious considerations. 
Africa is more than a continent of nations, 
governments and development planning, Africa is its 
people. Though there are refugee camps across the region 
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of the Horn and in southern Africa, it is its people who 
are sheltering the victims of famine and war. Without the 
benevolence of the African people themselves, relief 
operations would be overwhelmed. 
It is also the sacrifices of the victims 
themselves that call for special commendation. Harry 
Belafonte, who as the appointed good will ambassador to 
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), spoke before 
Congress and offered one example of such support and 
dignity: 
There was one occasion when there wasn't enough to 
feed thousands of drought victims. When the food 
ran out, the 30,000 who had not received anything 
turned their backs en masse to spare the sated 
10,000 any embarrassment.357 
In a nation where people have been killed while fighting 
over who gets which portion of a Thanksgiving turkey, or 
over the order in line of an individual's car who is 
receiving gas (during the sharp rise in gas prices during 
the early 1970's), it is almost inconceivable that this 
same level of cooperation and dignity would readily be 
found available in the u.s. under similar circumstances. 
Those who have been victimized by famine should be 
the primary emphasis in u.s. planning and implementation 
of foreign assistance, even under the conservative 
administration of Ronald Reagan. 
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